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Abstract 
The link between distorted thinking and anxiety in children and adolescents has 
long been established; however, there have been few studies which address 
gender differences or the effect of age on anxiety and cognition. The major aims 
of the thesis are to investigate age (via grade) and gender differences in the 
anxiety-induced cognitive output of children and adolescents, and to assess the 
effect of positive statements, coping statements and threat statements on state 
anxiety. To this end, a number of hypotheses are explored involving children 
from different grade levels in a series of four experiments. First it is 
hypothesised that there will be increases in the number of anxiety-induced 
cognitions as grade increases. Second, females will report significantly more 
coping and threat statements and significantly less positive statements. Third, 
that trait anxiety will be significantly positively correlated with coping and threat 
statements, and in addition, the relationship between positive cognitions and 
anxiety will be explored. Fourth it is hypothesised that those presented with 
positive statements will report significantly less state anxiety than those 
presented with coping or threat statements. 
It has been demonstrated that there are developmental changes in the 
presentation and intensity of children's fears, and previous research in the area 
has not controlled for these differences in selecting stimuli items to induce 
anxiety. Experiment 1 selected three fear items to be used to induce anxiety in 
later experiments which control for age differences. The Fear Survey Schedule 
for Children-II (FSSC-II; Gullone & King, 1992a) and the State Trait Anxiety 
Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, 1983) or the State Trait Anxiety Inventory for 
Children (STAIC; Spielberger 1973) were administered to 311 children from 
grades 3, 4, 5, 7 and 10. The selected items did not display significant effects of 
grade, were significantly positively correlated with trait anxiety and they were 
reported with notable levels of fear. It was not possible to select items that did 
not show gender differences because the majority of items were feared 
significantly more by females. The final selected items were 'having no friends', 
'having an operation' and 'sharks'. 
The second experiment developed these items into imagery scenarios which 
were presented to 121 children in grades 3, 5, 7 and 10. Resultant cognitions 
were measured using the think-aloud method, and state anxiety was assessed. 
Trait anxiety was also measured using the STAI or STAIC and the Revised 
Children's Manifest Anxiety Scale (RCMAS; Reynolds & Richmond, 1985). The 
scenarios induced equivalent levels of state anxiety across the grades, thus 
providing an adequate basis for comparing reported cognitions across the 
grades. Females reported significantly higher levels of state anxiety in response 
to the 'having no friends' and 'having an operation' scenarios. While internal 
threat statements, external threat statements, coping statements and positive 
statements were evident across all grades, there was no evidence to suggest that 
the levels of these cognitions varied across the grades. Coping statements and 
threat statements were positively correlated with measures of anxiety. It was 
noted that threat cognitions were reported at the highest rates, and positive 
statements at the lowest rates. Coping statements varied the most between 
scenarios, and this probably reflects the level of control that the individual has 
over the imagined situation. 
In experiment 3 cognitions selected from experiment 2 were used to develop four 
different conditions of the operation scenario. Each of the four conditions of the 
operation scenario contained one of the four categories of self talk investigated in 
experiment 2, and these were presented to a total of 311 participants in grades 3, 
5, 7 and 10. Reported cognitions were measured on a checklist which consisted 
of the cognitions contained in each of the four conditions. It was hypothesised 
that those given the positive statements condition would report significantly 
lower levels of state anxiety than those given the other three conditions. Results 
supported this hypothesis. It was noted that females displayed greater reactivity 
to the scenarios in all cases, evidenced by significantly higher induced levels of 
state anxiety despite equivalent levels of baseline state anxiety. State anxiety did 
not remain consistent across the grades, but increased in grade 5, representing an 
inverted 'U' developmental pattern. Levels of reported cognitions were 
consistent with the imagery condition which had been presented to participants. 
Reported cognitions also displayed an inverted 'U' developmental pattern, with 
participants in grade 5 reporting higher levels of anxiety-related cognitions than 
those in other grades. Coping and threat statements correlated positively with 
both state and trait anxiety. Positive statements were negatively correlated with 
state anxiety but not trait anxiety. 
The final experiment aimed to replicate the findings of experiment 3 and to 
generalise these findings to the friends and shark scenarios. This experiment 
indicates that while those given the positive statements condition did report 
significantly less state anxiety than those given the other conditions, this effect 
iv 
was limited to grade 3 participants, demonstrating that the positive statements 
were only effective in reducing state anxiety with this younger group of 
participants. There was no evidence of the inverted 'U' developmental profile of 
state anxiety. There was no consistent developmental pattern associated with 
reported cognitions, however reported cognitions were consistent with 
presentation condition as in experiment 3. The finding of greater reactivity to the 
anxiety-inducing scenarios by females was replicated in this experiment. 
This investigation suggests there are few consistent developmental trends related 
to reported cognition, but that threat statements, coping statements and positive 
statements are all implicated in anxiety at some level. While the role of positive 
statements in trait anxiety is limited there is evidence to suggest that positive 
statements reduce state anxiety and the effect is more pronounced in grade 3 
participants. Although there were no differences in baseline state anxiety, 
females consistently reported higher levels of state anxiety in response to the 
scenarios. The theoretical and methodological implications of these findings are 
considered. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Anxiety is one of the most common psychological conditions experienced by 
children. Anxiety has been found in 21% of children based on self report 
(Kashani, Orvaschel, Rosenberg, & Reid, 1989). Anxiety is a multifaceted 
condition with symptoms found in the affective, physiological, behavioural and 
cognitive domains. Psychologists are beginning to recognise the importance of 
the cognitive aspects of anxiety, and this is reflected by the inclusion of worry as 
one of the central diagnostic criteria for generalised anxiety disorder in the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (fourth edition, 1994) 
(DSM-IV). Cognition, self talk or internal speech are all terms referring to the 
dialogue which individuals continually carry on in their own minds. To measure 
such activity is one challenge, to understand it is to begin to uncover one of the 
central aspects of the human condition. The cognitive aspects of anxiety in 
children are only beginning to be understood. 
The study of any psychological condition in children must take into account the 
basic nature of children: That they are not a homogenous group and they are a 
group which is constantly changing and becoming more complex on the journey 
into adulthood. Research clearly demonstrates that there are significant changes 
in the fears of children as they grow older (e.g., Gullone & King, 1992b; 011endick 
& King, 1991). Anxiety and fear are closely related, and yet there have been few 
studies which attempt to take into account the role of age in anxiety and 
cognition in children. Likewise for gender. Research has shown that females are 
more likely to report higher levels of anxiety than males, and yet has failed to 
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address directly gender differences in cognition. The thesis investigates anxiety 
and cognition in children with particular reference to age and gender. 
The role of cognition in childhood anxiety has been investigated since the 1980's 
(e.g., Fox, Houston, & Pittner, 1983; Houston, Fox, & Forbes, 1984; Zatz & 
Chassin, 1983, 1985). Many of the studies of this era used test situations as a 
means of inducing anxiety for the investigation of cognitive activity. It was one 
of the few ways in which anxiety could be induced in an ethically acceptable 
manner. Other studies used situations like jumping off a diving board (Prins, 
1986), or required children to report what they would think in given situations 
such as giving a talk in front of the class (e.g., Brown, O'Keeffe, Sanders, & Baker, 
1986). What these studies all had in common was that they paid no heed to the 
fact that children's fears of different situations vary as a function of age. For 
example, research shows that talking in front of the class would be considered a 
socially demanding situation, and situations such as these are more commonly 
feared in older children than young children (Gullone & King, 1992b). So, it is 
likely that the cognitive responses of children to such situations will also vary as 
a function of their fear of the situation. Findings from studies such as these are 
therefore limited in their applicability to different age groups. Studies are 
needed that choose stimuli which control for these age variations in fear. 
It was noted earlier that many studies use test situations to induce anxiety. The 
research findings regarding anxiety-related cognitions in children are therefore 
biased toward such a context. It is not clear how easily the findings relating to 
test anxiety can be generalised to different situations. Much of this early research 
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suggests that coping thoughts are commonly reported in children experiencing 
test anxiety (Prins, Groot, & Hanewald, 1994; Zatz & Chassin, 1985). It is likely 
that coping thoughts are an appropriate response to test anxiety, as they help the 
individual to deal with the situation. A situation where active coping is not 
required however, such as going to the dentist, may not promote such coping 
thoughts. Research in this area would be well served by broadening its scope 
and including research into a wider range of anxiety-inducing situations. One of 
the problems with broadening the range of anxiety-inducing situations in 
research is that there are considerable ethical problems with exposing children to 
in vivo anxiety-inducing situations. Davison, Robins, and Johnson, (1983) and 
later Davison, Navarre, and Vogel (1995) induced anxiety in adults using 
imagery. This method has not been applied to children; however, imagery has 
been found to induce anxiety responses in children in related studies (Hermecz 
& Melamed, 1984). Such a method opens up a range of opportunities for 
inducing anxiety in children and adolescents. 
The thesis reports an investigation of anxiety and cognition in children with 
particular reference to the influences of age and gender. In this investigation 
imagery is used to induce anxiety in a range of situations which have not been 
included in past studies. 
3 
Chapter 2: An Overview of Anxiety in Children 
Anxiety is a psychological condition experienced at the affective, behavioural, 
physiological, and cognitive levels. It is commonly understood to entail fearful 
affect, avoidant behaviour, increased physiological responsiveness and 
threatening cognitions. This chapter will cover issues in the diagnosis of anxiety 
in children, followed by presentation of a theoretical background to 
understanding anxiety, which emphasises the role of negative affectivity in 
anxiety. Issues such as the relationship between anxiety and fear, and the 
relationship of anxiety with depression and self esteem will also be considered. 
This information will serve as a background for the discussion of the cognitive 
aspects of anxiety which will be covered in the following chapter. 
Anxiety as a diagnosable condition 
Anxiety in both children and adults is traditionally understood in terms of 
distinct diagnostic categories. The most common anxiety disorders diagnosed in 
children include separation anxiety disorder, specific phobias, social phobia, 
obsessive compulsive disorder, post traumatic stress disorder, acute stress 
disorder, and generalised anxiety disorder (formerly overanxious disorder of 
childhood) (DSM-IV, 1994). Prevalence rates for specific amdety disorders vary, 
but it is believed that separation anxiety disorder alone reaches a prevalence rate 
of 4% in children and adolescents (DSM-IV, 1994). Specific anxiety disorders can 
also vary in prevalence as a function of age. For example, the onset of separation 
anxiety disorder is more common in middle childhood, while specific phobias of 
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animals tend to be most common in early childhood (DSM-IV, 1994). Gender 
also plays an important role in the anxiety disorders. Separation anxiety 
disorder, social phobia, specific phobia and generalised anxiety disorder are 
more common in females than males, while obsessive compulsive disorder is 
equally represented in males and females (DSM-IV, 1994). 
Although such a diagnostic classification system has been in common use in 
diagnosing specific anxiety disorders in children for some time now (including 
previous editions of the DSM), there have been difficulties with the system. 
Lucas (1993) suggested that there is considerable diagnostic overlap between the 
various types of anxiety disorders. Clark and Watson (1991) argued that there is 
sufficient evidence to support the inclusion of a mixed anxiety/depression 
category within such a diagnostic system, because of the overlap between these 
two conditions. Lucas (1993) also argued that the impact of developmental 
factors has not been adequately integrated into the DSM diagnostic system, so it 
may have limited validity in assessing anxiety disorders across the age range in 
children. 
Kashani, Orvaschel, Rosenberg, and Reid (1989) assessed various categories of 
psychopathology in a community sample of children and found anxiety to be the 
most frequently reported category, reaching 21% based on child-report and 
14.1% based on parent-report. Separation anxiety symptoms decreased with age, 
while some specific fears, including social embarrassment, increased with age. 
These results suggest that while the level of anxiety remains relatively 
unchanged across the age range, there are age-related differences in various 
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categories of anxiety. Kashani et al. (1989) reported that the focus of anxiety 
changes from the family in early and middle childhood to social situations and 
peer relations as children reach adolescence. Males showed lower levels of 
anxiety symptoms than females, although the two groups showed similar 
patterns of anxiety over time. Females in Kashani et al.'s (1989) study showed an 
increase in concerns regarding their own adequacy as they increased in age. 
Girls also reported greater levels of panic disorder symptomatology, separation 
disorder symptomatology, and specific phobia (Muris, Merckelbach, Mayer, & 
Meesters, 1998). These results support the argument that gender and 
developmental factors play an important role in the anxiety symptoms of 
children (Lucas, 1993) and that consideration should be given to age and gender 
when researching anxiety in children. 
State and trait anxiety 
Theoretically, anxiety is viewed as a condition which is manifested at the trait 
and state level (Cattell & Scheier 1961; Spielberger, 1966). Trait anxiety refers to 
the enduring personality trait of anxiety, which predisposes a person to view the 
world and react in a predictable manner (Spielberger, 1983). Watson and Clark 
(1984) suggested that trait anxiety can be conceptualised as a manifestation of 
negative affectivity. They argued that those with a high negative affectivity 
disposition experience negative emotional states such as worry, tension and 
nervousness, and are likely to be distressed, upset and have lower self esteem 
while those with a low negative affectivity disposition are likely to feel calm and 
relaxed. In addition, and perhaps more importantly, they argued that negative 
6 
affectivity is unrelated to the experience of positive emotions, so an individual 
high in negative affectivity can still experience positive emotions such as joy and 
excitement. Their argument suggested that anxiety is related to high negative 
affectivity, but unrelated to positive affectivity. They described positive 
affectivity as the tendency to feel either active, excited, alert, enthusiastic and 
strong or fatigued, sluggish and drowsy (Clark & Watson, 1991; Watson & Clark, 
1984). Issues related to anxiety and positive affectivity will be addressed in more 
detail later. 
Spielberger (1983) reported that individuals who are high in trait anxiety are 
more likely to respond with greater increases in state anxiety where the threat 
involves interpersonal relationships and threat to self esteem while, they are less 
likely to respond in this way to physical dangers (Hodges & Spielberger, 1966) or 
imminent surgery (Auerbach, 1973; Martinez-Urrutia, 1975). Hodges and 
Spielberger (1966) measured heart rate (as an indicator of state anxiety) in 
response to the threat of shock, and reported no interaction between trait anxiety 
level and measurement time (that is, before and after threat of shock). These 
findings suggest that state anxiety is not differentially affected by trait anxiety 
level. Auerbach (1973) reported that while state anxiety scores both pre- and 
post-operatively were higher for high trait anxious individuals, state anxiety is 
not differentially affected by the individual's level of trait anxiety. Similarly, 
Martinez-Urrutia (1975) reported no difference in the magnitude of participants' 
state anxiety response as a function of trait anxiety level. It is important that the 
relationship between state anxiety and trait anxiety is investigated, to establish 
whether children of high trait anxiety display differentially high state anxiety. 
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Houston, Fox, and Forbes (1984) investigated state anxiety in a test situation, but 
did not find the predicted differential increase in high trait anxious children's 
state anxiety. This may be because they took initial measures of state anxiety 
during an anticipation period rather than at baseline. Interestingly, Houston et 
al. (1984) reported that the performance of high trait anxious but not low trait 
anxious children is affected by the manipulated level of stress. This research is 
consistent with the research on self-esteem and anxiety to be discussed later in 
this chapter, which suggests that interpersonal factors play a crucial role in 
anxiety. For example, Matthews and Odom (1989) reported that state anxiety 
was more highly correlated with self esteem than trait anxiety. This research is 
also consistent with the work of Friedman, Campbell, and Okifuji (1991), who 
reported that fear of failure and criticism was the best predictor of self reports of 
anxiety symptoms in children aged between 6 and 11 years of age. 
State anxiety refers to a transitory anxiety state or reaction to certain stimuli. 
Spielberger (1983) argued that the stronger the trait anxiety of an individual, the 
more likely he or she is to experience intense elevations in response to a 
threatening situation. So greater levels of trait anxiety increase an individual's 
susceptibility to higher levels of state anxiety. The most common measure of 
state anxiety is Spielberger's (1983) State Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) and the 
parallel children's version, the State Trait Anxiety Inventory for Children (STAIC; 
Spielberger, 1973). Watson and Clark (1984) suggested that an individual high in 
negative affectivity will be more likely to experience elevations in transient or 
state negative affectivity at all times, regardless of whether there is a direct threat 
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at the time. They investigated the construction of the STAI state scale, and 
reported that state anxiety is not a pure measure of transient negative affectivity, 
but measures a more general happiness/ unhappiness dimension, and is related 
to pure measures of both positive affect and negative affect. They explained that 
this is confirmed by the construction of the state anxiety scale which includes 
items which may be seen to reflect both negative affectivity (for example, jittery, 
nervous and upset as well as relaxed and calm) and more general happiness/ 
unhappiness items (for example, joyful and content as well as regretful). 
A number of researchers have investigated the STAIC using a factor analytic 
approach. Papay and Hedl (1978) administered the STAIC to 1522 grade 3 and 4 
children and reported a three factor solution. This solution consisted of a trait 
anxiety factor, and two state anxiety factors, which they name 'anxiety absent' 
and 'anxiety present'. Similarly, Dorr (1981) reported the same factor structure 
with the STAIC administered to 644 grade 5 and 6 students. Cross and Huberty 
(1993) developed this line of research further in a more recent study, which 
assessed the factor structure of the STAIC using principal components analysis 
on data from 541 grade 7 and 8 children. They found the same factor structure as 
the earlier studies (Don, 1981; Papay & Hedl, 1978), but the authors in this study 
choose to call the two state factors 'state unhappiness' and 'state distress', which 
correspond to the positively and negatively valenced items of the state anxiety 
scale. 
The findings of Cross and Huberty (1993) and others (Don, 1981; Papay & Hedl 
1978) reveal that there are two independent factors within the state scale of the 
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STAIC. These two factors consist of the positive and negative items on the state 
scale. The results of these studies appear inconsistent with Watson and Clark's 
(1984) explanation of the construction of the STAI state scale. Watson and Clark 
(1984) argue that items such as 'tense' and 'calm' both reflect negative affectivity, 
while items such as 'happy', and 'pleasant' both measure a general unhappiness 
construct. The factor analytic studies are not consistent with these conceptions of 
positive affectivity and negative affectivity. 
Cross and Huberty (1993) further investigated the relationships between the 
three factors of the STAIC. Correlational analyses revealed that trait anxiety (or 
negative affectivity) was more highly correlated with state distress than with 
state unhappiness, and the highest correlation (r=+0.49) was found between state 
unhappiness and state distress. A regression analysis of state unhappiness and 
state distress revealed that there was little relationship until unhappiness 
increased beyond its mean, and then the slope of state distress increased rapidly, 
suggesting that the factors are not independent of each other at higher levels of 
unhappiness. The important conclusion here is that state anxiety is a bi-
dimensional measure, and that the relationship between the two measures is not 
completely linear. Research into anxiety in children and adults does not appear 
to take this into account when measuring state anxiety. As discussed in the 
following chapters, many researchers have used the state scales of the STAI and 
STAIC as a pure measure of state negative affectivity. 
Another important consideration in understanding the utility of the STAIC in 
children is that state anxiety may be differentially affected by stressors at 
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different ages. Reed, Carter, and Miller (1992) pointed out that there are many 
age specific fears which will impact on children's experience of state anxiety 
which will be addressed more fully later in this chapter. Researchers do not 
appear to have addressed adequately the issue of differences in the magnitude of 
state anxiety according to qualitatively different threatening situations. It is 
therefore important that investigations of state and trait anxiety in children use 
stimuli that are not age specific, as age specific stimuli may simply reflect natural 
age-related fluctuations in state anxiety. 
In sum, anxiety can be understood as a condition manifested at the state and trait 
level. Trait anxiety is characterised by high levels of negative affect, but is 
unrelated to positive affect. Anxiety is further characterised by elevated 
physiological arousal. Anxiety can be differentiated from depression on the basis 
of these factors. Depression is also characterised by high negative affectivity, but 
also includes low levels of positive affectivity. State anxiety is usually measured 
by the STAIC and STAI state anxiety scale, which includes positive and negative 
items which consistently fall into two separate factors (Cross & Huberty, 1993; 
Dorr, 1981; Papay & Hedl, 1978). Watson and Clark (1984) suggest that the items 
of the STAI state anxiety scale do fall into positive affect and negative affect 
items, but their description of this breakdown does not fit with the factor analytic 
studies. It is possible that these factors represent positive and negative affectivity 
respectively, but this has not been empirically tested. 
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The differentiation between anxiety and depression 
There has been debate over whether anxiety and depression are completely 
distinct syndromes, or whether they represent different presentations of the one 
underlying trait, referred to as neuroticism, general psychological distress, 
internalising disorder (Brady & Kendall, 1992) or negative affectivity (Watson & 
Clark, 1984). As previously discussed, negative affectivity is described by 
Watson and Clark (1984) as a stable trait which predisposes people to experience 
discomfort across the whole range of times and situations, even in the absence of 
a stressor. People with high negative affectivity also tend towards negative 
introspection and world view. Clark and Watson (1991) proposed a tripartite 
model of anxiety and depression, which states that both anxiety and depression 
are characterised by high levels of negative affectivity, but that depression is 
additionally characterised by the absence of positive affectivity (or anhedonia), 
and anxiety is additionally characterised by physiological hyper-arousal. 
Angold and Costello (1993) reviewed epidemiological studies of co-morbidity of 
depression and anxiety disorders in children. Their findings reveal that co-
morbidity of these two disorders ranges from 30% to 75%. They also report that 
anxiety is more common in depressed than non-depressed individuals. Kovacs, 
Gatsonis, Paulauskas, and Richards (1989) reported that 41% of 104 children 
referred to a psychiatric clinic received a diagnosis of both anxiety and 
depression. They reported that a secondary diagnosis of anxiety was more likely 
in those children with a diagnosis of major depression or dysthymic disorder 
rather than adjustment disorder with depressed mood. They also suggested that 
anxiety disorders in depressed children are likely to be more common than they 
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are in the general population. In an investigation of co-morbidity of anxiety and 
depression in children, Strauss, Last, Hersen, and Kazdin (1988) reported that 
28% of those children receiving a DSM-III diagnosis of anxiety also displayed 
major depression. This group of children with both disorders was older and 
displayed more severe anxiety symptomatology. 
Joiner and Blalock (1995) addressed the issue of gender differences in depression 
according to Clark and Watson's (1991) tripartite model of anxiety and 
depression. Joiner and Blalock (1995) suggested that differences in the rates of 
diagnosis are related to levels of positive affect. Groups given a diagnosis of 
specific depression (characterised by anhedonia, few or no symptoms of 
physiological arousal and high negative affectivity), specific anxiety 
(characterised by no indication of anhedonia, but elevated levels of physiological 
arousal and negative affectivity), co-morbid depression and anxiety 
(characterised by elevated anhedonia, physiological arousal and negative 
affectivity), and mixed anxiety-depression (characterised by elevated negative 
affectivity without indication of elevated physiological arousal or anhedonia) 
were investigated. The study reported that co-morbid anxiety and depression 
and mixed anxiety-depression were more common in women than men, but that 
specific anxiety and depression were equally common in men and women. 
Self report measures are probably the most common means of anxiety symptom 
assessment in children. While there can be difficulties in using self report data, as 
Crowley and Emerson (1996) point out, assessment of a child's internal states by 
an external observer must be limited, so self report is the only way in which to 
13 
measure children's experiences of anxiety. Self report measures are also a quick 
and convenient means of assessing these internal states. However, there are 
problems with the use of such measures. Research has repeatedly shown that 
self report measures of anxiety and depression in children lack discriminant 
validity because of the very high correlations between the two types of measures 
(Eason, Finch, Brasted, & Saylor, 1985; 011endick & Yule, 1990; Stark, Humphrey, 
Laurent, Livingstone, & Christopher, 1993; Strauss et al., 1988; Tannenbaum, 
Forehand, & McCombs, 1992; Wolfe, Finch, Saylor, Blount, Pallmeyer, & Carek, 
1987). 
Brady and Kendall (1992) reported that the three most widely used self report 
measures .used in research into anxiety and depression in children are the 
Revised Children's Manifest Anxiety Scale (RCMAS; Reynolds & Richmond, 
1985), the STAIC and the Children's Depression Inventory (CDI; Kovacs, 1992). 
The relationship between anxiety and depression in a non-clinical adolescent 
sample using the RCMAS and the CDI was assessed by Tannenbaum et al. 
(1992). Their results showed that the two measures were highly correlated. 
Tannenbaum et al. (1992) suggested that the measures must therefore be tapping 
the same construct, so only one of the measures was needed to gain a realistic 
measure of this construct, namely negative affectivity. Similarly, Strauss et al. 
(1988) reported that of 106 children attending an outpatient child and adolescent 
anxiety clinic, those diagnosed with anxiety did not significantly differ from a 
psychiatric control group on self report measures of trait anxiety (STAIC) or 
depression (CDI). However, anxious children did report significantly higher state 
anxiety (STAIC) than controls. Wolfe et al. (1987) assessed anxiety and 
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depression with both self report and teacher report and found further evidence to 
support the existence of a single construct reflecting internalising disorder. 
The question remains whether self report measures are capable of tapping the 
differences between anxiety and depression. One of the problems with self-
report measures is that there is significant item overlap between measures of 
anxiety and depression for children. As Brady and Kendall (1992) point out, the 
RCMAS, STAIC and CDI all have items relating to 'making up my mind', and 
'having trouble falling asleep'. The CDI and RCMAS have items relating to 
'worry about bad things happening to me', 'feeling alone' and 'being tired a lot'. 
When omitting overlapping items from the CDI and RCMAS, the shared variance 
between these two measures is reduced by between 12% and 14%; however it is 
not clear how this affects the discriminant validity of the two scales (Cole, 
Truglio, & Peeke, 1997). A study by Inderbitzen and Hope (1995) demonstrated 
that the CDI was more highly correlated with the RCMAS than with the Social 
Anxiety Scale for Children -Revised (La Greca, 1991). They suggested that this 
was due to the shared content between the CDI and the RCMAS which primarily 
assess negative affectivity. The study also examined the overlap in students with 
high scores on the measures. All of the students with high scores on the RCMAS 
reported high scores on the CDI, while only 17% of the students had high scores 
on both the social anxiety measure and the CDI. 
Most studies assessing the relationship between self report measures of anxiety 
and depression use total scores in their investigation as opposed to factor scores 
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or scales. Research employing total scores along with individual scale scores 
tends to provide greater evidence of a dual model of anxiety and depression. 
Mattison, Bagnato, and Brubaker (1988) reported that the Worry/Oversensitivity 
scale of the RCMAS significantly distinguished a group of anxiety disordered 
children from a psychiatric control group, and that the Worry/Oversensitivity 
scale showed the highest mean T-score for the anxiety group. Lonigan, Carey, 
and Finch (1994) addressed the individual scales of the CDI and the RCMAS 
using 233 in-patient children with a diagnosis of either depression or anxiety. 
They reported that when controlling for the general distress elements using the 
depressed affect scale of the CDI, the anxious group scored more highly on the 
RCMAS total and RCMAS Worry/Oversensitivity scale than a depressed group. 
They concluded that Worry/Oversensitivity represents the purest anxiety factor 
in the RCMAS. Their study suggests that depression and anxiety can be 
discriminated using self report measures, but the use of total scores on the 
RCMAS and CDI does not effectively discriminate between the two conditions. 
In a more recent investigation, Crowley and Emerson (1996) employed 
confirmatory factor analysis on the CDI, RCMAS, STAIC trait scale with 273 
school children aged between 8 and 12 years. Results were more supportive of a 
two factor model, than a one factor model, suggesting that self report measures 
and their scales do help to delineate between anxiety and depression. This study 
did not elucidate those scores or subscale scores which clearly differentiate 
between anxiety and depression. 
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Developmental changes in the manifestations of depression and anxiety are also 
likely. Craighead (1991) suggested that the existence of depression as a separate 
condition after puberty was quite clear. Cole et al. (1997) provided support for 
this in their study using self-report, teacher, parent and peer ratings of anxiety 
and depression. Cole et al.'s (1997) results of this study supported a tripartite 
model of anxiety and depression, but this was only evident in the sixth grade 
children. Data from grade 3 children revealed that depression and anxiety were 
virtually indistinguishable, which supports a unified model of anxiety and 
depression in children. They concluded that research into psychopathology in 
children should be aware of such developmental differences. 
This section has considered issues in the differentiation between depression and 
anxiety mainly through the use of self report measures. To summarise, self report 
measures of trait anxiety such as the RCMAS and STAIC are not pure measures 
of trait anxiety, but measure negative affectivity, which is one of the components 
of trait anxiety, but also one of the components of depression. Most studies of 
anxiety employ these scales as measures of trait anxiety, so it is important to keep 
in mind that negative affectivity is also a part of depression. Such instruments 
may have the ability to discriminate between anxiety and depression when 
individual scales such as the Worry/Oversensitivity scale of the RCMAS are 
employed. If discriminant power is necessary, as it may be in cases where 
diagnosis is important, this may be improved by deleting items which are 
represented on both anxiety and depression inventories (Cole et al., 1997). 
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The relationship between anxiety and fear 
An understanding of the nature of the terms 'fear and 'anxiety' is essential to 
understanding the relationship between these two emotional states. Both fear 
and anxiety are subjective aversive experiences. Kashani, Dandoy, and Orvaschel 
(1991) described fear as a reaction to a specific object or situation, and anxiety as 
non-specific, diffuse and anticipatory in nature. King (1988) added that anxiety 
is an aversive or unpleasant emotional state which involves subjective 
apprehension and diffuse physiological arousal. Reed et al. (1992) also pointed 
out that fear disappears with the withdrawal of the feared object. The most 
pertinent point is that fear is a response to a specific stimulus, where anxiety is a 
more diffuse response, which can occur in the absence of a specific stimulus. 
Fear can be seen as a component of anxiety, but can also exist in isolation, as a 
natural protective response to a threatening object or situation. Watson and 
Clark (1984) argued that although measures of negative affectivity and fear are 
positively correlated (typically at around 0.40) and share some common variance, 
they are clearly not measures of the same construct. 
Fear is commonly assessed via self report using a fear list such as the Fear Survey 
Schedule for Children - II (FSSC-II; Gullone & King 1992a), which requires 
children to report their level of fear in response to 78 different items. (Fear is also 
measured using the earlier versions of this checklist like the FSSC-R; 011endick, 
1983, or the FSSC; Scherer & Nakamura, 1968.) The FSSC-II does not measure the 
extent of fearful responding in everyday life, but merely the extent of negative 
affective response to the thought of the occurrence of the event (McCathie & 
Spence, 1991). Factor analysis of fears reported by children in response to the 
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FSSC-II reveal that there are five distinct factors within this scale: 'death and 
danger', 'the unknown', 'failure and criticism', 'animals', and 'psychic 
stress/medical fears' (Gullone & King, 1992a). 
Fearfulness decreases with increasing age (Gullone & King, 1992b) with 
preadolescent children reporting a greater number of fears than adolescent 
children (011endick & King, 1991). Gullone (1992) summarised normative fear 
research with children and she concluded that the most common fears across 
childhood are related to death and danger. She explained that reporting of other 
fears fluctuates as a function of age, and that fears change in focus from the 
immediate and concrete (such as the sound of a door banging) in the very young, 
to the more anticipatory (such as death, ghosts, the dark) in older children. Older 
children are also more likely to report fears which are social-evaluative in nature, 
such as talking in front of the class (Gullone & King, 1992b). A follow-up study 
to Gullone and King's (1992b) study revealed that gender and initial fear scores 
were better predictors of follow up fear scores than age, suggesting that even 
though fear is related to developmental level, the trait component to fear is 
stronger(Gullone & King, 1997). This study also suggested that decreases in fear 
are greatest between 7 and 10 years of age. 
Positive correlations between the number of reported fears and measures of 
anxiety in children are repeatedly reported (e.g., Friedman, Campbell, & Oldfuji, 
1991; Gullone & King, 1992b; Muris et al., 1998; 011endick, 1983; 011endick & 
Yule, 1990). These correlations reveal that children reporting a greater number of 
fears are also more likely to report higher levels of anxiety symptoms. Some 
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fears may be better predictors of anxiety than others. In a study involving 8- to 
11-year-old children, 011endick and Yule (1990) reported that social evaluative 
fears are higher in children with high self reported anxiety and depression. 
Friedman et al. (1991) reported that fear of failure and criticism is the best 
predictor of self reports of anxiety symptoms in a group of children aged 
between 6 and 11 years of age, followed by fear of the unknown. Muris et al. 
(1998) reported that some fear items are better predictors of specific anxiety 
disorders than others, for example, that children reporting high levels of fear in 
response to the 'spiders' item on the FSSC-II had significantly higher scores on a 
measure of specific phobia, animal type. Muris et al. (1998) also found however, 
that FSSC-II items did not always predict anxiety disorders symptomatology as 
expected, for example, the item 'not being able to breathe' was related to 
obsessive-compulsive symptomatology. It is not clear to what extent 
developmentally appropriate fears contribute to general anxiety in children, 
however studies of anxiety employing developmentally different fears as stimuli 
for anxiety would be likely to reflect these developmental differences in their 
anxiety data. Therefore studies addressing developmental differences in fear 
would be best to use stimuli which show similar fear reports across the age 
range. 
Gender differences are also apparent in children's reports of fear. A consistent 
finding in research on fear in children has been that girls report more fears than 
boys (e.g., Ferrari, 1986; Gullone & King, 1992b; Muris et al., 1998; 011endick & 
King, 1991). There are also higher correlations between self report of fear and 
self report of anxiety in girls compared with boys (011endick, 1983). It is not clear 
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whether these differences in reporting levels are associated with true differences, 
or a propensity for girls to report fears more readily. Studies of anxiety which 
use fear items as anxiety stimuli would benefit by selecting stimuli which elicit 
similar fear levels in boys and girls. 
The relationship between anxiety and self esteem 
Recent research points to a negative relationship between anxiety and self 
esteem. Self esteem refers to one's perception of personal worth (Rawson, 1992). 
Self report measures of anxiety correlated positively with depression, external 
locus of control and self-esteem in a study by Rawson (1992). In a study of grade 
5 and 6 children, Matthews and Odom (1989) reported that self esteem is 
significantly negatively correlated with state anxiety, but is not correlated with 
trait anxiety. This is not surprising in light of the factor analytic studies of the 
STAIC cited earlier, which show that the trait scale has only negative items while 
the state scale has two distinct factors, which comprise the positive and negative 
items of the scale (Cross & Huberty, 1993; Dorr, 1981; Papay & Hedl, 1978). 
Mathews and Odom's (1989) study also revealed neither state nor trait anxiety is 
significantly correlated with the 'Social Self-Peers' scale of the Coopersmith Self-
Esteem Inventory, yet trait and state anxiety correlated significantly and 
negatively with the 'School-Academic' scale and trait anxiety alone with the 
'Home-Parents' scale. 
Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, Rosenblatt, Burling, Lyon, Simon, and Pinel 
(1992) reported that when adults are given positive feedback about their 
personality, they are less likely to report high levels of state anxiety in response 
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to vivid images of death. Similarly, adults physiological arousal was lower in 
response to a threatened shock when they were given positive personality 
feedback. Greenberg et al. (1992) concluded from this study that self esteem 
serves an anxiety buffering function, which may be particularly relevant to state 
anxiety. 
Evidence suggests that the relationship between self concept and fear differs 
according to gender. 011endick (1983) reported that there was a significant 
negative correlation between self concept and fear scores in his total sample of 
children, and for girls separately, but not for boys. Fear scores were also found to 
have a significant relationship with locus of control in this study, with low fear 
scores associated with high internal locus of control for girls and the total sample. 
This suggests again the importance of investigating gender issues in any study of 
anxiety. It may be that self esteem has a positive or buffering effect on anxiety 
for girls but not for boys. 
Kashani, Dandoy, Vaidya, Soltys, and Reid (1990) reported evidence to suggest 
that children experiencing severe psychiatric conditions are more likely to report 
lower levels of self esteem, higher anxiety and hopelessness. Silverstone (1991) 
investigated self esteem levels in adults with a range of psychiatric conditions, 
and reported that those diagnosed with depression and personality disorders 
reported the lowest self-esteem, and those diagnosed with anxiety reported the 
highest levels of self-esteem (although this is still lower than the normal 
population). This is consistent with Clark and Watson's (1991) tripartite model of 
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anxiety and depression, which suggests that depression is differentiated from 
anxiety by low positive affect, which is itself related to self esteem. 
Conclusions 
This chapter has addressed important issues in understanding the nature of 
anxiety in children. While a structured diagnostic approach to anxiety in 
children, such as that used in the DSM-IV (1994) may be useful in guiding clinical 
intervention, the research literature has emphasised the utility of a more 
functional understanding of anxiety. The concept of negative affectivity is a 
useful way to understand anxiety and its relation to depression. An 
understanding of the relationship between fear and anxiety, as well as the 
importance of self esteem in anxiety are also useful additions to understanding 
the nature of anxiety. Clearly age and gender issues must be taken into account 
when investigating anxiety. The following chapter will address the cognitive 
aspects of anxiety, and develop a more integrated understanding of the cognitive 
experience of children experiencing anxiety. 
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Chapter 3: Theoretical Perspectives on Cognition in Anxiety 
In the previous chapter, theoretical issues in the study of anxiety were 
considered, with reference to depression, fear and self esteem. An important 
aspect of anxiety not considered in the previous chapter was the role of 
cognition. The current chapter will consider the role of cognition in anxiety, with 
particular reference to the literature on children. Issues including developmental 
differences, the role of depression and worry, and gender differences will be 
considered. 
Internal speech, automatic thoughts, self-statements and cognitions are usually 
considered equivalent terms, all referring to the thoughts which occur within the 
mind of the individual. Such thoughts are a running dialogue which place an 
interpretation on the internal and external world of the individual. These 
thoughts, and their relationship to behaviours and emotions, provide the 
underpinnings of the cognitive behavioural therapies which have been 
demonstrated to ameliorate anxiety symptoms in children (e.g., Barrett, Dadds, & 
Rapee, 1996). Research focuses on the assessment of these internal thoughts, but 
is generally biased towards assessing cognition in adults and there are relatively 
few empirical studies of cognition in children (but see, Fox, Houston, & Pittner, 
1983; Prins, 1986; Zatz & Chassin, 1983, 1985). 
Kendall (1991) used a system model to explain cognition. He explained that the 
output of the cognitive system is best described as cognitive products, which are 
the cognitions which result from the interaction of external information with the 
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internal processing of that information. Most research focuses on the output 
stage of this model, the cognitive products, which are the final output of the 
higher order components of this information processing system. Children's self-
talk is an example of these cognitive products. 
The cognition literature often refers to the differentiation between cognitive 
deficiency and cognitive distortion, and the relation of these two phenomena to 
psychiatric symptoms (Kendall, 1991). Cognitive deficiency refers to the absence 
of thinking or careful information processing, perhaps best understood in the 
example of an impulsive child who does not effectively process information prior 
to acting. Cognitive distortions, on the other hand, refer to dysfunctional thought 
processes where the available information is distorted by the individual. 
The links between distorted cognitive products and anxiety in children have long 
been established. For example, according to the DSM-IV (1994) generalised 
anxiety disorder (formerly overanxious disorder of childhood) has 'excessive 
worry' as a central diagnostic criterion. Worry in this context is defined as 
apprehensive expectation, and can be seen as a representation of distorted 
cognitive products. As stated earlier, treatment of anxiety in children often uses 
a cognitive behavioural approach (e.g., Barrett et al., 1996; Kendall, 1994). The 
majority of empirical research focuses on specific fears such as test anxiety (Fox 
et al., 1983; Houston, Fox, & Forbes, 1984; Zatz & Chassin, 1983, 1985), or medical 
or dental fears (e.g., Prins, Groot, & Hanewald, 1994). 
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A model of anxiety-related cognition in children 
Studies of cognition and anxiety have generally divided anxiety-related 
cognitions into four major categories; positive statements, coping statements, 
internal threat statements and external threat statements. These categories have 
various relationships to anxiety. Most studies demonstrate that trait anxiety is 
positively related to coping statements, external threat statements and internal 
threat statements (e.g., Fox et al., 1983; Houston et al., 1984; Zatz and Chassin, 
1983; 1985). The research regarding the relationship between positive statements 
and trait anxiety is less clear, with some studies demonstrating a negative 
relationship between these two factors (e.g., Blankstein, Flett, Boase, & Toner, 
1990; Zatz & Chassin, 1983; 1985), and others demonstrating no relationship 
between them (e.g., Prins, 1986; Prins et al., 1994). This section aims to review the 
literature regarding anxiety and cognition, with particular reference to studies of 
children and adolescents, and provide a framework of anxiety and cognition for 
the experiments which follow. 
Ingram and Kendall (1987) suggested that anxious self talk is mediated by two 
cognitive structures known as threat schemata, which form the frame of 
reference through which the individual views the self, others and the outside 
world. These two threat schemata, relating to internal and external threat, are 
consistent with the trait-state conceptualisation of Spielberger (1983). Internal 
threat schemata can be seen as parallel to trait anxiety, they represent an 
underlying tendency to focus on internal threat (better described as negative 
internal states). The anxious individual therefore functions within a background 
of negative internal dialogue. 
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External threat schemata, on the other hand, are parallel to state anxiety, and are 
employed in threatening or dangerous situations, to shift the focus of attention 
onto the threatening circumstances. Ingram and Kendall (1987) explained that 
external threat cognition is usually future oriented, and often takes the role of 
automatic questioning regarding the adequacy of the individual in the situation, 
for example, 'what if I can't do this?', 'what will I do?'. When the anxious 
individual is not focussing on the future, Ingram and Kendall (1987) explained 
that he or she is likely to retrieve threatening incidents from the past and the 
consequences of these incidents, such as, 'I failed the last test like this, it was 
awful'. Ingram and Kendall (1987) suggested that anxious individuals are more 
likely to respond with cognitions related to personal or interpersonal 
competency. This is consistent with Spielberger's (1983) report that individuals 
who are high in trait anxiety are more likely to respond with greater increases in 
state anxiety when the threat involves interpersonal relationships and threat to 
self esteem. Research into children's fears also demonstrates that social 
evaluative fears are closely associated with high levels of fear (Friedman, 
Campbell, & Okifuji, 1991; 011endick & Yule, 1990). Five studies which address 
the role of cognition in anxiety are outlined below. 
Zatz and Chassin (1983) investigated the cognitions of low, moderate and high 
test anxious children in a study of fifth and sixth grade children. Cognition was 
measured with their own self report measure of cognition, the Children's 
Cognitive Assessment Questionnaire (CCAQ), which consists of 40 test-related 
self statements representing positive self-evaluations, negative self-evaluations, 
27 
on-task thoughts and off-task thoughts. Negative self evaluations include items 
such as 'I have a bad memory', 'I am too dumb to do this' Off task thoughts 
include items such as 'I wish I were home, I wish this were over'. Positive 
evaluations include items such as 'I do well on tests like this', 'This test is easy for 
me to do'. On-task thoughts include items such as 'Stay calm and relaxed', 'pay 
attention'. Off task thoughts are consistent with Ingram and Kendall's (1987) 
external threat and negative self evaluations are consistent with internal threat. 
Zatz and Chassin (1983) reported that high test anxious children endorse more 
off-task thoughts, on-task thoughts and negative self evaluations as well as less 
positive self evaluations on the CCAQ. Similar results were found in a second 
study employing a naturalistic testing situation (Zatz & Chassin, 1985). 
Fox et al. (1983) used a think-aloud procedure with fourth grade children prior to 
a maths test to assess the relationship between anxiety and cognition. They 
found that trait anxiety was significantly positively correlated with both 
preoccupation cognitions (which appear to be consistent with internal threat) and 
justification of positive attitude (which appears to be similar to rationalisation or 
coping statements). No significant correlation was found between trait anxiety 
and analytic attitude, avoidant thinking, or positive situation relevant thoughts. 
In a related study, Houston et al. (1984) used a cognitions questionnaire in 
addition to the think-aloud procedure to assess cognition in fourth grade 
children anticipating a maths game. During an anticipation period, children 
thought aloud for two minutes and then filled out the cognitions questionnaire. 
This questionnaire required children to report on a 5-point scale to what extent 
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each item reflected what they had been thinking prior to the maths game. 
Children's cognition scores were related to their scores on the questionnaire and 
the think-aloud measure for each category. Trait anxiety was positively 
correlated with preoccupation (or internal threat) and, for females only with 
justification of positive attitude (or coping). 
These two studies support the link between internal threat statements and trait 
anxiety, as proposed by Ingram and Kendall (1987). These two studies also 
highlight the problems with categorisation of cognitions because the categories 
employed are not consistent with the categorisations used in similar studies, thus 
making cross study comparisons difficult. Kendall and Chansky (1991) 
suggested that the lack of coding uniformity needs to be resolved because it 
interferes with generalisability across studies. 
Self talk in children confronted with a fear-producing situation (jumping off 
diving boards) was reported by Prins (1986). In this study self talk was assessed 
via a semi-structured behavioural interview, in which children were asked to 
relate what they thought/said to themselves while they were on the diving 
board. Prins (1986) assessed self talk using a semi structured behavioural 
interview following the fear-provoking situation. He reported that the self talk of 
highly anxious children in this situation was preoccupied with being hurt, vivid 
memories of past painful experiences and negative task expectations. Those who 
reported self talk in this study were more likely to be anxious than those who did 
not. These findings are again consistent with the model proposed by Ingram and 
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Kendall (1987) by demonstrating the positive relationship between trait anxiety 
and both internal and external threat statements. 
In a study employing a behavioural measure of responding, Vasey, Daleiden, 
Williams, and Brown (1995) also reported data that support the existence of 
threat schemata in anxious children. This study employed a probe detection 
task, where children were presented with two words, either two neutral words or 
a threatening and a neutral word. Highly anxious children showed an 
attentional bias toward threat words compared with control participants, 
demonstrating that their attention is drawn toward threat words. This research 
circumvents the difficulties associated with more subjective measures of anxiety 
by measuring reactions to threatening words rather than production of them. 
Essentially this study took what had until then been a dependent measure, and 
used it as an independent measure, thus validating the relationship between 
threat cognition and anxiety. This study further demonstrated that children not 
only produce more threat related words, but are predisposed to attend to 
threatening material over neutral material. 
Kendall et al. (1991) claimed that anxiety in children is related to an increased 
rate of negative cognitions, rather than a decrease in positive cognitions, because 
those who display decreased levels of negative thoughts alone have been found 
to be less anxious. Kendall (1983) described this as 'the power of non-negative 
thinking', and suggested that it is the lower frequency of negative thoughts rather 
than the presence of positive ones which differentiates non-anxious from anxious 
adults and children. 
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In a review of the literature, Schwartz (1986) investigated the ratio of positive to 
negative thoughts reported in groups of individuals experiencing various level of 
psychological functioning. Functional groups were characterised by a ratio of 1.7 
positive thoughts to 1 negative thought, while mildly dysfunctional groups 
displayed a 1:1 ratio of positive to negative thoughts. Schwartz (1986) reported 
that treatment studies generally reveal a decrease in negative thoughts, rather 
than an increase in positive thoughts, which is consistent with the idea that 
negative thoughts are the most crucial in determining mental health outcomes. 
These findings are consistent also with Clark and Watson's (1991) tripartite 
model of anxiety and depression which proposes that anxiety is essentially 
unrelated to positive affect. Three empirical studies which support Kendall's 
(1983) 'power of non-negative thinking' are discussed below. 
Prins (1986) reported evidence to support 'the power of non-negative thinking' in 
his study assessing children's cognitive responses to jumping off a diving board. 
In this study, high anxious children were those who refused to jump, moderate 
anxious children were those who hesitated and low anxious were those who 
jumped without hesitation. These groupings were consistent with teacher, 
interviewer and self report measures of anxiety. In this study moderate and low 
anxious children were not characterised by any specific self talk style but by a 
relative absence of negative self-speech. The self talk of the highly anxious 
children was characterised by negative self speech. 
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A second study which supports Kendall's (1983) 'power of non-negative 
thinking' hypothesis is a study of cognition in fifth and sixth grade children in a 
real test taking situation by Prins et al. (1994). This study demonstrated that high 
anxious children report more coping thoughts, more off-task thoughts and more 
negative self evaluations than moderate or low test anxious children, but there 
was no difference in the number of reported positive self evaluations. Positive 
self evaluations were related to task performance irrespective of ability. This 
study also reported that coping thoughts are negatively related to test 
performance in high anxious children. Although measures of state anxiety were 
taken in this study, there is no report of the relationship between these measures 
and cognition. In another study on test anxiety by Fox et al. (1983), no reliable 
correlations between trait anxiety and positive situation referent thoughts were 
found. 
In a study employing a behavioural approach technique where adult participants 
were required to touch a harmless snake, Eifert and Lauterbach (1987) reported 
that the only factor which distinguished those who did touch the snake from 
those who did not was the balance of reported positive and negative cognitions. 
This study measured cognitions via think-aloud and questionnaire. Those who 
did touch the snake produced virtually the same number of positive and 
negative statements, while those who did not touch the snake produced more 
negative than positive statements. There was no difference between the two 
groups on the number of negative self verbalisations reported, which suggests 
that positive verbalisations enhance the approach behaviour of anxious 
individuals. This is consistent with the findings of the study by Prins et al. (1994) 
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which showed a positive relationship between positive statements and test 
performance. Eifert and Lauterbach (1987) suggested that this issue is probably 
more complex than just the balance of positive versus negative thoughts, and that 
it probably depends on the nature of the tasks and the problems investigated. 
Kendall's (1983) 'power of non-negative thinking' hypothesis is not without its 
detractors. Other research suggests that positive self statements can be 
negatively correlated with anxiety. Blankstein et al. (1990) conducted a study on 
test anxiety with adults using a thought listing procedure. They reported that 
test anxiety was positively correlated with negative self referent thoughts 
(internal threat), and negatively correlated with positive self referent thoughts. 
Zatz and Chassin (1983, 1985) reported that their test anxious children endorsed 
less positive self evaluations than the low anxious groups. Similarly, Galassi, 
Frierson, and Sharer (1981) reported that their low anxious undergraduate 
students endorsed significantly more positive thoughts on a checklist than either 
moderate or high anxious participants, and that positive cognitions were more 
closely related to test anxiety than to test performance. State anxiety was 
measured by a subjective units of distress scale (suds) in this study, but there was 
no mention of the relationship between suds and positive or negative thoughts. 
Coping cognitions show a surprising relationship to anxiety. Many studies show 
that those children reporting coping thoughts during a stressful event are more 
likely to be rated as anxious. For example, Zatz and Chassin (1985) added a 
coping statements scale to the CCAQ which included items such as; 'Try to calm 
down', 'There's no need to get upset about this'. The results of this study 
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showed that high anxious children reported more coping statements than low 
anxious children (as measured by the CCAQ) as well as significantly more off-
task thoughts, negative evaluations, and significantly less positive evaluations. 
Zatz and Chassin (1985) suggested that coping cognitions may act to sensitise 
children to anxiety, or they may act to distract children from the task, thus 
increasing their anxiety. This study also revealed that coping cognitions were 
negatively related to actual task performance on a maths test. They suggested 
that poor performance may cause both high levels of coping cognitions and high 
levels of anxiety, without a causal relationship existing between the two because 
coping statements were unrelated to performance at low or moderate anxiety 
levels, only at high anxiety levels. Vasey and Daleiden (1996) suggested that 
coping cognitions may actually represent a response to anxiety rather than 
representing a cause of anxiety. 
A final point to make in this section concerns the relationship between cognition 
measures and state anxiety. Although a number of the studies described above 
measure state anxiety, usually through a SUDS measure, or Likert-type measure, 
these scores are generally used to assess how trait anxiety affects state anxiety. 
Not surprisingly there are generally positive relationships between these two 
measures (e.g., Prins et al., 1994; Zatz & Chassin, 1983, 1984). No studies have 
been found which report the relationship between state anxiety and various 
cognitive measures. Based on the information available regarding the 
relationship between threat cognitions and trait anxiety it is likely that there 
would be a positive relationship between threat cognitions and state anxiety, and 
the same would probably be true for coping cognitions. While it remains unclear 
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how positive cognitions and trait anxiety are related, investigating the 
relationship between state anxiety and positive cognitions may help to clarify the 
issue. 
Worry in children 
Worry may also be of utility in understanding anxiety-induced cognitions in 
children. Worry is one of the major cognitive components of anxiety in adults 
(Barlow, 1988; Mathews, 1990) and is an anticipatory cognitive process which 
involves repetitious thoughts and images containing fear producing content 
which are related to possible traumatic events and their potentially catastrophic 
implications (Borkovec, Shadick, & Hopkins, 1991). The primary aim of worry in 
adults seems to be the anticipation and avoidance of all possible negative 
outcomes, and worry is characterised by uncontrolled and ineffective attempts to 
control the outcomes of a situation which very rarely lead to effective solutions 
(Borkovec et al., 1991). According to Vasey (1993), there has been little theoretical 
or empirical research into the role of worry in anxious children and it is likely 
that children's ability to worry would develop along with cognitive abilities. 
Vasey (1993) reported that the ability to look into the future for future threats, or 
to catastrophise, is a central ability required for effective worry. 
A study by Vasey, Crnic and Carter (1994) showed that the content of worry is 
mediated by children's developmental level as measured by both age and self 
concept development. In younger children, worries were found to be more 
egocentric and more related to physical threats, while worries relating to 
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behavioural competence, social evaluation and psychological well being were 
more prevalent with increasing age and self concept complexity. Not 
surprisingly, these findings are consistent with the fear research, which suggests 
similar developmental patterns for fears (e.g., Gullone & King, 1992b; 1997). 
Differentiating anxiety and depression through cognition 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the differentiation between anxiety and 
depression is problematic when self-report measures are employed. Better 
discriminant validity is found for cognition self-report measures. Beck, Brown, 
Steer, Eidelson, and Risldnd (1987) described the cognitive content specificity 
theory in relation to the development of the Cognition Checklist (CCL), a 
cognition self report measure designed for adults. They explain that the 
cognitive experience of depressed individuals revolves around the theme of self 
deprecation and negative attitudes toward the past and future, while the 
cognitive experience of anxious individuals revolve around the theme of danger, 
in both a physical and psychosocial sense. The CCL comprises a 14 item 
depression scale and a 12 item anxiety scale. Results from this study revealed 
that adults with a DSM-III anxiety disorder diagnosis scored significantly higher 
on the anxiety subscale while those with a DSM-III diagnosis of a depressive 
disorder score significantly higher on the depression scale of the checklist. These 
data lay the basis of what has come to be known as the cognitive content 
specificity hypothesis, which espouses the view that anxiety is related to threat 
cognitions and depression is related to loss cognitions. If threat cognitions are 
taken as parallel to negative affectivity, and loss cognitions are taken as parallel 
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to positive affectivity, then the cognitive content specificity hypothesis has some 
consistency with Clark and Watson's (1991) tripartite model of anxiety and 
depression. 
More recently, Ambrose and Rholes (1993) found support for the cognitive 
content specificity hypothesis with children using the CCL. They hypothesised 
that the impact of threat and loss cognitions would vary as a function of the 
severity of the anxiety or depression. Their study showed that, while CCL threat 
cognitions showed a stronger relationship with CDI scores than STAIC scores 
overall, as the level of threat cognitions increased, their relationship with 
depression also increased. Conversely, Ambrose and Rholes (1993) reported that 
low level loss cognitions were related to anxiety, but that this relationship 
displays a decrement as the loss cognitions reach higher levels. In sum, Ambrose 
and Rholes (1993) demonstrated that the relationship of threat and loss 
cognitions with anxiety and depression is not as simple as earlier research has 
led us to believe, that the relationship between cognition and affect varies as a 
function of the intensity of the affect and the rate of cognitive output. 
Jolly and Dykman (1994), in a study of adolescent in-patients at an acute care 
psychiatric facility, reported evidence to support the cognitive content specificity 
theory. Factor analysis of results on the CCL showed that specific anxiety 
cognitions (for example 'I'm going to be hurt') along with general cognitive 
content scores, were predictive of the non-cognitive symptoms of anxiety (that is, 
autonomic symptoms), while specific depressive cognitions such as 'I don't 
deserve to be loved' and general cognitive content were related to depressive 
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symptoms, but not to anxiety symptoms. It was also noted by the authors that 
the CCL was originally designed for use with adults, thus the results with this 
adolescent group may not be reliable. Validity is however demonstrated by high 
internal consistency, good item-total score correlation, and score patterns in the 
predicted direction. 
Gender differences in anxiety and cognition 
Research on anxiety reveals a range of evidence to suggest that anxiety disorders 
are over represented in girls (e.g., Kashani, Orvaschel, Rosenberg, & Reid, 1989). 
As explained earlier, one consistent finding in the research on fear is that girls 
report more fears than boys (e.g., Ferrari, 1986; Gullone & King, 1992b; 011endick 
& King, 1991) and that girls show higher correlations between self report of fear 
and self report of anxiety than boys (011endick, 1983). Joiner and Blalock (1995) 
on the other hand suggest that such gender biases are found in co-morbid and 
mixed anxiety-depression diagnoses, but not in specific anxiety or depression. 
It does not appear that there is any published research which specifically 
addresses gender differences in anxious cognition, however there are some 
studies that report gender differences. Zatz and Chassin (1985) found that 
coping thoughts and positive evaluations are both reported at significantly 
higher levels in boys than girls in their study assessing cognitions in test taking. 
Similarly Prins et al. (1994) reported that boys endorse significantly more positive 
evaluations than girls on the CCAQ. In their study into test anxiety, Houston et 
al. (1984) found that females reported higher levels of 'justification of positive 
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attitude' thoughts (otherwise described as rationalisation), than males in the pre-
test session. Brown, O'Keeffe, Sanders, and Baker (1986) reported that in two of 
their three stimulus situations more girls than boys reported negative affect 
cognitions. Girls were also more likely than boys to report coping self-statements 
in two of the situations in this study. Brown et al.'s (1986) use of 'coping is 
different to most other studies reviewed in this section, and includes positive 
statements as well as coping statements. Ambrose and Rholes (1993) reported no 
gender differences in response to the CCL for children from fifth to eleventh 
grade, and found no differences in response according to gender. 
It appears that there is extensive evidence to suggest that there are gender 
differences in the anxiety-induced cognitions of boys and girls. In summary, 
these studies point to a greater tendency for girls to report higher levels of 
anxiety-inducing thoughts and lower levels of positive evaluations. Further 
research is clearly needed in this area in order to elaborate further these 
differences. It may be that there is an interaction between age and gender, and 
that the differences become more apparent as children become older. It may also 
be that gender differences differ as a function of the situation, as Brown et al.'s 
(1986) study appears to suggest. 
Developmental changes in anxiety and cognition 
Considering the changes which occur in the focus of children's fears over the age 
range (e.g., Gullone & King, 1992b; 011endick & King, 1991) and the different 
rates of some anxiety disorders at different ages (Kashani et al., 1989), it is likely 
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that there will be some changes in the reports of anxiety-induced cognitions over 
the age range. Gullone (1992) reported that fears change from immediate and 
concrete fears in the very young to more anticipatory fears in older children. 
Older children are more likely to report fears related to social situations, while 
younger children report more concrete fears. This research is consistent with the 
hypothesis that the anxiety-induced cognitions of young children are more likely 
to relate to concrete aspects of threat, while those of older children are more 
likely to relate to themselves in relation to others, and therefore are more likely to 
be internally threatening in nature. It is therefore likely that children's anxiety-
induced cognitions will move from situation referent to self referent, and from 
external to internal. Vasey et al. (1994) have presented research which supports 
this hypothesis. They found that older children showed more worries than 
younger children which related to the psychological or internal aspects of threat. 
Younger children were more likely to report concrete and therefore external 
aspects of threat. 
Research into the developmental changes which occur in anxiety-induced 
cognitions in children has been notably sparse. Four studies which investigated 
developmental changes are summarised below. 
Brown et al. (1985) investigated the developmental changes which occur in 
children's cognitions to stressful and painful situations with a group of 487 
students aged between 8 and 18 years. In this study children were presented 
with a questionnaire and required to respond to two standard imagined stressors 
and one personal stressor on the questionnaire, and write down their thoughts. 
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The data were categorised into coping and catastrophising cognitions. 
Catastrophising cognitions were classed as those which focussed on or 
exaggerated negative aspects of the situation including thoughts of escape or 
avoidance. Coping cognitions were those which were inconsistent with pain or 
stress, or thought about the stressor in a problem solving manner. (There was no 
differentiation made between coping statements and positive statements, thus 
this study has difficulty in adding to the body of research which addresses 
coping cognitions in the manner discussed earlier.) Children were categorised as 
either copers or catastrophisers on the basis of the thoughts that they reported, 
and overall more catastrophisers than copers were found. The study also 
revealed that the proportion of children who reported predominantly coping 
thoughts increased significantly with age, and the range of reported strategies 
also increased with age. Children categorised as predominantly copers 
displayed significantly lower levels of trait anxiety than those categorised as 
catastrophisers. The study concluded that there was a developing ability to use 
coping cognitions in relation to stressful and painful situations from age 8 to 18 
years. There are limitations with the use of such a questionnaire method, as it 
assumes that all children are able to comprehend and respond effectively to the 
questionnaire. The study also assumed that asking children to recall the 
cognitions associated with a personal event would bring forth the actual 
cognitions, where there is no evidence to suggest that this is the case. 
Another study looking at developmental differences was conducted by Vasey et 
al. (1994) and assessed worry in 76 children aged between 5 and 12 years. In this 
study worry was defined as an anticipatory cognitive process involving 
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repetitive thoughts related to possible outcomes and their consequences. The 
study investigated the hypothesis that children would increase the number of 
possible catastrophic outcomes to a situation as age increases and self concept 
develops. This was investigated by assessing children's responses to their own 
suggestions of anxiety-provoking situations, as well as to three standard 
vignettes. The data showed an increase in the number and variety of 
anticipatory thoughts of threat. The study revealed that older children were 
more able to elaborate the potential consequences of the situations. This increase 
occurred at around the age of 8 or 9 years. The study also revealed that worries 
become less self focussed as age increases. Worries moved from threat to self, to 
behavioural competence, social evaluation and psychological well-being as age 
increased, which is consistent with the fear research. Most of these differences 
were found between the 5- to 6-year-olds and the older children, so it seems that 
the largest changes occurred at the younger age. 
Ambrose and Rholes (1993) assessed the frequency of self reported cognitions in 
a study of 501 children in fifth, eighth and eleventh grade. In this study, 
cognition was measured with the CCL and no effect of grade was found in 
response to either the loss or threat scale of the CCL. This study assessed the 
frequency of cognitions in the absence of a stressor so the results are probably not 
equivalent to the other studies discussed in this section which measure cognition 
in response to specific stressors. The questionnaire format also limited the 
number of possible responses that were available to participants, which were 
unlimited in the studies by Brown et al. (1985) and Vasey et al. (1994) which 
allowed children less structured responses. 
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Martin, Horder, and Jones (1992) used a Stroop task with spider phobic and non-
phobic children to assess the differential effect of the Stroop effect over age. 
Children were required to report the colour of a word presented to them, and 
ignore the meaning of the word. The results of this study showed that children 
classified as spider phobic did show a Stroop effect for spider-related words, as 
they took longer to report the colour of words which were spider-related than 
non-phobic children. The magnitude of this effect did not change over the range 
of ages studied (6 years to 13 years). Martin et al. (1992) concluded that the 
effects of phobia on cognitive performance appear at a relatively young age, and 
there was no evidence of there being an early stage of phobia development where 
the cognitive distortion effect was not evident. It was also noted by the authors 
that these results are remarkably similar to the findings with adults, suggesting 
that cognitive distortion does not change with age into adulthood. 
The studies outlined here suggest that there is evidence of changes in anxiety-
induced cognitions across the age range. In the studies by Brown et al. (1987) 
and Vasey et al. (1994) it appears that there is an increase in the range of possible 
outcomes that children report in response to specific situations. The study by 
Brown et al. (1987) reported these outcomes as coping strategies, and the study 
by Vasey et al. (1994) reported them as possible threats. The study by Ambrose 
and Rholes (1994), on the other hand, suggested that there are no such age-
related differences. This may be a result of the style of cognition assessment 
which was employed. Children in this study had only to report the frequency of 
these thoughts, not the frequency of them in response to a specific stressor, and 
43 
the manner in which they reported their thoughts was constrained to the self 
report format, giving them no chance to elaborate further their thoughts. 
Similarly, the study by Martin et al. (1992) suggested that there was no 
quantitative difference in the magnitude of the Stroop effect to spider words in 
children aged between 6 and 13 years. This study also used a very different 
methodological approach to that of Vasey et al. (1994) and Brown et al. (1987). 
Conclusions 
It has been demonstrated that anxiety in children is related to increased levels of 
threat and coping cognitions. The research on the link between positive 
statements and anxiety remains unclear, as some research presents evidence to 
suggest that positive statements are unrelated to anxiety, while others suggest 
that they are negatively related to anxiety. Kendall et al. (1991) would argue that 
positive statements are unrelated to trait anxiety, which is consistent with Clark 
and Watson's (1991) tripartite model of anxiety and depression which states that 
positive affect is implicated in depression but not anxiety. While most research 
in this area is carried out by inducing state anxiety in the individual, 
investigation of the role of cognition in state anxiety appears to have been 
neglected. There is strong evidence of gender differences in anxiety-induced 
cognitions, which is consistent with the literature on gender differences in 
anxiety and fear. Evidence also indicates that anxiety-related cognitions 
(specifically coping strategies and threats cognitions) increase as age increases. 
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In assessing anxiety-induced cognitions, there are numerous methodological 
issues which must be considered. The following chapter will outline these issues, 
particularly in relation to the literature which has been discussed in this section. 
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Chapter 4: Methodological Issues in the Study of Anxiety and 
Cognition in Children 
The previous two chapters have considered theoretical issues surrounding 
anxiety and related cognitions in children. This chapter investigates some of the 
important methodological issues which arise in this area of research. Firstly this 
chapter will consider the issues surrounding techniques used in the 
measurement of cognition. Secondly consideration will be given to the methods 
of managing the verbal output of self report data. Thirdly this chapter will 
consider the use of imagery in anxiety induction, and its utility with a child 
population. Finally, although issues in the use of self report measures of anxiety 
in children have been addressed in previous chapters, the psychometric 
properties of the scales to be used in the experimental chapters of the thesis will 
also be considered. 
Measurement of cognition 
Measurement of self reports is fraught with difficulty, because regardless of the 
methodology employed, it is not possible to measure directly cognitive activity. 
Researchers must therefore use methods which address their research aims in the 
most reliable and appropriate manner. With children, the selection of methods 
will also vary according to their developmental appropriateness. Genest and 
Turk (1981) pointed out that self report data have many limitations. They can be 
incomplete; reactive to environmental influences; inconsistent with observational 
data; idiosyncratic; and confounded by investigator bias during interpretation. 
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Clark (1988) stated that the validity of self talk measures must be established. 
Techniques should display content validity, concurrent and discriminant 
validity, and should be sensitive to changes in cognitive output as a result of 
treatment. However there has been little research which addresses the reliability 
and validity of cognitive measures (Francis, 1988), or which attempts to measure 
cognitive changes after therapeutic intervention (Last, Barlow, & O'Brien, 1985). 
In a review of the literature, Clark (1988) concluded that no individual method of 
cognitive assessment is consistently superior to all others and each has 
advantages and disadvantages which need to be considered in their selection 
(Kendall & Chansky, 1991). This section will consider the relative advantages 
and disadvantages of some of these different methods of assessing cognition in 
children. 
Self report assessment of cognition can be broadly divided into production and 
endorsement methods, where the former require the individual to report actual 
cognitions, and the latter require the individual to endorse cognition items on a 
checklist. This section will describe some empirical studies using production 
and endorsement techniques and consider the methodological issues highlighted 
by each study. Specific research findings will not be described in full because the 
content of these studies either bears little relevance to the current study, or has 
been outlined elsewhere. 
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Production techniques: think-aloud and thought listing 
Think-aloud 
One of the most widely used methods of assessing self talk in individuals is the 
think-aloud method, where the participant is asked to say out loud the thoughts 
that he or she experiences in response to a stimulus. The think-aloud technique 
uses either in vivo (e.g., Eifert & Lauterbach, 1987), or imagery (e.g., Davison, 
Robins, & Johnson, 1983) methods of stimuli. The obvious advantages of this 
technique are, firstly that participants report their own thoughts and are not 
constrained by the items on a checklist, and secondly that they are reporting 
them as they happen (or as close to as possible), rather than recalling them at a 
later time. Ericsson and Simon (1980) suggest that because verbal information is 
stored in short term memory, only the most recent information is directly 
accessible, therefore the think-aloud method more accurately measures the 
essential characteristics of the cognitive products. The think-aloud method is not 
reliant on retrospective memory and distortions, and therefore minimises 
participants' causal inferences (Genest & Turk, 1981). 
Ericsson and Simon (1980) have pointed out that think-aloud procedures have 
been criticised for a number of reasons. Firstly, verbalisations may be reactive 
and participants may report only selected cognitive products. Secondly, 
participants may not report all of the available information in short term 
memory. Thirdly, because different thoughts can occur simultaneously, 
participants may report thoughts that are irrelevant to the processes of interest. 
Kendall and Hollon (1981) therefore suggested that to use this method is to 
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interrupt the flow of normal internal speech. Genest and Turk (1981) also 
outlined a number of difficulties with the think-aloud method. They suggested 
that having participants verbalise their internal experiences can slow them down, 
distort the cognitions reported, and necessitate the omission of content because 
of time constraints, or problems expressing themselves. Secondly, Genest and 
Turk (1981) suggest that the process of having participants think-aloud may 
inhibit them through self consciousness, so the least obtrusive, and reactive 
method of assessing cognition is via recording without participants awareness. 
Current ethical considerations make this option impossible. 
One of the early references to the think-aloud method is made by Diener and 
Dweck (1978). This study looked at the achievement-related cognitions reported 
by children classified as mastery oriented or helpless following failure. In this 
study the children were told that the experimenters were interested in the things 
children their age think about while doing such tasks. They were simply asked 
to verbalise what they were thinking about as they performed a specified task. 
All verbalisations were recorded verbatim and classified into appropriate 
categories and analysed. The authors noted that while some children were 
hesitant on the first trial, all children did make some sort of verbalisation, and by 
the second trial they seemed at ease with the task. Significant differences were 
found between the verbalisations of the two groups of children. This 
demonstrated the utility of the think-aloud approach in establishing group 
differences in children. 
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Fox et al. (1983) used the think-aloud method to investigate trait anxiety and test 
taking in fourth grade children. In this study children were required to spend 
two minutes immediately before taking a test saying aloud their thoughts and 
feelings into a tape recorder while the experimenter was out of the room. These 
thoughts and feelings were then rated on a number of different categories, such 
as preoccupation and justification of positive attitude and analysed in relation to 
the children's levels of trait anxiety. Trait anxiety correlated positively with 
preoccupation and justification of positive attitude. The paper concludes that the 
think-aloud procedure is successful and that this is in part due to the age of the 
children. The authors argue that at this age, self talk has only been internalised 
for a limited amount of time, so is easily accessible in a think-aloud task. Having 
the experimenter out of the room partially addresses the problem of self 
consciousness raised by Genest and Turk (1981). 
In a follow up study to Fox et al. (1983), Houston et al. (1984) again used the 
think-aloud method in their investigation of anticipatory anxiety cognitions but 
this time in conjunction with a cognition questionnaire. The cognition 
questionnaire was devised to include self statements which would fit all of the 
seven categories of cognition under investigation, and participants rated the 
extent to which each cognition occurred to them during anticipation of a maths 
test. The children were first required to think aloud their thoughts and feelings 
and then completed the self report measure. Scores for the think-aloud and the 
self report measures were significantly positively correlated for five of the seven 
categories, although correlations were small in magnitude. This study is one of 
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very few which measure cognition by two methods, and it is encouraging that 
the responses to the two different measures are correlated. 
Davison et al. (1983) used audio recordings of simulated situations to stimulate 
participants' self talk in an investigation designed to provide a paradigm for 
assessment of cognitions. While listening to recordings of two stressful 
situations, participants were asked to imagine as clearly as possible that they 
were a part of the event and to focus on their thoughts and feelings. During 
silences in the recordings, participants were asked to say out loud their thoughts, 
which were recorded. These data were then transcribed and categorised into 25 
different categories loosely based along cognitive behavioural lines, but also 
based on typical responses to the tapes. Measures of interrater reliability were 
taken, with around 75% agreement among raters. This method gives a direct and 
flexible approach to assessing cognitions in a variety of situations and allows the 
use of stimuli which would be impractical or unethical to use in vivo. A more 
recent paper by Davison, Navarre, and Vogel (1995) describes this method more 
fully, and recommends the use of a practice session before data are collected to 
ensure that participants can fully visualise the stimuli. They suggest that because 
this method accesses cognitions as they occur, it may be better suited to tapping 
actual thoughts than other methods. 
In a comparison of the efficacy of the think-aloud method, videotape 
reconstruction and a 24 item self-verbalisation questionnaire, Eifert and 
Lauterbach (1987) reported that the think-aloud method is the preferable method. 
For this study participants were required to approach a glass cage containing a 
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python while thinking aloud. They then touched and held the python, and if 
possible allowed the snake to crawl on their laps. For the video reconstruction 
method, participants viewed a video of themselves approaching the snake and 
recalled and verbalised what they thought, felt and said to themselves. The 
verbalisations for both methods were taped and subsequently categorised into 
positive and negative statements by independent raters. While participants 
produced higher levels of verbalisation in the videotaped reconstruction than in 
the think-aloud method, the video output included far more clinically irrelevant 
and incidental comments, plus the interrater reliability is lower for this than the 
think-aloud method. Eifert and Lauterbach (1987) noted that the videotape 
method is more time consuming and intricate to score. Finally, it was found that 
during the use of retrospective methods of assessment (that is video 
reconstruction and self-verbalisation questionnaire), it appears that participants 
tried to adjust their verbalisations to fit with their overt behaviours so it was 
suggested that the think-aloud method was more able to reflect truly internal 
speech. 
In summary, the think-aloud method is effectively used in adult and child 
populations to stimulate self talk (Davison et al., 1983; Diener & Dweck, 1978; 
Eifert & Lauterbach, 1987; Fox et al., 1983; Houston et al., 1984). The findings of 
these studies suggest that the method is sensitive to group differences (Diener & 
Dweck, 1978), and the output correlates with other measures such as trait anxiety 
(Fox et al., 1983; Houston et al., 1984). The output also correlates with self 
statement questionnaires (Houston et al., 1984). One comparative study with 
adults suggests that the method is more able to reflect the true flow of internal 
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speech than retrospective methods (Eifert & Lauterbach, 1987). While there has 
been extensive use of the method with children in test taking situations and in 
other performance based situations, the imagery method espoused by Davison et 
al. (1983) and Davison et al. (1995) has not been used with children. There is 
probably some scope therefore for the use of this method with children. 
Thought listing 
Thought listing techniques require that participants retrospectively report, 
usually in written form, their thoughts from a specific time interval (Clark, 1988). 
Using a written response format with children has clear disadvantages when 
considering the literacy levels of young children. Brown et al. (1988) explain that 
their 8- to 9-year-old children produced the largest number of unscorable 
responses in comparison to the older age groups. Thought listing has the 
disadvantage that it does not require children to report their cognitions 
immediately; often children are asked to recall their thoughts after the event. 
Prins (1986) used a behavioural interview to assess 8- to 12-year-old children's 
spontaneous use of self speech and self regulation in a fear producing 
behavioural test involving jumping or diving off diving boards at a swimming 
pool. The interview was semi structured, designed in such a way that the 
children could deny the occurrence of self speech. Pertinent questions were 
asked of the participants regarding what they were thinking/ saying to 
themselves while they were waiting to jump off the board. 
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This study showed that between one third and two thirds of the total sample 
reported no self speech in the various different tasks. This is vastly different to 
the cited research on the think-aloud method, where no reference is made to 
participants failing to verbalise (Davison et al., 1983; Diener & Dweck, 1983; 
Eifert & Lauterbach, 1987; Fox et al., 1983; Houston et al., 1984). As an 
explanation for this lack of self talk in some participants, Prins (1986) has 
suggested that the less difficult tasks become more automated, and therefore are 
less likely to require verbal mediating responses. Prins (1986) noted that 
incidental observations suggested that children may have become bored with 
answering the self speech questions (they had to do this five times), and some 
answered 'I've told you already!' at the fifth questioning. This technique 
assumed that individuals could accurately recall and report their cognitions after 
the event. 
In another thought listing study focussing upon children's coping self statements 
in response to imagined stressors, Brown et al. (1986) investigated the 
relationships between cognition and trait anxiety, age and gender. Children 
between 8 and 18 years of age were asked to respond in writing to a 
questionnaire that asked them to imagine themselves firstly at the dentist about 
to receive an injection, secondly giving a report in their class, and thirdly in a 
situation of their choosing that had worried or troubled them recently, and then 
to write down their thoughts in response to the situations. The study concluded 
that cognitions for children as young as 8 years of age can be reliably determined 
using a self report questionnaire. Twelve and a half percent of responses were 
unscorable for the personal stressor question in the 8 to 9 year age group, thus 
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biasing the sample towards more literate children. It is suggested that the 
questions would have generated better responses if asked orally. 
Vasey et al. (1994) used a thought listing interview procedure to assess worry in 
children across three age groups ranging from 5 to 12 years of age. The interview 
initially elicited from children the situations in which they experienced worry 
and the cognitions associated with these situations. Participants were then 
presented with three vignettes of fictitious children in worrying situations and 
asked to list all the things that the child in the story could be worried about, then 
to list all of the related worrying possibilities. Thus children's own experiences of 
worry were studied, in addition to their assumptions concerning the worry of 
others. Worrisome thoughts were found to be more prevalent and varied in 
children of 8 years and older. Vasey et al. (1994) suggest that younger children 
may have less awareness of the possible outcomes of situations, thus less possible 
outcomes to worry about. 
In summary, the thought listing method of cognition assessment has been used 
with children and adults, however it seems that there are some concerning 
limitations of the method when children are required to give written responses. 
The study by Brown et al. (1986) showed that in children aged 8 to 9 years, there 
were the largest number of unscorable responses compared with older children. 
This finding suggests that the thought listing method employing written 
responses is probably not an appropriate method for the study of anxiety-
induced cognitions in children. 
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Endorsement techniques 
Self statement questionnaires 
Clark (1988) reported that structured questionnaires are the most widely adopted 
method of assessing cognitions. The reason for this appears to be their reliability 
and validity as alternate measures of anxiety or depression. Glass and Arnkoff 
(1982) suggest that questionnaires reflect the importance or relevance rather than 
the frequency of a cognition, that participants may experience similar but not 
identical thoughts and that participants may interpret the questions as affective 
rather than cognitive. Kendall and Chansky (1991) added that while 
endorsement techniques may be more valid, it is possible that they provide more 
of a global measure of distress than a measure of current internal dialogue. Clark 
(1988) suggested that because questionnaires rely on recognition rather than 
recall, responses 'may be more susceptible to selective memory biases, social 
desirability response sets, post performance rationalisations, inconsistent 
responses and demand characteristics than measures that rely on the recall of 
thought content' (Clark, 1988, p. 3). However he concluded that although there 
has been an over reliance on the self statements questionnaires, these measures 
clearly display the strongest validity, in that they are able to differentiate 
between adjusted and maladjusted groups, they are sensitive to treatment effects, 
and show consistent correlations with corresponding affective states measured 
by self report and observation. 
There is a number of self report inventories developed to assess cognitions in 
anxious children. Generally these are based upon adult research (Beck et al., 
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1987; Zatz & Chassin, 1983), and then applied to children (e.g., Ambrose & 
Rholes, 1993). Self report methods are reliant on the ability of children to recall 
their thoughts, and it is unclear to what extent children can recall such thoughts. 
Further, Eifert and Lauterbach (1987) reported that adults using a self report 
questionnaire endorsed significantly more statements than they produced in 
either the think-aloud or a video reconstruction method, suggesting that 
questionnaires are prone to over endorsement, thus giving an unrealistic 
measure of cognitions. 
Kendall and Hollon's (1989) Anxious Self Statements Questionnaire (ASSQ) was 
devised for adults using an interview technique. Items for the inventory were 
initially generated from 508 undergraduate students who recalled an anxiety 
provoking experience, recreated it mentally and recorded verbatim their first 
thoughts. These data were then developed into a self statement questionnaire, 
using a sample of high anxious and low anxious students designated by the 
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (Hathaway & McKinley, 1942) 
anxiety scale and STAI scores. The ASSQ is capable of distinguishing between 
high and low anxious groups. Kendall et al. (1991) reported on the development 
of the children's version of the ASSQ, the CASSQ, designed to assess anxiety-
induced cognitions in children. In this study children reported the frequency of a 
range of thoughts experienced over the last week. Preliminary reliability and 
validity data were reported to be promising and the scale was able to 
differentiate between anxious and non anxious children, as categorised by 
RCMAS and STAIC. Kendall and Chansky (1991) conceded that the scale may be 
measuring global distress (as suggested by Strauss, Last, Hersen, & Kazdin, 
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1988), rather than psychopathology specifically related to anxiety. As previously 
discussed, the RCMAS and STAIC tend to be measures of negative affectivity, 
rather than pure anxiety, so the findings of Kendall and Chansky (1991) are no 
guarantee that the scale is capable of differentiating between anxiety and other 
disorders such as depression. 
As previously discussed in Chapter 3, the Cognitions Checklist (CCL, Beck et al., 
1987) is a self report measure originally designed to measure the frequency of 
automatic thoughts relevant to anxiety and depression in an adult population. 
The CCL has good discriminant validity when used to assess anxiety and 
depression (Beck et al., 1987). Ambrose and Rholes (1993) have since used the 
CCL with fifth, eighth and eleventh grade children and concluded that the CCL 
can be used with younger age groups without substantial modification. Jolly and 
Dykman (1994) studied adolescent in-patients at an acute care psychiatric facility 
using the CCL. The authors accept the reliability problems of using an adult 
measure with adolescents although they noted that reliability was demonstrated 
by high internal consistency, good item-total score correlation, and score patterns 
in the predicted direction. 
The Children's Cognitive Assessment Questionnaire (CCAQ, Zatz & Chassin, 
1983) is a self report measure derived from the adult literature and designed to 
assess children's cognitions. It consists of 40 yes/no items, each prefaced by "I 
thought...". Four subscales are included in the questionnaire: positive 
evaluations, negative evaluations, on-task thoughts and off-task thoughts. 
Results showed that fifth and sixth grade children classed as high test anxious, 
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reported more task debilitating cognitions on both the negative evaluations 
subscale and the off-task subscale, displaying a similar profile to adults. Zatz 
and Chassin (1985) updated the CCAQ to include a coping scale, which is also 
positively related to test anxiety. 
In summary, structured questionnaires are reported to be a valid means of 
assessing cognitions in children; however it is possible that participants interpret 
the questions as affective rather than cognitive, therefore the responses to these 
questionnaires are more likely to reflect global distress rather than direct 
measures of internal dialogue, and thus cast doubt on their validity. As 
questionnaires are also retrospective in nature, it is likely that they will be 
impacted upon by selective memory and demand characteristics. However, the 
bottom line is that these measures are sensitive to treatment effects, and can 
differentiate between adjusted and maladjusted groups, as well as providing 
some differentiation between anxiety and depression. 
Summary comments on measurement of cognitions 
Clark (1988) concludes from a review of the literature that methods such as 
thought listing and think-aloud are not more accurate than self statement 
questionnaires, and their validity has not been established. However, he points 
out that this may in part be due to an over reliance on the endorsement 
techniques, and that there is not enough research addressing validity issues for 
other measures. He claims that emotional intensity and degree of belief and 
control associated with cognitions may be important issues to address in future 
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research. The accessibility of cognitive phenomena does affect the accuracy of 
assessment of cognitions. 
Finally, Clark (1988) states that there is little agreement between different 
methods of assessment. It is likely that this reflects the differing cognitive 
processes involved in accessing cognition via different methods. Genest and 
Turk (1981) suggest that in the early stages of research it is appropriate to use less 
structured approaches to cognitive assessment such as think-aloud and thought 
listing, as this will facilitate unanticipated, yet relevant data coming to light. As 
specific hypotheses are developed, more structured measures should be 
employed to address these. 
Categorisation of cognitions 
Before verbal material is transformed into quantitative data, material must be 
transcribed verbatim. According to Genest and Turk (1981), all transcriptions 
involve some margin of error partly due to unclear recordings, and partly due to 
human error. Data must then be broken down into meaningful units of speech. 
Genest and Turk (1981) suggest three methods. Firstly for judges to give global 
ratings of the verbalisations (e.g., Houston et al., 1984), second to unitise these 
data according to time segments and have judges rate individual time segments, 
and thirdly to unitise the data into some naturally occurring unit of speech (e.g., 
Davison et al., 1983). Any method using global ratings will lose vast amounts of 
information, so is generally considered inappropriate for research. The second 
method described is also likely to lose a certain amount of information, as 
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thought may change within time segments. The latter of these three methods is 
therefore seen as the most satisfactory, and it seems, the most commonly used 
method (e.g., Blackwell et al., 1985; Davison et al., 1983; Eifert & Lauterbach, 
1987). 
Genest and Turk (1981) reported on a method which uses paralinguistic cues 
such as pauses, shifts in tone, speed and inflection to unitise verbal data. They 
recommend that raters view the transcripts while listening to the recordings of 
verbalisations. In the study by Davison et al. (1983) data are unitised by trained 
scorers into 'idea units' (p.26), which are units of speech that are as small as 
possible without distorting the assumed meaning of the speaker. In this study, 
the second rater used 96% of the same boundaries as the first; however the 
second employed additional boundaries which reduced the agreement to 83%. 
Eifert and Lauterbach (1987) used a similar method, where discrete verbalisations 
are counted according to cues like sentence structure, changes in content and 
pauses. Blackwell et al. (1985) also used a similar method which includes 
sentence structure and content as a basis for running verse into units of speech. 
In this particular study raters received eight hours of training prior to rating data, 
and there was a 96.5% agreement rate. 
There is a lack of established categorisation systems for the investigation of 
cognitive products. Kendall and Chansky (1991) have suggested that the lack of 
coding uniformity across studies interferes with the generalisability of research 
findings. For example, the studies by Houston et al. (1984) and Fox et al. (1983) 
reported categories which were difficult to compare with related studies. Also, 
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because a majority of the empirical work in this area focuses on test anxiety, 
many categorisation systems are based on a test taking model, therefore include 
categories such as 'on-task thoughts' and 'off-task thoughts'. Systems based on 
the test taking model are not always relevant to other studies. Also, 
categorisation systems must take into account the differences between coping 
statements and positive statements. This is highlighted in the study by Brown et 
al. (1986), where thoughts were split into coping and catastrophising. In this 
study, coping included both coping statements and positive self evaluations. 
Kendall and Chansky (1991) suggested that there must be differentiation between 
thoughts that are essentially strategic in nature and aimed at inspiring action and 
those that are seen as 'good' thoughts that help the individual to cope. The latter 
of these types of coping statements are probably more correctly rated as positive 
statements, as they do not represent an attempt by the individual to cope with 
the situation, but rather are task facilitative in and of themselves. Clearly any 
categorisation system will depend upon the interest of the investigators (Genest 
& Turk, 1981) or the aims of the study. 
Numerous categorisation systems have been used in the study of cognition in 
children. Craighead, Kimball, and Rehak (1979) and Blankstein, Flett, Boase, and 
Toner (1990) have suggested that cognitions can be classified into four categories: 
positive self-referent, negative self-referent, positive task-referent and negative 
task-referent. Such a categorisation system does not take into account coping 
statements, thus loses important data required for any effective investigation of 
anxiety-induced cognitions. The categorisation systems of Houston et al. (1984) 
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and Fox et al. (1983) have previously been discussed. Their use of categories 
such as 'justification of positive attitude' and 'performance reassurance' may have 
suited the aims of the experiment, but are not easily comparable to other studies. 
Brown et al. (1986) rated thoughts according to 13 different categories, which 
were then divided into coping and catastrophising. All of these categorisation 
systems have their advantages and disadvantages, but it is suggested that studies 
of anxiety-related cognitions in children should at least take into account positive 
and negative self and situation referent cognitions as well as coping cognitions. 
In summary, it appears that unitisation presents an effective means of managing 
verbal output. These data can then be categorised according to a system which is 
appropriate to the particular study. 
Imagery induction of anxiety 
As previously discussed in this chapter, Davison et al. (1983, 1995) recommend 
the think-aloud method in conjunction with an imaginal script as a paradigm for 
cognition assessment. Due to the ethical difficulties involved in exposing a child 
to some in vivo anxiety provoking situations, the use of such imaginal scripts is 
clearly preferable. Research such as that conducted by Davison et al. (1983) is 
based upon the assumption that the emotional responses induced by imagery 
procedures are equivalent to those experienced in the real situation. 
Lang's (1979) bio-informational theory of emotional imagery investigated the 
assumption that responses to imagery are equivalent to real life responses from 
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the perspective of both psychophysiology and information processing. He 
described an emotional image as one which integrates stimulus propositions 
(descriptors of the stimulus such as visual and aural information) and response 
propositions (descriptors of the individual's behaviour within the image which 
can include verbal, motor and visceral responses). Such imagery is found to 
induce physiological responses which mimic the responses experienced in an in 
vivo situation. Lang, Kozak, Miller, Levin, and McLean (1980) have found that 
imagery involving both stimulus and response material induced greater levels of 
physiological responding than imagery which consists only of stimulus material. 
Using Lang et al.'s (1980) imagery induction technique on undergraduate 
students, Fernandez and Allen (1989) compared responses to imagery of test 
taking with responses to real examinations. They found that participants 
experienced significantly greater levels of emotional arousal during the actual 
examination than during the imagery, but that the pattern of emotional responses 
for the two situations was almost identical. Measures of cognition were taken 
after completion of the exam, but unfortunately not after completion of the 
imagery, so there were no comparisons between reported cognitions in response 
to the imagery and in vivo situations. Lang, Levin, Miller, and Kozak (1983) 
found similar results, namely that imagery induced physiological responses 
mirror responses shown during in vivo exposure. 
Imagery has also been effectively used with panic disordered adults in 
conjunction with physiological response cues to induce anxiety in a study by 
Watkins, Clum, Borden, Broyles, and Hayes (1990). The imagery included 
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prompts to recall pertinent cognitive responses to the stimulus situations, as well 
as cues about the physical setting and physiological responses. Not all imagery 
studies employ individual imagery scripts. For example Lang et al. (1983) used 
standard scripts such as encountering a snake, giving a speech, and experiencing 
a fire in a theatre with socially anxious and snake fearful participants. 
There is limited research which verifies the validity of the use of imagery to 
induce anxiety responses in children. Most studies of this nature tap the 
physiological dimension of anxiety in response to imagery. King, 011endick, and 
Gullone (1990) report that although the extent to which different emotions are 
associated with different autonomic patterns in children is not well understood, 
it is clear that fear imagery does induce psychophysiological arousal in children. 
A study by Hermecz and Melamed (1984) assessed children's physiological 
responses to imagery and a dental video prior to in vivo dental treatment. 
Neutral imagery was used to train participants in imagining. Vividness of 
imagery was measured by their scale, The Image Clarity Scale, which consisted 
of seven pictures of a neutral object displayed from very blurry to very sharp in 
focus, and children responded by pointing to the clarity of the scene just 
imagined. For the stimulus training, children were asked to create a detailed 
image of what the situation would be like, and were then asked a series of 
questions relating to the physical aspects of the scene. Each stimulus oriented 
response was praised. For the response training children were given similar 
scripts, but this time the experimenter emphasised active responding, and 
children were asked to involve themselves in the image as active participants. 
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Questions this time relate to the children's responses to the scene, and each 
response oriented answer was praised. The video which followed showed a 
child undergoing treatment and included a narration which again either 
emphasised response or stimulus material. 
Results of the study by Hermecz and Melamed (1984) showed that children given 
response training responded with greater breathing and heart rate reactivity than 
those given stimulus training. Other findings of interest revealed that response 
participants showed an increase in reported clarity from trial one to trial two, 
while stimulus participants showed a decrease in imagery over the trials. 
Imagery was also negatively correlated with age, with younger children 
reporting clearer imaging of the scripts. Physiological responses increased with 
increases in reported imagery. Hermecz and Melamed (1984) concluded that 
response imagery induced more complete processing of the images, and this was 
reflected in the greater clarity of reports and greater magnitude of physiological 
responses to response imagery. 
Imagery was effectively employed with children in an anxiety treatment study by 
King, Cranstoun and Josephs (1989), who used emotive imagery in a treatment 
study of children's night time fears. Emotive imagery involved the use of 
positive imagery to induce emotional responses which were inconsistent with 
anxiety. This technique was previously used by Jackson and King (1981) in a 
treatment study of trauma induced phobia. This research provides evidence that 
imagery can induce psychophysiological responses in children which mimic 
those found in the real situation. It would therefore seem likely that it can also 
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stimulate similar cognitive responses to the real situation, suggesting that 
Davison et al.'s (1983) paradigm of imagery induced anxiety is an effective means 
of assessing cognitive response. 
In summary, it appears that imagery can be effectively employed to induce 
anxiety in children. Imagery scenarios should employ both stimulus and 
response cues to most effectively induce anxiety. Scenarios can be developed for 
individuals or to be administered to a group of participants. Perhaps the greatest 
advantage of such methods, is that they provide an ethically acceptable 
alternative to in vivo exposure to anxiety-inducing stimuli. 
Self report measures of anxiety 
The investigations to be described in the following chapters will employ some 
commonly used self report measures of anxiety in children. These measures have 
already been discussed in some detail from a theoretical perspective, however, it 
is important to also consider their psychometric properties. This section of 
Chapter 4 will address the important issues in the use of the RCMAS, the STAIC 
and to a lesser extent, the STAI. 
Revised Children's Manifest Anxiety Scale (RCMAS; Reynolds & Richmond, 
1978) 
The original Children's Manifest Anxiety Scale (CMAS) was designed in 1956 by 
Castenada, McCandless and Palermo and based upon an adult scale with items 
drawn from the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (Hathaway & 
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McKinley, 1942). The CMAS has been modified by Reynolds and Richmond in 
1978 with the aim of lessening the administration time, increasing the clarity of 
items, lowering the reading age of the test to make it more suitable for young 
children and improving the psychometrics of the test. The scale includes 20 new 
items, and 27 old items, and the wording has been modified to be equivalent to 
about grade 3 reading level. It is recommended that the scale be read aloud to 
younger children. Results of the initial study (Reynolds & Richmond, 1978) 
revealed that females reported higher levels of anxiety than males and that there 
were no significant grade differences, although there was a tendency for anxiety 
to decrease with age. Wisniewski, Mulick, Genshaft, and Coury (1987) reported 
similar gender differences, with females reporting higher levels of anxiety than 
boys. The lie scale of the test has been found to show relatively high scores for 
first grade children, and it is recommended that care should be taken in using the 
scale with children of this age. 
In 1985 the RCMAS was commercially published with a manual by Reynolds and 
Richmond. The scale includes a total anxiety score and three factor analytically 
derived scales as well as a lie scale. These scales include somatic problems 
(Physiological Anxiety), worry and rumination (Worry/Oversensitivity) and 
concentration and attention difficulties (Social Concerns! Concentration). 
Responses are based upon a yes/no format, and norms are provided for children 
between 6 and 19 years of age. The standardisation sample included 4 972 school 
age children from the United States of America. Subscales were established in a 
study by Reynolds and Paget (1981). Reliability is based upon internal 
consistency ranging from .56 to .80 across the 11 age groups for its three factors, 
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and internal consistency coefficients for the total anxiety score is consistently 
above .80 (Reynolds & Richmond, 1985). Test-retest reliability is reported at one 
and five week retest intervals in a study by Wisniewski et al. (1987) using 
children in sixth, seventh and eighth grade classrooms. One week retest 
correlations were 0.88, and five week retest correlations were 0.77, suggesting 
excellent reliability. In all cases re-test means were lower than initial means. 
Construct validity is based upon the trait scale of the STAIC, and a correlation of 
0.85 (p<0.001) is reported (Reynolds, 1980) with a sample of clinic referred 
children. Reynolds (1980) also reported small but consistently positive 
correlations between children's ratings of their anxiety and teachers' observations 
of behaviour. A study by Lee, Piersel, and Unruh (1989) suggested that the 
Physiological scale of the RCMAS does not display convergent nor discriminant 
validity based on behavioural reports by teachers and parents. 
The different scales of the RCMAS have received limited attention in the research 
literature. A study by Lonigan, Carey, and Finch (1994) addressed the individual 
scales of the CDI and the RCMAS, assessing 233 in-patient children at a 
psychiatric unit of a medical school with the CDI and RCMAS. Results revealed 
that when controlling for the general distress elements using the depressed affect 
scale of the CDI, the anxious group scored higher on the RCMAS total and 
RCMAS Worry/Oversensitivity scale. They concluded that 
Worry/Oversensitivity represents the purest anxiety factor in the RCMAS. They 
further explained that the Physiological scale does not seem to be specific to 
anxiety, and the Social Concerns/Concentration scale is similar to the CDI, and 
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reflects depressed mood and negative self evaluation. The findings of Norvell, 
Brophy, and Finch (1985) foreshadow these findings. Using regression analyses, 
Norvell et al. (1985) found that the Physiological Anxiety and Social 
Concerns/Concentration scales of the RCMAS together predicted CDI Dysphoric 
Mood scale, while the Worry/Oversensitivity scale added no significant 
variance. 
The Lie Scale reflects a child's tendency to fake good, or to have an inflated or 
inaccurate sense of self. Hagborg (1991) reported that the Lie Scale showed 
concurrent validity as a measure of social desirability in a sample of non-clinical 
high school students. The Lie Scale did not correlate with the anxiety scales, or 
total score, suggesting that high scores on the Lie Scale do not contaminate the 
reporting of anxiety on the RCMAS in a non clinical sample. Reynolds (1981) 
reported that the Lie Scale appears to be a measure of defensiveness or social 
desirability, and suggested that the correlation of -0.5 between the Lie Scale and 
the STAIC state anxiety measure supports this, as children who were high on 
social desirability would be less likely to report high levels of state anxiety. 
In conclusion it appears that the RCMAS is a measure which has adequate 
reliability and validity as a self report measure of anxiety. Most studies of 
validity appear to have been completed with other self report measures of 
anxiety. The RCMAS is at worst a measure of negative affectivity, and at best the 
Worry/Oversensitivity scale is a promising measure which may tap distress 
more truly related to pure anxiety. Additionally, high scores on the Lie Scale 
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should not be taken as evidence that children will under-report anxiety 
symptoms on the rest of the scale. 
State Trait Anxiety Inventory for Children (STAIC; Spielberger, 1973) 
This scale has been discussed at some length in Chapter 2, particularly in relation 
to its utility as a specific measure of anxiety as opposed to a measure of general 
negative affectivity, and the factor analytic studies of the state scale. This section 
will be confined to discussion of other psychometric qualities of the instruments. 
The STAIC is a downward extension of the State Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; 
Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970) and was initially developed as a research 
tool for measuring anxiety in primary school aged children. It comprises two 
separate scales, one for measuring trait anxiety and one for measuring state 
anxiety. The different qualities of trait and state anxiety have been previously 
addressed in Chapter 2. Research evidence suggests that the trait and state scales 
are measuring different aspects of anxiety, and this was illustrated by Reynolds 
(1981) who demonstrated that the RCMAS was significantly correlated with the 
trait scale but not the state scale. The STAIC was initially developed to assess 
anxiety in 9- to 12-year-old children, but can be used with younger children with 
average or above reading ability, and older children of below average reading 
ability. The scale has since been appropriately used with grade 7 and grade 8 
children (Cross & Huberty, 1993). Test-retest reliability over a six week interval 
for the trait scale was only moderate, which Spielberger (1973) comments may be 
due to the instability of personality structure of children at this age. Reliability 
coefficients for the state scale are lower than the trait scale, as would be expected. 
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Internal consistency of the measure is reasonably good, but does not show the 
same stability as the STAI (Spielberger et al., 1970). The scale also shows 
adequate validity, by its correlations with the CMAS (Castenada et al., 1956). 
The trait scale of the STAIC consists of 20 statements asking children to report 
how they generally feel on a three point scale. The manual notes that girls report 
consistently higher trait anxiety scores than males, and that children from lower 
socioeconomic backgrounds score higher on the trait scale, but that race and 
grade do not impact upon reports of trait anxiety. 
The state scale consists of 20 statements measuring how children feel at a given 
moment in time, on a three point response scale. The state scale has also been 
shown to be sensitive to changes in instructions. Spielberger (1973) explained 
that children reported significantly higher state anxiety when asked how they 
would feel prior to their final examinations compared with how they felt in a 
normal situation and that each item on the scale was able to discriminate 
significantly between the normal and test conditions. Spielberger (1973) 
demonstrated that children with high trait anxiety experience elevations of state 
anxiety of greater intensity in response to dangerous or threatening stimuli than 
do those with lower levels of trait anxiety. Spielberger (1973) reports in the 
manual for the STAIC that situations in which failure is experienced or situations 
in which personal adequacy is evaluated are more likely to induce state anxiety 
scores of greater intensity in high trait anxious children. 
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State Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, 1983) 
The STAI is the original inventory designed by Spielberger and colleagues in 
1970, and is designed for use with an adult population. In 1983 an updated form, 
Form Y, was produced and published (STAI; Spielberger, 1983). The scale 
consists of 20 item trait and state forms, of which each has a four point response 
format. The manual notes that when state anxiety is measured in a neutral 
environment, it will be approximately equal to trait anxiety. As with the STAIC, 
the state scale of the STAI is sensitive to changes in immediate stress, such as 
examination induced stress, and elevated state anxiety is found in both males 
and females. The test-retest reliability of the trait scale is 0.71 and 0.75 for males 
and females respectively at 30 days, and 0.68 and 0.65 for males and females 
respectively at 60 days. As for the STAIC, the state anxiety scale reliability is less 
than the trait scale, particularly for females. All trait items have item total 
correlations above 0.30, and 19 of the state items reach at least this level. 
Adequate validity has also been established for the STAI (Spielberger, 1983). 
The manual provides norms for high school students, college students, working 
adults, and military recruits. The high school sample is based on the responses 
of 424 tenth grade students in regular class periods. While the STAI is devised 
for use with senior high school students, the manual also claims that it can be 
used with junior high school students (Spielberger, 1983). Brown et al. (1986) 
uses the STAI rather than the STAIC with their older groups of children. 
As with the STAIC, there is evidence to support a factor structure for the STAI 
based upon positive and negative items. Items on Form Y trait anxiety include 
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both positively and negatively valenced items, or anxiety present and anxiety 
absent items. This differs from the STAIC Trait scale, which has only anxiety 
present items. As a result of this the trait and state scales of the STAI are both 
two factor scales, and these factors represent the positively and negatively 
valenced items of the trait and state anxiety scales (Spielberger, 1983). 
In conclusion, both the RCMAS and STAIC are adequate measures of anxiety in 
children, while the STAI is an adequate measure of anxiety in adolescents. The 
RCMAS has the advantage of providing assessment of anxiety across a wide age 
range and provides additional information through its subscales. The STAIC is 
not recommended for children above sixth grade and the adult version can be 
used to assess anxiety in upper high school students. The advantage of the 
STAIC and STAI is that they also provide state measures of anxiety, which are 
sensitive to transient fluctuations in anxiety which is important in any 
experiment assessing anxiety induction procedures. 
Concluding comments 
The current chapter has covered some important methodological issues in the 
study of anxiety and anxiety-induced cognitions. Consideration has been given 
to a number of methods of assessing cognition in children, and methods of 
categorising cognitions once they have been assessed. The use of imagery in 
inducing anxiety in children has also been discussed, as well as the three main 
self report measures of anxiety to be used in the thesis. The next chapter will 
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now establish the research aims of the thesis. These will be based on the 
literature presented in Chapters 2, 3 and 4. 
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Chapter 5: Research Aims and Objectives 
The aims of the thesis are based upon the research reviewed in the previous three 
chapters. The thesis will focus on anxiety-induced cognitions in children and 
adolescents from regular schools. Anxiety will be assessed via self report 
measures of anxiety. 
It is clear that there is limited understanding of the role of cognition in anxiety in 
children and adolescents, and the manner in which the role of cognition varies 
across different age groups and between genders. Research into anxiety-induced 
cognitions in children is limited and has not followed an established route. 
Therefore there are many different methodologies for studying cognition in 
children, and little validation of these methods. Most studies of anxiety-related 
cognitions have used fear stimuli to induce anxiety, for example, test taking or 
going to the dentist. However, these stimulus situations may elicit differing 
levels of fear according to the age and gender of the sample. Thus it is 
impossible to measure whether the results are truly associated with 
developmental level or are a function of the developmental or gender differences 
in fears of the stimulus material. A consequence of this is that results may not be 
generalisable to different age groups, or between males and females. 
The initial experiment in the thesis aims to establish a range of suitable stimulus 
items for inducing anxiety to measure the resultant cognitions. These items will 
be selected from the Fear Survey Schedule for Children II (FSSC-II; Gullone & 
King, 1992a) and will be reported with a notable level of fear and will not be 
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affected by the grade level or gender of the participants. The stimulus items will 
each be selected from qualitatively different fear domains. Research has 
suggested that children and adults with high trait anxiety show increased anxiety 
responses to situations of social evaluative threat, so one item will be chosen to 
reflect social evaluative fear. Each item will also be significantly correlated with 
trait anxiety. The items selected from this experiment will therefore provide a 
theoretically sound basis from which to investigate the aims of the thesis. 
The second experiment of the thesis will develop these fear items into scenarios 
which will be used to induce state anxiety in children. The scenarios will be 
presented to children and their resultant levels of state anxiety will be measured. 
Given that the fear items have been selected because they induce similar levels of 
fear across the age range, it is hypothesised that there will be no significant effect 
of grade on state anxiety responses to the scenarios which are developed on the 
basis of the fear items. Similarly, given that the items have been selected because 
they display no gender differences, then it is also hypothesised that there will be 
no gender differences in the reported levels of state anxiety in response to them. 
If this experiment establishes that the scenarios induce simular levels of state 
anxiety across the grades and between the genders, then a valid means of 
assessing changes in anxiety-induced cognitions across the age range and 
between genders will have been established. 
As research has suggested that the state scale of the STAIC is a two factor scale 
when measured under baseline conditions, a subsidiary methodological 
hypothesis of this experiment is that this factor structure of the STAIC state scale 
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will remain unchanged under induced state anxiety conditions. If the two factor 
structure can be reliably established using these data, state anxiety will be 
measured as a total scale and as two separate subscales in subsequent analyses, 
thus allowing greater understanding of the role of state anxiety in children and 
adolescents. 
Experiment 2 will also measure cognitive responses to the scenarios via the 
think-aloud method, and utterances will be recorded and categorised according 
to whether they are 'positive statements', 'coping statements', 'internal threat 
statements' or 'external threat statements'. The initial and central aim of this 
second experiment is to investigate whether the output of the four cognitive 
categories is affected by grade or gender. On the basis of previous research it is 
hypothesised that there will be an increase in coping and threat statements as 
grade increases. Since there is no research which has provided any evidence 
regarding the developmental profile of positive statements, it is not possible to 
pose directional hypotheses regarding these types of cognitions. On the basis of 
previous research it is hypothesised that females will report higher levels of 
threat and coping statements, and males will report higher levels of positive 
statements. 
The second central aim of experiment 2 is to investigate the correlations between 
measures of anxiety and cognitive output. It is hypothesised that coping and 
threat statements will be significantly positively correlated with state . and trait 
anxiety. Since the research literature which addresses the relationship between 
anxiety and positive statements is divided, with one set of literature 
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demonstrating a negative relationship between anxiety and positive statements, 
and another set demonstrating no link between the two, no directional 
hypothesis is posed regarding the relationship between positive statements and 
anxiety. Instead, further investigation of this issue will be conducted. 
Previous research has suggested that the pattern of cognitions varies according to 
the stimulus situation. Experiment 2 will attempt to investigate further how the 
pattern of cognitions varies across the stimulus situations employed in this 
experiment. It is hypothesised that there will be a significant difference in the 
pattern of reported cognitions according to the anxiety-inducing scenario. 
The third experiment of the thesis will aim to demonstrate a causal link between 
the various types of cognitions collected in experiment 2 and measures of state 
anxiety. Cognitions produced in experiment 2 will be selected from each of the 
four cognition categories, and inserted into one of the scenarios to produce four 
separate scenarios, each with a different type of cognition. The cognitions will be 
inserted into the anxiety-inducing scenarios as if the children are thinking these 
thoughts themselves. In effect this will take the dependent variables of 
cognitions measured in the previous experiment and turn them into independent 
variables to assess how effectively they induce anxiety in individuals. It is 
hypothesised that the positive statements scenario will induce significantly less 
state anxiety than the coping or threat scenarios. As these scenarios contain 
different cognitions, the effect of grade and gender on state anxiety responses to 
these scenarios will be investigated. It is hypothesised that there will be no effect 
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of grade on state anxiety, and that females will report higher levels of state 
anxiety in response to the anxiety-inducing scenarios than males. 
A checklist of cognitions will be developed, consisting of the cognitions in the 
four scenarios. The aim of this measure is to assess whether participants report 
back the cognitive content presented to them in the scenario and to assess how 
effectively the cognitive content of the scenarios has impacted upon the 
participants' reports of cognition. It is hypothesised that participants will report 
significantly more of the cognitions presented to them than the other categories 
of cognition. To establish convergent construct validity of the scale, it is 
hypothesised that trait anxiety will be significantly positively correlated with 
reported threat statements and coping statements on the checklist. The 
intercorrelations between the scales of the checklist will also be investigated. To 
establish the internal consistency of the scales of the checklist, intercorrelations 
between the scales will be measured. It is hypothesised that there will be 
positive correlations between the coping and threat scales of the checklist. 
The data collected from this checklist will also be employed to assess the effects 
of grade and gender on reported cognitions. Again it is hypothesised that 
females will report significantly more coping and threat statements and 
significantly less positive statements. Additionally, the data collected from the 
cognitions checklist will be used to investigate further the relationship between 
anxiety and cognitions. As for experiment 2 it is hypothesised that there will be a 
significant positive relationship between state anxiety and reported threat and 
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coping cognitions, and the relationship between positive statements and anxiety 
will be further investigated. 
A methodological comment on Experiment 3 is that only one of the three 
scenarios from experiment 2 will be used. Experiment 4 will attempt to replicate 
and extend the findings of experiment 3. 
A large number of statistical tests will be performed in the course of these 
experiments. It has been decided to use an alpha level of 0.05 to assess statistical 
significance. Type one errors will be controlled for by replicating the major 
findings in successive experiments, and by varying the methodology by 
changing the dependent variables of cognitive output measured in experiment 2, 
to independent variables in experiments 3 and 4. 
This chapter has briefly outlined the major aims and hypotheses of the thesis. 
These aims and hypotheses will guide the four experiments which comprise the 
thesis. The following chapter presents the initial experiment of the thesis. 
81 
Chapter 6: Experiment 1- Selection of Stimulus Items 
The preceding chapters have highlighted the need for research which assesses 
anxiety-related cognitions in children using stimuli which produce an equivalent 
level of fear across the age range. Many of children's fears change throughout 
development (e.g., Gullone & King, 1992b) and it is likely that if such fear stimuli 
are used to induce anxiety experimentally, they will produce different cognitive 
output at different developmental stages thus masking any true developmental 
differences in anxiety-induced cognitions. 
The role of gender is also an important consideration in developing stimulus 
items to assess anxiety-related cognitions. Anxiety disorders symptomatology 
are over represented in girls (Kashani et al., 1989; Muris, Merckelbach, Mayer, & 
Meesters, 1998). Further, girls consistently report more fears than boys (e.g., 
Ferrari, 1986; Gullone & King, 1992b; 011endick & King, 1991) and with girls 
there are higher correlations between self report of fear and self report of anxiety 
than with boys (011endick, 1983). This suggests that research which addresses 
anxiety-related cognitions should employ stimulus situations which show no 
significant gender differences so that any resultant cognitive output will be truly 
related to gender differences in cognitive output rather than differences in fear of 
the stimulus item. 
This first experiment therefore attempts to establish a set of stimulus items which 
meet a number of criteria using items selected from the Fear Survey Schedule for 
Children (FSSC-II; Gullone & King, 1992a). As this experiment addresses 
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methodological issues, it is not addressing particular hypotheses, but selecting 
items which meet certain criteria. The criteria for the selection of items are that: 
1. They represent a range of fear domains in children; 
2. They elicit no difference in the reported fears of children from grade 3 to grade 
10; 
3. They elicit no gender differences in fear responses; and 
4. They are significantly correlated with trait anxiety. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were selected in whole class groups from three different primary 
schools and a high school. Children were selected from grades 3, 4, 5, 7 and 10, 
in order to sample a wide range of participants. For practical reasons is was 
difficult to be granted access to the same range of students in high school 
students. Children whose parents had not given consent did not participate in 
the experiment. A total of 311 students participated in the experiment, which 
was completed in a classroom setting. A breakdown of participants by grade and 
gender can be seen in table 1.1 below. 
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Table 1.1: Participants by grade and gender. 
Gender 
Females Males Total 
Grade 
3 30 37 67 
4 32 33 65 
5 20 28 48 
7 24 40 64 
10 30 37 67 
Total 136 175 311 
The average age for grade 3 students was 8 years 8 months (standard deviation 
3.6 months), for grade 4 students was 9 years 4 months (standard deviation 3.5 
months), for grade 5 students was 10 years 6 months (standard deviation 4.9 
months), for grade 7 students was 12 years 5 months (standard deviation 5.8 
months) and for grade 10 students was 15 years 4 months (standard deviation 4.6 
months). 
Measures 
Students completed the FSSC-II (Gullone & King, 1992a). This instrument is a 78 
item self report scale asking participants to report how scared they are of 
different items on a three point likert type scale (from 1, 'not scared' to 3 'very 
scared') so the lowest possible score on the FSSC-II is 78 if participants respond 
with 'not scared' to all items, and 234 if they respond with 'very scared' to all 
items. The FSSC-II was forwarded to the experimenter by the first author of the 
scale, and there are some slight differences between this instrument and the one 
reported in Gullone and King (1992a). Three extra items ('riding in a car or bus', 
'going to the dentist' and 'having to go to school') are included in this scale (See 
Appendix Al). 
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All participants completed the trait scale of the STAIC (Spielberger, 1973) except 
the grade 10 students who completed the more age appropriate STAI 
(Spielberger, 1983). The STAIC is a 20 item scale, with items scored on a three 
point scale and a minimum score of 20 and maximum of 60. The STAI is also a 20 
item scale, but is scored on a four point scale with a minimum of score of 20 and 
a maximum of 80. 
Procedure 
Participants completed both instruments in the normal classroom setting. The 
investigator read aloud the standard instructions followed by each item for the 
grade 3, grade 4 and grade 5 participants. Standard instructions for the STAIC 
allow the examiner to read items aloud when there is some doubt about the 
reading ability of the participants. See Appendix B1 for administration 
instructions. 
Results 
The results section of this chapter will address the four criteria for selection of 
stimulus items outlined in the introductory section of this chapter. Prior to this 
an outline of the data will be presented covering mean trait anxiety and mean 
fear scores by gender and grade. 
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Methodological Issues 
Sample characteristics: trait anxiety 
Mean STAI and STAIC trait anxiety scores and the T scores corresponding to 
these means for males and females across all grades are given in table 1.2 below. 
The T scores in the manual of the STAIC are calculated separately for gender 
across all grades, while the T scores for the STAI are calculated separately for 
gender on a sample grade 10 students. 
Total mean trait anxiety on the STAIC was 32.10, with a standard deviation of 8.1. 
Further to this, 19% of females and 3.7% of males had STAIC trait scores above 
one standard deviation above the mean. In a normal population 16% of 
participants would be expected to have trait anxiety more than one standard 
deviation above the mean. A two way ANOVA for grade by gender was 
performed on STAIC trait anxiety raw scored, and there was a significant effect 
of grade [F(4, 228)=2.90 p<0.05], with trait anxiety increasing to grade 5 and then 
decreasing to grade 7, and gender [F(1, 228)=15.74, p<0.05[ with females 
reporting more trait anxiety than males. There was no significant interaction 
between grade and gender [F(3, 228)=0.11, ns]. 
Total mean trait anxiety on the STAI was 42.25 with a standard deviation of 9.1. 
Grade 10 participants (STAI) had T scores of 53 and 51 for females and males 
respectively, placing them just within the average range. Twenty percent of 
females and 19% of males completing the STAI had scores more than one 
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Gender 
Females 
Males 
Total 
Grade 3 
33.58 (8.7) 
T=45 
n=30 
30.40 (7.8) 
T=39 
n=37 
31.75 (8.3) 
Grade 4 
34.75 (8.9) 
T=47 
n=32 
30.82 (8.3) 
T=40 
n=33 
32.75 (8.8) 
Grade 5 
37.30 (7.5) 
T=50 
n=20 
32.50 (7.8) 
T=42 
n=28 
34.50 (8.0) 
Grade 7 
32.70 (6.5) 
T=44 
n=24 
28.23 (6.1) 
T=35 
n=40 
29.89 (6.6) 
Grade 10 
43.90 (8.7) 
T=53 
n=30 
40.65 (9.3) 
T=51 
n=37 
42.25 (9.1) 
standard deviation above the mean. A t test revealed no gender differences in 
responses to the STAI [t(59) =1.41, ns]. 
Table 1.2: Means, standard deviations (in parentheses), T scores and numbers 
for STAI and STAIC trait anxiety and means and standard deviations (in 
parentheses) for FSSC-II score by gender and grade. 
STAI and STAIC Trait Anxiety Scores 
FSSC-II Scores 
Gender Grade 3 	Grade 4 	Grade 5 	Grade 7 	Grade 10 
Females 137.82 (27.8) 144.46 (32.6) 145.89 (21.9) 135.05 (19.6) 124.29 (21.26) 
n=30 	n=32 	n=20 	n=24 	n=30 
Males 	116.03 (22.5) 115.85 (28.3) 124.79 (22.8) 104.83 (16.7) 108.21 (16.96) 
n=37 	n=33 	n=28 	n=40 	n=37 
Total 	125.08 (26.8) 130.42 (33.5) 134.12 (24.69) 117.52 (23.3) 115.47 (20.5) 
Note that grade 10 students completed the STAI (which has a maximum score of 80) and the students in 
grades 3, 4, 5 and 7 completed the STAIC (which has a maximum score of 60). Note also that the T 
scores are those corresponding to the means of raw data, not the mean of individual T scores. 
Table 1.2 also shows FSSC-II means and standard deviations by grade and 
gender. The level of reported fear generally increased to grade 5, and then 
decreased in grades 7 and 10. Mean scores also show that fear scores were higher 
in females than males. Analysis of variance on FSSC-II total by grade and gender 
revealed that both main effects were significant [F(4, 253)= 5.54, p <0.05 and F(1, 
253)=64.59, p<0.01 respectively]. The interaction between grade and gender for 
FSSC-II was not significant [F(3, 228)=0.84, ns]. 
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Table 1.3 outlines the correlations between trait anxiety scores and FSSC-II total 
scores for each grade separately and for males and females separately. Note that 
the correlations between fear scores and trait anxiety is lower in grade 10 
participants than younger participants, perhaps reflecting the different trait 
anxiety measure employed with this group. 
Table 1.3: Correlations between trait anxiety and fear scores. 
Sample STAIC Trait STAI Trait 
Grade 3 0.73** 
n=50 
Grade 4 0.70** 
n=55 
FSSC-II Total Grade 5 0.67** 
n=43 
Grade 7 0.60** 
n=49 
Grade 10 0.33* 
n=58 
Females 0.64** 0.37, ns 
n=88 n=28 
Males 0.66** 0.20, ns 
n=109 n=30 
*p<0.05 
** p<0.01 
Selection of stimulus items 
Factor analysis of FSSC-II items 
A principal components factor analysis with varimax rotation was completed on 
all items of the FSSC-II for all 311 participants. Participants with missing data 
were deleted listwise leaving a total of 263 participants in the analysis. The 
Principal Components analysis accounted for 43% of the total variance, and 
extracted a total of five factors using Kaiser's criterion of factors, which extracts 
those factors with eigenvalues of greater than 1.00. Using a loading of +0.3 and 
above, this analysis revealed conceptually similar results to Gullone and King's 
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(1992a) study and the factors were given the same descriptors which can be seen 
in Table 1.4 below. The factors were 'fear of death and danger', 'fear of the 
unknown', 'fear of failure and criticism', 'psychic stress and medical fears' and 
'animal fears'. Items that differed from the study by Gullone and King (1992a) 
are starred, and have their factor placement from this study noted after them. 
Table 1.4: Principal components factor analysis rotated factor loadings for the 78 
items of the FSSC-II. 
Item I II 
Factor 
III IV V 
Factor 1: Fear of Death and Danger 
32 Myself dying 	 0.69 	0.02 0.14 0.15 -0.02 
31 Cyclones 0.67 0.20 0.06 -0.06 0.28 
33 Being hit by a car or truck 0.67 0.11 0.10 0.13 0.13 
38 Not being able to breathe 0.66 0.04 0.20 0.03 0.05 
56 Earthquakes 0.66 0.20 -0.01 0.05 0.29 
45 Someone in my family 
having an accident 0.66 0.22 0.27 0.03 -0.09 
19 Murderers 0.64 0.21 0.07 0.10 0.03 
28 Someone in my family dying 0.62 0.10 0.20 0.10 -0.10 
22 Being kidnapped 0.62 0.25 0.06 0.11 0.14 
36 Being threatened with a gun 0.61 0.21 0.10 0.14 0.16 
51 A burglar breaking into our house 0.60 0.33 0.24 0.07 0.08 
37 Bushfires 0.60 0.20 0.15 0.20 0.11 
11 Our country being invaded 0.59 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.26 
25 Fire 0.59 0.24 0.17 0.11 0.27 
64 AIDS 0.58 0.12 0.14 0.08 0.02 
43* My parents separating or 
getting divorced (F&C) 0.57 0.29 0.26 -0.08 -0.09 
14 Taking dangerous drugs 0.57 0.16 0.15 0.01 0.20 
13 Nuclear war 0.57 0.10 0.09 0.02 0.28 
23 Getting a serious illness 0.55 0.07 0.31 0.18 -0.11 
77 Falling from high places 0.55 0.25 0.05 0.28 0.14 
41* Drunk people (U) 0.52 0.29 0.17 0.07 0.19 
44 Getting an electric shock 0.52 0.21 0.02 0.02 0.12 
48 Someone in my family getting sick 0.44 0.18 0.34 0.10 -0.20 
17*  Violence on television (U) 0.36 0.19 0.05 0.17 0.16 
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Factor 2: Fear of The Unknown (cont..) 
53 Being alone at home 0.30 0.65 0.23 0.03 -0.01 
62* Thunder (AF) 0.07 0.63 0.10 0.04 0.29 
69* Thunderstorms (AF) 0.10 0.62 0.10 0.00 0.29 
75 Strangers 0.35 0.62 0.18 0.12 0.19 
65 Creepy houses 0.25 0.61 0.25 0.28 0.09 
49 Strange looking people 0.40 0.57 0.19 0.08 0.11 
46 Getting lost in a crowd 0.40 0.57 -0.02 0.16 0.06 
72 The sight of blood 0.23 0.56 0.12 0.14 0.10 
3 Being alone 0.26 0.54 0.33 -0.01 0.02 
52 Having bad dreams 0.25 0.54 0.20 0.20 0.03 
68 Getting lost in strange places 0.45 0.51 0.15 0.13 0.13 
67 Dead people 0.42 0.49 0.18 0.22 0.00 
39* Getting punished by my dad (F&C) 0.12 0.46 0.28 0.16 0.17 
35 Ghosts or spooky things 0.24 0.45 0.11 0.14 0.17 
12 Darkness 0.11 0.44 0.03 0.36 -0.21 
70* Cemeteries (AF) 0.30 0.44 0.14 0.41 -0.09 
54* Rats (AF) 0.09 0.43 0.21 0.34 0.33 
34* Being sent to the principal (F&C) 0.27 0.39 0.34 0.11 0.20 
58* Bees (AF) 0.10 0.38 0.19 0.31 0.35 
8 Being in closed places 0.30 0.32 0.23 0.14 0.11 
Factor 3: Fear of Failure and Criticism 
24* Meeting someone for first time (P&M) 0.09 0.03 0.63 0.25 0.07 
10 Getting bad marks at school 0.15 0.05 0.63 0.05 0.28 
47* Having no friends (P&M) 0.36 0.17 0.63 0.00 -0.20 
7* Losing my friends (P&M) 0.30 0.07 0.60 0.01 -0.01 
40 Failing a test 0.18 0.22 0.56 0.01 0.40 
59 Sitting for a test 0.08 0.21 0.49 0.26 0.07 
73 Looking foolish 0.17 0.37 0.48 0.11 0.00 
20 My parents criticising me 0.22 0.13 0.48 0.01 0.15 
1* Being teased (U) 0.06 0.39 0.45 0.01 0.18 
61 Getting my school report 0.10 0.16 0.43 0.40 0.03 
5* Riding in a car or bus 0.21 0.37 0.42 -0.04 0.37 
(not in Gullone & King, 1992a) 
55* Going to a new school (P&M) 0.18 0.28 0.42 0.28 0.08 
29 Making mistakes 0.14 0.27 0.42 0.09 0.17 
60* Being bullied (U) 0.19 0.38 0.40 0.22 0.14 
30 My parents arguing 0.31 0.33 0.38 0.01 0.05 
21* Being in a fight (U) 0.25 0.34 0.36 0.13 0.22 
Factor 4: Psychic stress and medical fears 
15* Going to the dentist 0.04 0.06 -0.04 0.60 0.04 
(not in Gullone & King, 1992a) 
9 Going to the doctor 0.14 0.02 0.15 0.57 0.00 
57 Getting an injection from a 
nurse or doctor 0.25 0.35 0.02 0.52 0.07 
16 Having to talk in front of my class -0.04 -0.19 0.43 0.50 0.09 
2* Rides like the big dipper (U) 0.17 0.01 0.02 0.47 0.22 
26* Having an operation (D&D) 0.43 0.23 0.15 0.45 0.14 
18 Spiders 0.14 0.25 0.23 0.41 0.13 
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Factor 4: Psychic stress and medical fears (cont...) 
76 Having to go to hospital 0.37 0.39 0.08 0.41 0.11 
63* Lizards (A) -0.06 0.20 0.00 0.39 0.33 
74* Flying in a plane (U) 0.02 0.16 0.08 0.32 0.28 
6* Mice (A) -0.03 0.15 0.18 0.31 0.10 
Factor 5: Animal Fears 
66* Tigers (D&D) 0.30 0.17 0.16 0.08 0.55 
78* Sharks (D&D) 0.45 0.17 0.03 0.20 0.51 
71 Dingoes 0.31 0.23 0.20 0.05 0.50 
42 Snakes 0.39 0.29 0.09 0.35 0.45 
50* Getting punished by my mum (F&C) 0.12 0.39 0.34 0.11 0.40 
Other 
4 Being criticised by others 0.06 0.02 0.07 0.11 0.24 
27 Having to go to school -0.16 0.12 -0.04 0.08 0.06 
* Items which differ from the study by Gullone and King (1992a) where placement is shown as follows: 
D&D= Fear of death and danger factor, U= Fear of the unknown, F&C= Fear of failure and criticism 
P&M= Psychic stress and medical fears, A= Animal fears 
Items with no significant effect of grade 
Analyses of variance were completed for each FSSC-II item by grade. The results 
of these analyses can be seen in Appendix Cl. Items which did not show a 
significant effect of grade were selected for further consideration, and ANOVAs 
were then conducted on each of these items for grade separately for males and 
females. The results of these analyses are presented in Appendix C2. Those 
items with no effect of grade for either males or females were again selected for 
further consideration. At this stage there were only 31 items which satisfied 
these selection criteria. Selected items were then analysed for gender differences 
using independent samples t tests and the results of these analyses are presented 
in Appendix C3. There were only two items which showed no significant gender 
differences: 'sitting for a test' and 'rides like the big dipper', and all other items 
showed significantly higher fear levels in females than in males. 
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Correlations between fear items and trait anxiety 
All selected items were then correlated with trait anxiety scores. Correlation 
coefficients are presented below in Table 1.5. Note that all items correlate 
positively and significantly with STAIC trait anxiety, except for 'going to the 
doctor', although this item does correlate significantly and positively with STAI. 
Correlations between items and the STAI trait anxiety scores, that is all grade 10 
students, were generally low and not significant, apart from some items in the 
'Fear of the Unknown', 'Fear of Failure and Criticism' and 'Psychic Stress and 
Medical Fears' factors. 
Table 1.5: Correlation between trait anxiety and fear items 
Item STAIC Trait 
n=243 
STAI Trait 
n=67 
13 
Factor 1: Far of Death and Danger 
Nuclear war 	 0.39** 0.01 
23 Getting a serious illness 0.34** 0.05 
38 Not being able to breathe 0.38** 0.01 
45 Someone in my family 
having an accident 0.46** 0.16 
48 Someone in my family 
getting sick 0.33** 0.09 
64 AIDS 0.38** 0.11 
Factor 2: Fear of the Unknown 
8 Being in closed places 0.33** 0.10 
21 Being in a fight 0.32** 0.27* 
35 Ghosts or spooky things 0.33** 0.43** 
54 Rats 0.31** 0.31* 
62 Thunder 0.36** -0.01 
Factor 3: Fear of Failure and Criticism 
1 Being teased 0.22** 0.37** 
2 Rides like the big dipper 0.20** 0.06 
7 Losing my friends 0.34** 0.24 
29 Making mistakes 0.34** 0.25* 
40 Failing a test 0.37** -0.05 
47 Having no friends 0.45** 0.08 
55 Going to a new school 0.48** 0.18 
59 Sitting for a test 0.28** -0.10 
60 Being bullied 0.32** 0.34** 
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Factor 3: Fear of Failure and Criticism (Cont.—) 
73 Looking foolish 	 0.48** 
Factor 4: Psychic stress and medical Fears 
0.22 
9 Going to the doctor 	 0.13 0.35** 
26 Having and operation 0.41** 0.05 
63 Lizards 0.20** 0.09 
70 Cemeteries 0.39** 0.29* 
Factor 5: Animal Fears 
78 Sharks 0.38** 0.07 
* p<0.05 
** p<0.01 
Discussion 
Methodological issues 
Sample characteristics 
All participants completed the STAIC or STAI (depending on their age) and the 
FSSC-II. T scores corresponding to the mean trait anxiety scores on the STAIC 
fell either at or below average. Males tended to fall at a lower level than females, 
and there were notably more females with scores more than one standard 
deviation above the mean than males. Mean STAIC trait anxiety overall was 
lower than those scores reported elsewhere for similar samples (Houston et al., 
1984; Strauss et al., 1988). Trait anxiety peaked in grade 5 and decreased in grade 
7. Gender differences in trait anxiety were also evident, with females reporting 
higher levels of trait anxiety, which is consistent with the manual for the STAIC 
(Spielberger, 1973). 
Analyses then addressed the effect of grade and gender on FSSC-II. These 
analyses revealed that total fear scores increased to grade 5 and then decreased in 
grade 7 and 10. This profile is equivalent to the findings with the STAIC across 
grades. Gullone (1992) and Gullone and King (1992a) report an effect of age on 
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the FSSC-II, but this is a consistent decrease in total fear scores across the grades. 
Females in the current experiment reported higher levels of fear than males, 
which is consistent with the findings of other studies (e.g., Ferrari, 1986; Gullone 
& King, 1992b; 011endick & King, 1991). Overall the mean fear scores reported in 
the current experiment are lower than those reported by Gullone and King 
(1992a). 
Criteria for stimulus selection 
Selection criterion I: fear domains 
The first step in analysis was to establish the fear domains covered by the FSSC-
II. Principal components factor analysis grouped the items into a five factor 
solution. Results of the factor analysis were generally consistent with the results 
obtained by Gullone and King (1992a). The five factors in the solutions were: 
'Fear of Death and Danger', 'Fear of the Unknown', 'Fear of Failure and Criticism', 
'Psychic Stress and Medical Fears', and 'Animal Fears'. 
There was a number of differences between this experiment and Gullone and 
King (1992a) which may be attributable either to the lower number of 
participants or to the more restricted age range used in the current experiment. 
Of note, there were only 263 participants in this experiment ranging from 8 to 16 
years of age, as opposed to 918 participants ranging from 7 to 18 years. Generally 
the differences did not cause conceptual difficulties for the factor structure. There 
was a number of other items which loaded equally on two factors, for example 
'cemeteries' loaded almost equally on 'Fear of the Unknown' and 'Psychic Stress 
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and Medical Fears'. Other items were not conceptually consistent with the factor 
upon which they loaded, for example, 'riding in a car or bus' came under 'Fear of 
Failure and Criticism'. Factor five, animal fears, had only five items, one of 
which was 'getting punished by my mum', which had a very low loading on this 
factor, and loaded almost equally with factor 2 (fear of the unknown) which is 
where 'getting punished by my dad' fell. 'Fear of Death and Danger' was the 
largest factor and consisted of a majority of the highly feared items. 
Selection criterion 2: effect of grade 
The second step in the analysis was to select those items which showed no 
significant effect of grade. There were 32 items which had no significant effect of 
grade overall and for males and females separately. These findings do not 
guarantee that the items will continue to show no effect of grade when they are 
translated into imagery scripts for future research; however it does serve to 
provide a strong empirical basis for their selection. This empirical basis has not 
been reported elsewhere in the literature. 
Selection criterion 3: gender differences 
The third step in the analysis was to find items which did not elicit gender 
differences. Results showed that for almost all items, females reported higher 
levels of fear than males. The two items which showed no effect of gender were 
'sitting for a test' and 'rides like the big dipper', both of which were items with 
low fear scores, and therefore could not be considered for selection as anxiety 
stimuli. These gender differences in fear levels are consistent with previous 
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research which suggests that females report higher levels of fear than males (e.g., 
Ferrari, 1986; Gullone & King, 1992b; Muris et al.; 011endick & King, 1991). On 
the basis of these findings it appears that it is not possible to isolate items which 
show no significant difference between reported fear in males and females. 
Findings in future experiments will therefore need to take into account that 
females in general report higher levels of fear than males in response to the 
stimulus items. 
Selection criterion 4: correlation with trait anxiety 
The fourth and final step in the analysis was to correlate each of the selected fear 
items with trait anxiety scores, to assess the degree to which each item is related 
to trait anxiety. All but one of the items were significantly correlated with STAIC 
anxiety. Correlations with the STAI trait anxiety measures were less pronounced. 
This may in part due to the lower numbers of participants in these analyses. 
According to Cohen (1992), the correlations between anxiety and fear given in the 
results section of this chapter would fall between small and large, and could 
therefore be considered not only statistically significant, but also to varying 
degrees, clinically significant. 
Other considerations 
A number of items which are statistically suitable for use as anxiety-inducing 
stimuli in future research have been selected, and the practical and ethical issues 
of item selection will now be considered. Firstly, the selected items should not be 
too frightening for ethical reasons. Secondly they must be items which can 
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practically be developed into standard imagery scenarios that will be applicable 
to all children. Finally they must be items which can elicit significant fear, 
without creating undue distress to the child. Items in the 'Fear of Death and 
Danger' factor are ruled out on ethical and practical grounds. All selected items 
in this factor were rated with relatively high fear scores (i.e., above 2.00), and 
consisted of items such as 'nuclear war', 'AIDS', 'not being able to breathe' and 
'getting a serious illness', which could all cause significant distress to children, as 
they are items which pose a life threat to the child in some form. The remaining 
items 'someone in my family having an accident', and 'someone in my family 
getting sick' were considered too personal in nature. It would be difficult to 
write imagery scripts for these items which could be applied to all children. 
Selected items on the 'Fear of the Unknown' factor were rated at relatively low 
levels (below 1.50), and it is likely that these items would not induce significant 
levels of anxiety in participants, so they have also been ruled out. While the item 
'being in a fight' was found to evoke a slightly higher level of fear, it was decided 
that this item would also pose some ethical difficulties on the basis that such an 
item could cause significant distress to a child, because it involves aggressive 
physical threat to the child. 
Research has shown that social fears are good predictors of anxiety (e.g., 
Friedman et. al., 1991; 011endick & Yule, 1990), so it is important that an item 
from the 'Fear of Failure and Criticism' factor be included. Many items in this 
factor had relatively low levels of reported fear (below 1.50), so these items are 
ruled. There were three items with relatively high levels of reported fear (above 
2.00). These were 'losing my friends', 'having no friends' and 'going to a new 
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school'. 'Having no friends' was selected as it had the highest level of reported 
fear, and would easily lend itself to imagery in children from a range of different 
grades. 'Having no friends' correlates with STAIC trait anxiety at a level which 
would be considered a large effect (Cohen 1992), but there was no correlation 
with STAI trait anxiety. 
The 'Psychic Stress and Medical Fears' factor included only four items which met 
the statistical criteria explained earlier. Of these, 'having an operation' stood out 
as an item which would be a good selection for later research. The fear rating for 
'having an operation' was relatively high, at 1.89. Because this item does not 
involve aggressive physical threat in the same manner as an item such as 'being 
in a fight' does, it was considered ethically suitable for the purposes of future 
research. 'Having an operation' correlates with STAIC trait anxiety at a level 
which would be considered a medium effect (Cohen, 1992) but does not correlate 
with the trait scale of the STAI. 
'Sharks' is the only item from the 'Animal Fears' factor which is a possibility for 
use as an imagery item. While there may be some doubts about the use of an 
item with such a high fear rating, it was decided that 'sharks could still be used 
as an imagery item if effective debriefing procedures are employed. The item 
would also be easily developed into a standard imagery scenario for children. 
The correlation of 'sharks' with the STAIC trait anxiety measure would be 
considered a medium effect (Cohen, 1992) but again there is no correlation 
between this item and STAI trait anxiety. 
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Conclusions 
This chapter reported on the selection of a group of stimuli to used in later 
experiments to assess more accurately children's anxiety-related cognitions. This 
approach has not been reported elsewhere in the literature, and as such 
represents an important step toward developing a greater understanding of the 
developmental profile of anxiety and anxiety-related cognitions in children. The 
items which have been selected through this process ('having no friends', 'having 
an operation' and 'sharks') are from three qualitatively different factors, they 
show no effect of grade for either males or females and represent items that are 
significantly correlated with trait anxiety (at least for STAIC), with effect sizes 
that could be considered to fall between medium and large (Cohen, 1992). It is 
recognised that the items are not always significantly correlated with STAI trait 
anxiety, and that this may impact on the effect that these items have as anxiety 
inducing items in later studies. The items do however show significant gender 
differences. Chapter 7 will now address how these items were developed into 
imagery scenarios which were then used with children to stimulate cognitive 
responses to anxiety. 
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Chapter 7: Experiment 2- Think-aloud Production of 
Cognitions 
Chapter 6 described the initial experiment in the thesis, which isolated three 
items from the FSSC-II to be used as the basis of the experiment described in this 
chapter. The items were 'having no friends', having an operation' and 'sharks'. 
These items represent three different fear domains, they show no effect of grade, 
and they are all correlated with trait anxiety. However females rate them as 
more fearful, as it was not possible to find appropriate items which had no 
gender differences. The present experiment aims to develop these items into 
imagery scenarios which will be used to induce anxiety in children as outlined in 
Chapter 4 (e.g., Hermecz & Melamed, 1984). After anxiety induction, this 
experiment will measure the resultant cognitions using the think-aloud method, 
which was discussed in Chapter 4. 
Research into developmental changes in anxiety-related cognitions is still in its 
infancy. No research has attempted to investigate anxiety-related cognitions 
while controlling for developmental differences in fear associated with the 
stimulus items, so this experiment aims to fill this gap by using the items selected 
in the previous experiment. No studies addressing the developmental aspects of 
anxiety-related cognitions appear to use a think-aloud procedure to allow for 
more direct measurement of internal thoughts. While questions about the 
validity of the think-aloud method have been previously raised, Genest and Turk 
(1981) state that it is appropriate to use such less structured methods of 
assessment in the early stages of research. Most studies use self report measures, 
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which limit the possible range of responses for children. There is some 
indication that as children develop cognitively, they develop the ability to see 
more possible responses to an anxiety producing situation, therefore producing 
more coping thoughts or worries (Brown et al., 1986; Vasey, 1993). There is also 
evidence to suggest that the pattern of cognitions reported by children changes as 
a function of the situation (Brown et al., 1986). 
Literature which addresses the cognitive correlates of arudetyin children has 
revealed that anxiety in children is positively related to both internal and 
external threat cognitions (Fox et al., 1983; Houston et al., 1984; Prins, 1986; Zatz 
& Chassin, 1983, 1985) and to coping cognitions (Zatz & Chassin, 1985).. As 
discussed in Chapter 4, the relationship between positive statements and anxiety 
is unclear. Some researchers have found evidence to suggest a negative 
relationship between positive statements and anxiety (e.g., Blankstein et al., 1992; 
Galassi et al., 1981; Zatz & Chassin, 1983, 1985), while others have found no 
relationship between them (Fox et al.; 1983, Prins et al., 1981). There is however 
some evidence to suggest that the pattern of cognitions reported by children 
varies as a function of the stimulus situation (Brown et al., 1986). 
Studies which address the cognitive correlates of anxiety generally assess the role 
of trait anxiety. There have been few studies which assess how state anxiety 
correlates with cognition. There is research to show that STAIC state anxiety is 
not a unified scale, but is made up of two factors, which consist of the positive 
and negative items of the scale (Cross & Huberty, 1993; Dorr, 1981; Papay & 
Hedl, 1978). It is therefore important to clarify the role cognitions play in state 
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anxiety, and further, how the two factor scales of the STAIC state anxiety scale 
are related to cognitions. 
Using the think-aloud production method of measuring cognitions in response to 
the three selected stimuli items, three methodological hypotheses are posed: 
1. That induced state anxiety will fall into two distinct factors representing the 
positive and negative items on the STAIC. 
2. That state anxiety in response to the three scenarios will not significantly differ 
across the grades. 
3. That females will report significantly higher levels of state anxiety in response 
to the anxiety-inducing scenarios. 
Four theoretical hypotheses are also posed: 
1. That there will be significant differences in the pattern of reported cognitions 
depending on which anxiety induction scenario is presented. 
2. That there will be an increase in anxiety-induced cognitions as grade 
increases, particularly in the rates of threat and coping cognitions. 
3. That females will report significantly more coping and threat cognitions and 
significantly less positive statements. 
4. That threat and coping cognitions will be significantly positively correlated 
with state and trait anxiety. Since the evidence regarding the role of positive 
statements in anxiety is mixed, the relationship between anxiety and positive 
statements will be clarified. 
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Method 
Participants 
One hundred and twenty one students from grades 3, 5, 7 and 10 in two primary 
schools and one high school participated in the experiment on a voluntary basis, 
with parental consent. Table 2.1 shows the breakdown of participants by grade 
and gender. 
Table 2.1: Participants by grade and gender 
Gender 
Females Males Total 
Grade 
3 16 16 32 
5 15 16 31 
7 15 16 31 
10 13 14 27 
Total 59 62 121 
The average age for grade 3 students was 9 years 3 months (standard deviation 
5.3 months), for grade 5 students was 10 years 9 months (standard deviation 5.6 
months), for grade 7 students was 12 years 9 months (standard deviation 4.4 
months) and for grade 10 students was 15 years 9 months (standard deviation 4 
months). 
Design 
The experiment employed a 4 x 2 (grade x gender) factorial design, where each 
participant completed two of the three possible scenarios. While it would have 
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been ideal for each participant to complete all three scenarios, practical 
considerations made this difficult, so each completed only two of the possible 
three which helped to guard against fatigue. Scenarios were presented in 
counterbalanced order. 
Measures 
Three instruments were used to measure anxiety. The Spielberger State Trait 
Anxiety Inventory for Children (STAIC, Spielberger, 1973) was employed to 
measure both state and trait anxiety in students from grades 3, 5 and 7. Because 
the STAIC is designed for use with children up to sixth grade, but allows some 
leeway in age, this scale was used for participants up to grade 7 and the adult 
version, the State Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI, Spielberger, 1983) was used for 
the students in grade 10. This was similar to the age split used by Brown et al. 
(1986). The Revised Children's Manifest Anxiety Scale (RCMAS, Reynolds & 
Richmond, 1985) was employed as an additional instrument to measure anxiety 
in all age groups, and to clarify specific scales of anxiety. The scales of the 
RCMAS include the Physiological Anxiety Scale, the Worry/Over sensitivity 
Scale, the Social Concerns/ Concentration Scale and the Lie Scale. A shortened 
version of the Fear Survey Schedule for Children-II (FSSC-II, Gullone & King, 
1992a, see Appendix A2) was employed to validate the findings of experiment 1 
in relation to the fear responses to each of the chosen fear items. A visual imagery 
scale based upon Bett's QMI Vividness of Imagery Scale (Marks, 1989) was 
designed along similar lines to that used by Hermecz and Melamed (1984) to 
gain a measure of each student's self reported imagery of the stimulus items (see 
Appendices A3, A4 and A5). 
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Stimulus selection and development 
Imagery scenarios were based on the selected FSSC-II items, and aimed to be 
applicable for children in all age groups investigated by the experiment. Each 
scenario developed the scene across four discrete sections, with the final section 
providing resolution to the anxiety-inducing situation. When read aloud, each 
section took approximately 75 seconds. All scenarios are included in Appendix 
B2. The scenarios were written from the participants perspective so that when 
read out loud they could imagine themselves in the anxiety-inducing situation. 
Using a similar method to Hermecz and Melamed (1984), physiological and 
emotional response cues of anxiety were used to more effectively stimulate 
anxiety responses in the children. Response cues were taken from items of the 
STAIC and RCMAS, and there were three physiological and three emotional cues 
in each section of the imagery scenario. 
Procedure 
Students were individually introduced to the researcher who explained the 
nature of the experiment (including explanation of the use of an audio tape 
recorder) and ensured that students were willing to continue. Students then 
completed the STAI or STAIC, the RCMAS and the shortened form of the FSSC-
II. The investigator explained that she wanted the students to complete some 
imagination activities, with the aim of finding out what went through their 
minds, or what they said to themselves while they were imagining. Training was 
completed on a standard scene where students closed their eyes and imagined 
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themselves waking up in bed on their birthday, then said out loud what they 
were thinking. Training continued until the participants were verbalising 
fluently. 
For ethical reasons, screening questions were then asked of participants to ensure 
they were not presented with a situation that was likely to distress them unduly 
(see Appendix B2 for details). For example, in the shark scenario, participants 
were firstly asked if they were good swimmers, and if they swam at the beach. 
They were then asked if anything bad had ever happened to them or someone 
they knew while swimming. If they had experience of shark attack, they did not 
continue in the experiment. Similar questions were asked in the other scenarios, 
and only one participant was excluded from the experiment on this basis. 
The students were then asked to sit back, close their eyes and imagine what they 
were told as clearly as if they were actually there. A similar method was used by 
Hermecz and Melamed (1984) where they asked participants to involve 
themselves actively in the image, 'as if they were really there'. After presentation 
of each section, participants were asked keep imagining the situation and to say 
out loud what was going through their mind. They were prompted to report 
more twice before moving on to the next section. This was the only control over 
the amount that participants reported. All verbalisations were audio taped. 
After completion of the scenario, students were asked to fill in the visual imagery 
scale and the state scale of the STAI or STAIC. Debriefing followed this. The 
same procedure was followed for the second scenario. 
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Verbalisations were transcribed verbatim and unitised (see Blackwell et al., 1985; 
Davison et al., 1983; Eifert & Lauterbach, 1987; Genest & Turk, 1981). Unitisation 
was completed on a 50% sample of the total data by the investigator and a 
trained rater. Interrater agreement was calculated at 97%, which is considered 
acceptable according to Hartmann (1977), who suggests that 80% agreement is 
sufficient in such circumstances. As the method showed acceptable reliability, 
the investigator unitised the remainder of the data alone. 
Based on the literature with both adults and children (Fox et al., 1983; Houston et 
al., 1984; Ingram & Kendall, 1987; Prins, 1994; Vasey et al., 1994; Zatz & Chassin, 
1985), four categories were developed against which to rate the unitised data, 
namely positive statements, coping statements, internal threat statements and 
external threat statements. These four categories relate to the aims of the 
experiment, however they did not account for all of the data collected. All other 
cognitive output is included under the category of luncategorisable', and 
included cognitions which could be classed as 'wishing', or 'information 
seeking'. Table 2.2 shows the four categories and gives the descriptors of these 
categories. A rater was trained by the major investigator for four one-hour 
sessions, until there was consensus on rating of cognitions, and then the two 
raters independently rated the 3 512 individual cognitions. Interrater reliability 
was calculated at Kappa = 0.732 (p<0.05). Hartmann (1977) suggests that kappa 
should exceed 0.60 for acceptable reliability to be established. Disagreements 
were discussed between the two raters and decisions made upon consensus 
agreement. Final data therefore consisted of a total score for each category of 
cognition for both scenarios for each participant. 
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Table 2.2: The four categories of cognition and descriptors 
Category 	 Descriptor 
1. Positive Statements: Positive statements related to self and abilities, positive 
affect and positive physiological states 
2. Coping Statements: Statements exploring possible actions in response to the 
situation, usually in the form of 'should I?' statements, and problem solving 
statements aimed at positive action to control the situation. 
3. External Threat Statements: Statements relating to negative aspects of the 
situation or anticipation of future negative events, including 'what if?' 
statements. 
4. Internal Threat Statements: Put down of self or abilities, and expression of 
negative affect or physiological states 
Results 
The results section of this chapter deals initially with description of the sample 
employed in the experiment in terms of STAI, STAIC and RCMAS trait anxiety. 
The effectiveness of the anxiety induction is then assessed according to state 
anxiety levels. Methodological hypotheses along with other methodological 
issues are addressed in the next section. The theoretical hypotheses are 
addressed in the final section. 
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Methodological issues 
Sample characteristics: trait anxiety 
Mean STAIC, STAI and RCMAS anxiety scores and the T scores corresponding to 
these means for males and females across all grades are given in table 2.3 below. 
Note that the T scores in the manual of the STAIC are calculated on the basis of 
gender for a total group of students, the T scores for the STAI are also based on 
gender for a sample high school students, while T scores on the RCMAS are 
based on individual age and gender samples. 
Total mean trait anxiety on the STAIC was 33.79, with a standard deviation of 6.7. 
T scores corresponding to the mean STAIC trait anxiety scores for female 
participants in grades 3 to 7 were 47, 49 and 45 respectively, and for males these 
scores were 37, 45 and 43 respectively. Also, 15% of females but only 2% of 
males had STAIC trait scores above one standard deviation above the mean. 
Again, in a normal population 16% would be expected to fall in this range. A 
two way ANOVA for grade by gender was performed on STAIC trait anxiety 
data, and there was no significant effect of grade [F(2, 88)=2.32, ns] or gender 
[F(1,88)= 2.82, nst There was no significant interaction between age and gender 
[F(2,88)=2.08, ns]. 
Total mean trait anxiety on the STAI was 41.00 with a standard deviation of 9.2. 
Mean scores for grade 10 participants (STAI) correspond to T scores of 60 and 53 
for females and males respectively, placing them just within the average range. 
Also, 7% of females and 14% of males completing the STAI had scores which 
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were more than one standard deviation above the mean. In a normal population, 
16% would be expected to fall in this range. Analysis revealed no gender 
differences in responses to the STA' [t(92) =0.37, ns]. 
Total mean trait anxiety on the RCMAS was 11.25, with a standard deviation of 
6.0. For females the RCMAS T scores of the means were relatively stable around 
the mean of 50, with grade 7 female participants showing slightly higher trait 
anxiety than females in other grades, and males showing higher T scores than 
females. Percentages of scores falling above one standard deviation above the 
mean are not reported for the RCMAS, as there were only around 50 participants 
in each of the norm groups provided by the manual, which was considered 
insufficient to provide a valid picture of the sample. There was a significant 
effect of gender on RCMAS anxiety [F(1, 104)=4.24, p<0.05[, but no effect of grade 
[F(3, 105)=0.36, ns].  The interaction between grade and gender was not 
significant [F(3, 105)=0.30, nsl. 
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Table 2.3: Means, standard deviations (in parentheses), T scores and numbers 
for STAI and STAIC trait anxiety and RCMAS score by gender and grade. 
Males 
Total 
Gender 
Females 
Grade 3 
8.71 (5.7) 
T=45 
n=16 
12.88 (7.8) 
T=52 
n=16 
10.93 (7.1) 
STAIC Trait 
Grade 5 
35.87 (4.4) 
T=49 
n=15 
35.44 (7.5) 
T=45 
n=16 
35.65 (6.1)  
RCMAS Scores 
Grade 5 
10.07 (6.9) 
T=48 
n=16 
11.60 (3.7) 
T=54 
n=15 
10.83 (5.5) 
Anxiety Scores 
Grade 7 
33.73 (6.1) 
T=45 
n=15 
33.5 (4.4) 
T=43 
n=16 
33.61 (5.2) 
Grade 7 
11.31 (4.5) 
T=53 
n=16 
13.07 (6.8) 
T=57 
n=15 
12.16 (5.9) 
Grade 10 
41.69 (8.8) 
T=60 
n=13 
40.36 (9.9) 
T=53 
n=14 
41.00 (9.2) 
Grade 10 
10.21 (5.5) 
T=48 
n=14 
12.25 (4.8) 
T=57 
n=13 
10.95 (5.3) 
STAI and 
Gender 	Grade 3 
Females 	35.19 (9.3) 
T=47 
n=16 
Males 	29.13 (5.5) 
T=37 
n=16 
Total 	32.16 (8.1) 
Note that grade 10 students completed the STAI (which has a maximum score of 80) and the students in 
grades 3, 5 and 7 completed the STAIC (which has a maximum score of 60). Note also that the T scores 
are those corresponding to the means of raw data, not the mean of individual T scores. 
Effect of anxiety induction on state anxiety 
Table 2.4 shows the mean scores for STAIC and STAI state anxiety scores by 
gender and grade after completion of each of the three scenarios. T scores 
corresponding to the means are also given, and these show that mean scores for 
almost all groups are at least two standard deviations over the mean (apart from 
males and females in the operation scenario). In a normal population, 16% 
would be expected to be more than one standard deviation above the mean. 
According to the STAIC norms, for the operation scenario, 97% of females and 
males had scores which were at least one standard deviation above the mean. 
For the friends scenario, 100% of females and 93% of males reported state anxiety 
within this range. For the shark scenario, 100% of females and 97% of males 
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reported state anxiety within this range. For the STAI, 50% of females and 37% of 
males reported state anxiety which were more than one standard deviation above 
the mean in response to the operation scenario. For the friends scenario, 86% and 
100% of participants reported state anxiety in this range, and for the shark 
scenario 90% of both males and females reported state anxiety more than one 
standard deviation above the mean. 
Table 2.4: Mean STAIC and STAI state anxiety scores and standard deviations 
(in parentheses) across grades for all scenarios separately by gender. 
Gender Grade Friends 	 Operation 	Shark 
Female 	3 	52.80 (4.9) 50.73 (8.1) 51.67(2.8) 
T=79 	 T=77 	 1=78 
5 	51.30 (1.5) 	49.60 (6.6) 	53.27 (4.9) 
T=77 	 T=76 	 T=79 
7 	52.11 (3.7) 	51.56 (6.3) 	56.00 (3.6) 
T=78 	 T=78 	 T=80 
10 	67.43 (11.5) 	55.88 (12.2) 	68.90 (8.7) 
T=71 	 T=62 	 T=72 
Male 	3 	47.70 (10.4) 	46.60 (9.2) 	50.10 (7.9) 
T=71 	 T=71 	 1=73 
5 	48.00 (7.2) 	46.20 (7.3) 	51.80 (6.7) 
1=71 	 1=70 	 1=75 
7 	48.22 (5.1) 	48.30 (7.4) 	52.92 (5.2) 
1=71 	 1=71 	 T=75 
10 	69.00 (8.3) 	50.63 (13.2) 	66.50 (11.9) 
1=80 	 T=62 	 T=78 
Note that grade 10 students completed the STAI, which has a maximum score of 80, and the students in 
grades 3, 5 and 7 completed the STAIC, which has a maximum score of 60. 
Impact of grade and gender on state anxiety 
Analyses of variance were completed on state anxiety responses to all scenarios 
by grade and gender. For the friends scenario, there was no significant effect of 
grade [F(2,52)=0.05, nsk but there was a significant effect of gender [F(1, 52)=6.34, 
p<0.051, with females reporting higher state anxiety. There was no interaction 
between grade and gender [F(2, 52)=0.11, nsi Similarly for the operation scenario, 
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there was no significant effect of grade [F(2,54)=0.53, ns], but again there was a 
significant effect of gender [F(1, 54)=3.35, p<0.05], with females reporting higher 
state anxiety responses. There was no interaction between grade and gender 
[F(2, 54)=0.02, ns] for the operation scenario. State anxiety in response to the 
shark scenario showed no significant effect of grade or gender [F(2,56)=2.20, ns 
and F(1, 56)=2.05, ns respectively]. There was no interaction between grade and 
gender [F(2, 56)=0.15, ns] on state anxiety for the shark scenario. There were no 
significant gender differences in STAI state anxiety response to the operation, 
friends or shark scenarios [t(14 =0.83, ns; t (14) =0.32, ns; t (18) =0.52, ns 
respectively]. 
State anxiety factor structure 
A principal components factor analysis was completed on the individual items of 
the STAIC to assess whether the data in this experiment represented a two factor 
structure. A total of 94 participants completed the state scale of the STAIC in 
response to two scenarios. Responses to both anxiety-inducing scenarios were 
analysed, making a total of 180 state anxiety responses in the analysis (eight 
STAIC state anxiety responses were either omitted due to missing data were not 
completed by the participants). A two factor solution (negative state and positive 
state) was found following varimax rotation and using Kaiser's criterion of 
factors, which extracts factors with eigenvalues of greater than 1.00, which 
accounted a total of 43.2% of the variance. Membership of the two factors was 
accounted for by the valence of the items, with factor one accounting for all 
negative items, and factor two accounting for all positive items. Table 2.5 shows 
the item loadings for each factor. The factors were named negative state anxiety 
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(n-state) and positive state anxiety (p-state) to reflect the valence of the items that 
they represent. 
Table 2.5: Principal components factor analysis with varimax rotated factor 
loadings for the 20 items of the state scale of the STAIC 
Factor 
Item Number and Description 	 I II 
Factor 1: Negative State Anxiety 
11. Frightened 0.83 0.11 
7. Scared 0.82 0.01 
18. Terrified 0.74 0.03 
15. Troubled 0.70 0.02 
9. Worried 0.67 0.27 
19. Mixed up 0.64 0.17 
5. Jittery 0.62 0.08 
16. Bothered 0.60 0.32 
2. Upset 0.52 0.29 
4. Nervous 0.51 0.12 
Factor 2: Positive State Anxiety 
14. Good 0.14 0.69 
17. Nice 0.03 0.66 
20. Cheerful 0.05 0.63 
13. Sure 0.02 0.59 
3. Pleasant 0.24 0.56 
6. Rested 0.35 0.54 
8. Relaxed 0.43 0.53 
12. Happy 0.14 0.49 
10. Satisfied 0.04 0.48 
1. Calm 0.40 0.47 
RCMAS Lie Scale 
The Lie Scale has been correlated with all measures of trait and state anxiety. 
Results revealed that the Lie Scale correlated significantly and negatively with 
the trait scale of the STAIC (r=-0.24). There were no correlations between the Lie 
Scale and any of the state measures of anxiety in response to the scenarios. There 
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were no significant correlations between the Lie Scale and any of the cognition 
categories. 
Visual imagery scale 
The visual imagery scale was correlated with the cognition categories using 
Spearman's rank order correlation. For the operation scenario, there was a 
significant positive correlation between the total cognitions reported, and the 
level of reported imagery of the scenario (r=0.27, p<0.05). For the friends and the 
shark scenarios, there were no significant correlations between the visual 
imagery scales and any measures of cognitions. There were no significant 
correlations between the visual imagery scales and measures of state or trait 
anxiety, or the RCMAS Lie Scale. 
Replication of experiment I fear items 
FSSC-II responses to the three target items (operation, friends or shark) were 
investigated in the same manner as they were in experiment 1, as the aim was to 
replicate the findings of experiment 1 in relation to the three stimuli items. First 
it was demonstrated that there were no significant effects of grade on any of the 
target items [F(3, 112)=0.73, ns for the operation item; F(3, 109)=1.75, ns for the 
friends item; F(3, 112)=0.30, ns for the shark item]. The effect of grade for males 
and females was then assessed separately. There were no effects of grade for any 
of the scenarios for females [F(3, 54) =1.53, ns; F(3, 53) =0.24, ns; F(3, 54) =0.24, ns 
respectively], there was no effect of grade on the operation or the shark scenario 
for males [F(3, 54) =0.18, ns and F(3, 54) =0.79, ns respectively] however, there 
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was an effect of grade for males responses to the friends item [F(3, 52)= 2.98, 
p<0.05]. Post hoc analysis using LSD revealed that grade seven boys reported 
significantly higher levels of fear in response to the friends item than did males 
from any other grade. Gender differences were then assessed using t tests, and it 
was found that females reported significantly higher levels of fear in response to 
the operation and shark items [t(114)= 4.16, p<0.05 and t(114)= 2.49 p<0.05 
respectively]. There was no gender difference in response to the friends item 
R(111)=0.27, ns]. 
Theoretical issues 
Cognition responses by scenario 
Means and standard deviations have been calculated for each of the four cognition 
categories for all three scenarios and are reported in Table 2.6 below. These data 
represent the means of raw scores of participants on each of the categories for each 
scenario. Note that mean scores are low, and range from 0.06 for the positive 
statements in responses to the shark scenario to 6.76 for external threat cognitions 
in response to the operation scenario. There are high standard deviations for all 
categories, which reflect the large variance in the number of responses produced by 
students. Paired t-tests were used to explore the differences between response 
rates for different scenarios on each of the cognition types. Note that each 
participant completed only two of the three scenarios, so paired t tests measure the 
differences between each possible combination of two scenarios. 
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Table 2.6: Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of reported cognitions 
for each scenario and differences between the scenarios. 
Category Friends 
mean (sd) 
Operation 
mean (sd) 
Shark 
mean (sd) 
Significant 
Differences 
1. Positive Statements 0.15 (0.5) 0.21 (0.6) 0.06 (0.29) 
2. Coping statements 1.93 (2.8) 0.53 (1.3) 3.34 (2.8) a t(34)=3.15* 
b t(37)=3.41* 
t(38)=6.46* 
3. External threat 3.22 (4.83) 3.76 (4.1) 3.24 (3.2) 
4. Internal threat 2.90 (2.8) 2.76 (3.4) 2.68 (3.3) b t(37)=2.74* 
,significant difference between the friends and operation scenarios 
b significant difference between the friends and shark scenarios 
significant difference between the shark and operation scenarios 
*p<0.05 
Grade and gender differences in cognition 
Table 2.7 below shows the means and standard deviations for all four categories 
of cognition across the grades. To control for the differences in the total output of 
participants, analysis of covariance was completed on all data by grade and 
gender, using total number of cognitions as a covariate. 
For the friends scenario, total number of cognitions was a significant covariate for 
all four categories of cognition [F(1,64)=15.05, p<0.05; F(1,64)=6.47, p<0.05; 
F(1,64)=83.36, p<0.05 and F(1,64)=17.56, p<0.05 for positive, coping, internal and 
external threat cognitions respectively]. There were no significant effects of 
grade or gender for any of the categories. For the operation scenario again the 
total number of cognitions was a significant covariate for all categories 
W(1,67)=10.90, p<0.05; F(1,67)=7.66, p<0.05; F(1,67)=74.62, p<0.05 and 
F(1,67)=19.28, p<0.05 for positive, coping, internal and external threat cognitions 
respectively]. Again there were no significant effects of grade or gender for any 
of the categories. For the shark scenario, there was no main effect of the covariate 
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total cognitions for positive statements [F(1, 70)=1.98, ns], but there was for 
coping statements, external threat cognitions and internal threat cognitions 
[F(1,70)=108.65, p<0.05; F(1,70)= 36.56 p<0.05 and F(1,70)= 43.15, p<0.05 
respectively]. Again there were no effects of grade or gender on cognitions in 
response to the shark scenario. 
Table 2.7: Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of responses for each 
category of each scenario by grade. 
Cognition Grade Mean ANOVA 
3 5 7 10 Grade Gender 
Friends Data: 
Positive 0.00 (0.0) 0.25 (0.6) 0.11 (0.3) 0.25 (0.8) F(3,64)=0.68 F(1,64)=2.40 
Coping 1.67 (3.5) 1.60 (2.4) 2.37 (2.4) 2.13 (3.1) F(3,64)=0.41 F(1,64)=0.43 
External 2.11 (2.4) 4.40 (6.0) 2.32 (3.5) 4.06 (6.4) F(3,64)=0.94 F(1,64)=0.01 
Internal 3.11 (2.3) 2.85 (2.7) 2.11 (2.8) 3.69 (3.4) F(3,64)=0.83 F(1,64)=0.92 
Operation Data: 
Positive 0.05 (0.2) 0.15 (0.4) 0.45 (0.9) 0.19 (0.7) F(3,67)=1.92 F(1,67)=1.55 
Coping 0.90 (1.5) 0.00 (0.0) 0.60 (1.8) 0.63 (1.1) F(3,67)=1.64 F(1,67)=0.33 
External 3.80 (4.5) 3.20 (3.2) 3.00 (3.6) 5.38 (5.0) F(3,67)=1.06 F(1,67)=0.02 
Internal 2.35 (2.6) 2.20 (2.8) 2.35 (2.8) 4.50 (5.2) F(3,67)=1.38 F(1,67)=0.58 
Shark Data: 
Positive 0.00 (0.0) 0.05 (0.2) 0.10 (0.3) 0.11 (0.5) F(3,70)=0.45 F(1, 70)=0.90 
Coping 3.37 (2.9) 3.95 (2.9) 3.33 (2.9) 2.68 (2.7) F(3,70)=0.90 F(1, 70)=0.00 
External 3.63 (4.1) 2.55 (2.1) 2.81 (2.5) 4.05 (3.9) F(3, 70)=1.73 F(1, 70)=2.37 
Internal 3.00 (3.3) 2.20 (2.9) 3.14 (3.6) 2.37 (3.6) F(3, 70)=0.40 F(1, 70)=0.22 
Note that there are no significant effects in this table. 
Correlations between anxiety and cognition 
Correlational analyses using Spearman's rank order method were completed for 
each of the scenarios on each of the four cognition categories with RCMAS 
scores, STAIC trait, state and the two state factors (p-state and n-state), STAI trait 
and state anxiety. Correlations are given in Table 2.8 below. 
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Table 2.8: Correlations between number of cognitions, trait anxiety and state anxiety. 
RCMAS 
Total 
RCMAS 
Physio 
RCMAS 
Worry 
RCMAS 	STAIC 
Social Con Trait 
STAIC 
State 
STAIC 
P-State 
STAIC 
N-State 
STAI 
Trait 
STAI 
State 
Friends: 	n=70 n=70 n=70 n=70 n=57 n=55 n=55 n=55 n=16 n=15 
Positive 	0.00 0.01 -0.08 0.11 0.13 0.07 0.01 -0.00 -0.50 -0.50 
Coping 	0.21 0.07 0.25* 0.19 0.12 -0.07 -0.27* 0.06 -0.21 -0.41 
External 	0.13 0.24* 0.12 -0.15 0.13 0.32 0.06 0.24 0.07 -0.41 
Internal 	0.08 0.17 0.12 -0.07 -0.01 0.09 0.03 -0.07 0.43 0.15 
Operation: n=69 n=69 n=69 n=69 n=60 n=59 n=59 n=59 n=16 n=16 
Positive 	-0.17 -0.19 -0.18 -0.09 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.36 -0.25 
Coping 	0.25* 0.00 0.24* 0.31* 0.16 0.14 0.16 0.14 -0.16 -0.51* 
External 	0.11 -0.08 0.16 0.13 0.25 0.27* 0.17 0.15 0.21 -0.25 
Internal 	0.18 -0.00 0.30* 0.12 0.21 0.34* 0.14 0.25 0.19 0.36 
Shark 	n=73 n=73 n=73 n=73 n=60 n=60 n=60 n=60 n=19 n=19 
Positive 	0.09 -0.10 0.07 0.24* 0.06 -0.03 -0.23 -0.35* 0.11 -0.39 
Coping 	0.27* -0.08 0.25* 0.27* 0.16 -0.01 -0.07 0.09 0.25 0.46* 
External 	0.16 0.11 0.21 -0.01 -0.05 0.30 0.25 0.24 0.04 0.25 
Internal 	0.24* 0.09 0.31* 0.09 -0.07 0.43* -0.09 -0.06 0.44 -0.15 
*p<0.05 
Note 'Worry' refers to the Worry/Oversensitivity scale and 'Social Con' refers to the Social Concerns/Concentration scale. 
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Discussion 
Methodological issues 
Sample characteristics: Trait anxiety 
Total mean scores on the STAI were generally equivalent to results reported 
elsewhere, although the STAIC trait score tended to be slightly lower than those 
reported elsewhere (Brown et al., 1986; Houston et al., 1984; Strauss et al., 1988). 
RCMAS mean scores are also slightly lower than other studies (see Strauss et al., 
1988). Investigation of STAIC, STAI and RCMAS trait anxiety T scores of the 
means allows some assessment of the normality of the sample. Grade 10 
participants' STAI T scores were just within one standard deviation of the mean. 
Participants in grades 3 through 7 however show lower T scores on the STAIC, 
with males in grade 3 reaching a T score of only 37, which is no longer within the 
normal range. Also, males showed an increase in trait anxiety on the STAIC 
across grades. The RCMAS manual provides different means for different ages 
and genders. T scores on the RCMAS appear contradictory to the STAIC, with all 
scores within one standard deviation of the mean, and no changes in trait anxiety 
across the age range. It is difficult to make comparisons between the two 
measures given the different style of T scores used in the manuals. 
Effect of anxiety induction on state anxiety 
Mean measures of state anxiety suggest that for the STAIC and the STAI, 
participants reported very high levels of state anxiety, with over 90% of 
participants reporting STAIC state anxiety more than one standard deviation 
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above the mean for all three scenarios. Over 80% of participants reported STAI 
state anxiety more than one standard deviation above the mean in response to 
the shark and friends scenarios. Mean state anxiety scores were higher than 
baseline state anxiety scores on the STAIC reported elsewhere (Strauss et al., 
1988), and also higher than mean state anxiety scores reported by children 
anticipating dental treatment (Heitkemper, Layne, & Sullivan, 1993). Given that 
trait anxiety scores were generally within one standard deviation of the mean, 
the high state anxiety results suggest that the anxiety induction procedure has 
been effective. In order to assess accurately how effectively the anxiety induction 
procedure impacted on state anxiety, a baseline measure of state anxiety would 
be required. The future experiments in the thesis will measure baseline state 
anxiety. 
RCMAS Lie Scale 
The RCMAS includes a validity scale know as the Lie Scale. Using a non-clinical 
sample, research has shown that while the scale does reflect social desirability, it 
does not correlate with the anxiety scales, and therefore it has been shown that 
high ratings on this scale do not contaminate responses to the RCMAS (Hagborg, 
1991). Reynolds (1981) found that the Lie Scale correlated with the state scale of 
the STAIC, showing that children who are high on social desirability are less 
likely to report high levels of state anxiety. However, results from this 
experiment show that the Lie Scale correlated significantly and negatively with 
the STAIC trait anxiety, suggesting that those high on the Lie Scale reported 
lower levels of trait anxiety. To ensure that this did not affect production of 
cognitions, the Lie Scale was correlated with all four categories of cognitions and 
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results showed that there were no significant correlations with any of these. 
Also, there were no significant correlations between the lie scale and state anxiety 
scores after exposure to the three scenarios, suggesting that the impact of social 
desirability disappears with the anxiety induction procedure. 
Visual imagery scale 
The visual imagery scale was introduced into this experiment to assess whether 
the clarity of visualisation had an impact upon the reporting of cognitions. 
Visual imagery correlated with the total number of reported cognitions only in 
the operation scenario, revealing that those who had clearer images of the 
scenario reported more cognitions. There were no other correlations, indicating 
that the level of imagery is not important to the reporting of cognitions. This in 
turn indicates that clarity of visualisation is not a particularly critical issue in the 
future study of anxiety-induced cognitions. 
Replication of experiment 1 fear items 
Participants were presented with the three target items embedded in a shortened 
version of the FSSC-II, to replicate the findings of experiment 1. Results again 
demonstrated that there was no effect of grade on any of the three target items, 
however, when assessed separately there was a significant effect of grade on the 
responses of males to the friends scenario, with grade 7 males reporting 
significantly higher levels of fear than other grades. Gender differences were 
again demonstrated on the shark and operation scenario, however, there were no 
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gender differences in response to the friends scenario. These findings are not 
entirely consistent with the findings of experiment 1. 
Hypothesis I: state anxiety factor structure 
The state anxiety scale of the STAIC has previously been shown to be a two factor 
scale comprising the positive items and the negative items of the scale (Cross & 
Huberty, 1993; Dorr, 1981; Papay & Hedl, 1978). Clark and Watson (1991) 
emphasised the different roles that positive and negative affect play in anxiety 
and depression, and it is possible that the two scales of the STAIC may lend some 
clarity to this issue. It was hypothesised that the factor structure of state anxiety 
would remain consistent with the previous findings in the area, despite the use of 
elevated levels of state anxiety. Individual items on the state scale of the STAIC 
were therefore analysed in a similar manner to Cross and Huberty (1993) using 
principal components factor analysis. Results supported the hypothesis and 
those of the previous researchers in the area (Cross & Huberty, 1993; Dorr, 1981; 
Papay & Hedl 1978) and revealed that the STAIC data in this study have a stable 
two factor structure which represents the positive and negative items of the 
STAIC. The factor loadings are not as clear cut as they are in the study by Cross 
and Huberty (1993), and this may be because items are all in response to anxiety-
inducing situations. Cross and Huberty (1993) found that the relationship 
between state unhappiness (p-state) and state distress (n-state) was stronger 
when state unhappiness exceeded its mean, but since p-state and n-state are both 
high and probably exceed the mean of the data in the Cross and Huberty (1993) 
study, less clear cut factor loadings on some items are not unexpected. This 
analysis allowed for calculation of p-state and n-state anxiety scores for all 
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participants in response to the various scenarios, and thus allowed further 
investigation of anxiety-induced cognitions in relation to positive state anxiety 
and negative state anxiety. These findings will be considered later. 
Hypotheses 2 and 3: Impact of grade and gender on state anxiety 
There was no significant effect of grade upon state anxiety responses, for males 
or females, which supports the hypothesis on which this experiment was based, 
that state anxiety would not be experienced at different levels in different age 
groups in response to the anxiety induction scenarios because of the selection of 
items which were not feared at different levels across the grades. These findings 
show that the stimuli items selected in experiment 1 have been effectively 
converted from fear items, to anxiety-inducing imagery, without losing the 
essential qualities for which they were chosen. On the basis of this finding, 
comparisons between cognitions at different grade levels in this study will 
accurately reflect grade differences. Any differences will be truly related to 
changes in the production of cognitions, rather than reflecting differences in the 
level of anxiety associated with the stimuli. 
There were significant gender differences in state anxiety in response to the 
operation and friends scenarios, which supports the findings of experiment 1, 
showing that females reported higher levels of state anxiety in response to these 
scenarios than males. No gender difference was found in response to the shark 
scenario. 
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Theoretical issues 
Hypothesis I: Cognitive responses by scenario 
Positive statements were reported at very low frequencies, with means below one 
for all scenarios. This is not unexpected given that the situations were intended 
to be anxiety inducing and each scenario included 18 anxiety cues from the 
STAIC and the RCMAS. Positive statements did not vary between situations. 
Mean coping statements were below one in the operation scenario, but four times 
this in the friends scenario, and over six times this in the shark scenario. This 
probably represents the differences in the nature of the situations. In the 
operation, there is little that the participant could do to cope with the situation, or 
to change it, while in the shark scenario there is a range of coping options, which 
include swimming away from the shark (which were in this situation coded as 
coping statements rather than escape cognitions, as they represented the main 
means of coping with the situation). Means for reported internal and external 
threat cognitions were higher than for the positive statements, and mean internal 
threat rates were generally higher than mean external threat. There were no 
significant differences in the mean number of external threat statements reported 
between the scenarios, while mean internal threat rates were higher for the 
friends than the shark scenario, perhaps reflecting the fact that the friends 
scenario involves greater threat to sense of self than the shark scenario. 
These findings suggested that coping statements are the most likely to vary 
across situations, being reported more frequently in situations over which the 
individual may feel that they have more control. Brown et al. (1986) reported 
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that different coping strategies were common to each situation in their study. 
While positive self talk was the most commonly reported in all situations, 
attention diversion was the second most common response to the dental 
situation, task orientation the second most common response to the class report 
and problem solving the second most common response to the personal stressor 
(Brown et al., 1986). So it seems unlikely that there is a clear pattern of cognitive 
responses common to all anxiety-inducing situations; it is more likely that 
children vary their responses to suit the demands of the situation. 
Hypotheses 2 and 3: Grade and gender differences in cognition 
Developmental differences in anxiety-related cognitions have been demonstrated 
in at least two other studies (Brown et al., 1986; Vasey, 1993) and on the basis of 
the findings of these studies it was hypothesised that there would be an increase 
in anxiety-induced cognitions as grade increased. The current experiment used 
three stimulus items selected because they produced no significant differences in 
reported fear across the age range, and when these stimuli situations were 
employed to induce anxiety, there were no differences in reported state anxiety. 
As previously explained, this provides a solid basis upon which to make 
comparisons of reported cognitions on the basis of grade level. The results of this 
current experiment provided no evidence for the existence of differences in the 
reported cognitions of children and adolescents on the basis of grade. Therefore, 
while threat statements, coping statements and positive statements were evident 
at all grade levels, there is no evidence to support the hypothesis that anxiety-
induced cognitions increase as grade increases. 
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While research has not specifically addressed gender differences in anxiety-
induced cognitions, it has been demonstrated that boys report significantly 
higher levels of positive evaluations than girls (Prins et al., 1994; Zatz & Chassin, 
1985) and that girls are more likely to focus on negative affect and to report 
coping statements (Brown et al. 1986). The current experiment hypothesised that 
girls would report significantly more coping and threat statements, and that they 
would report significantly less positive statements. This hypothesis has not been 
supported on any of the cognitions categories for any of the three scenarios. 
It is possible that the lack of grade and gender effects has been the result of the 
poor data set. Mean scores suggest that participants produced relatively few 
cognitions in response to the scenarios and the standard deviations reveal that 
there was a large amount of variance in the responses of participants. Therefore 
there is some doubt about the quality of the data, which may suggest that 
drawing any definitive conclusions from these data would be premature. It is not 
entirely clear why this experiment has had such difficulties with the think-aloud 
method, when others have not. It is possibly due to the way in which 
participants were given fairly free rein to report what they were thinking, and the 
use of two prompts the only means of controlling the output of participants. This 
could have led to the very large standard deviations. Most think-aloud studies 
do not clarify how they limit the data that they collect to avoid such problems 
with large variance. Future research must address this issue if the think-aloud 
procedure is to be used with any success. Analysis of covariance addressed 
some of these difficulties, by controlling for the total output of participants when 
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assessing the effects of grade and gender on output, however future research is 
still needed to find an effective means of employing the think-aloud method with 
such a wide range of ages. Such research is beyond the bounds of the thesis, as 
the major aim is to investigate age differences in the presentation of anxiety and 
particularly the cognitive aspects of anxiety 
Hypothesis 4: Correlations between anxiety and cognition 
It was hypothesised that there would be a significant positive correlation 
between threat cognitions and anxiety. In the friends scenario there was a 
significant positive relationship found between external threat statements and 
the RCMAS Physiological Anxiety scale. In the operation scenario internal threat 
statements were positively correlated with both the Worry/Oversensitivity scale 
of the RCMAS and the STAIC state anxiety scale. The STAIC state anxiety scale 
also correlated positively with external threat statements. In the shark scenario 
internal threat statements correlated positively with the RCMAS total score and 
worry scale as well as the STAIC state anxiety scale. So it appears that threat 
statements, particularly internal threat statements, correlate positively with 
measures of anxiety. 
It was also hypothesised that there would be a positive relationship between 
coping statements and anxiety. In the friends scenario coping statements were 
significantly positively correlated with worry; however they were negatively 
correlated with STAIC p-state anxiety. In the operation scenario, coping 
statements were significantly positively correlated with the RCMAS total score, 
Worry/Oversensitivity scale and the Social Concerns/Concentration scale, but 
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negatively correlated with STAI state anxiety. Finally in the Shark scenario 
coping statements were correlated with the RCMAS total score, 
Worry/Oversensitivity scale and the Social Concerns/Concentration, only this 
time they were positively correlated with the STAI state anxiety scale. These 
results suggest that coping statements are positively correlated with trait anxiety, 
particularly as measured by the RCMAS and its subscales, but that the 
relationship between coping statements and state anxiety is less clear. In the 
operation and friends scenarios, there are negative relationships between state 
anxiety and coping statements; however in the shark scenario, this relationship is 
positive. 
These results suggest that reported coping and threat statements correlate most 
consistently with the worry scale of the RCMAS. This finding is consistent with 
previous research. Mattison, Bagnato, and Brubaker (1988) reported that the 
worry scale of the RCMAS significantly distinguished a group of anxiety 
disordered children from a psychiatric control group, and that the worry scale 
showed the highest mean t-score for the anxiety group. Lonigan, Carey, and 
Finch (1994) also suggested that worry represents the purest anxiety factor in the 
RCMAS. 
Finally, no hypothesis was proposed regarding the relationship between positive 
statements and anxiety because of the conflicting evidence in this area. Given the 
very low rates of positive statements reported in all scenarios, it is difficult to 
attach too much significance to the findings in this set of data. No relationships 
were found between any measures of anxiety and positive statements in the 
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friends scenario, or the operation scenario. In the shark scenario, there was a 
significant positive correlation between positive statements and the RCMAS social 
concerns/oversensitivity scale, and a significant negative correlation between 
positive statements and the n-state scale of the STAIC. In the shark scenario, the 
rates of positive statements are at their lowest, with no positive statements 
reported by grade 3 participants in response to this scenario, and a mean of no 
more than 0.12 for the other grades. It is therefore possible that the findings 
regarding positive statements are spurious. 
It appears that there is evidence to support a positive relationship of anxiety with 
threat statements and coping statements (although this may be limited to trait 
anxiety). Future research could therefore address the causal relationship 
between these cognitions and anxiety. If supportive evidence can be found to 
show that anxiety can be induced by certain types of cognition then this will 
serve to strengthen the link between experimental research and clinical outcome 
studies in the area of anxiety in children. 
Conclusions 
Using the think-aloud production method of measuring cognitions in response to 
the three selected stimuli items, this experiment has tested three major 
methodological hypotheses and four major theoretical hypotheses. Results have 
supported the two methodological hypotheses and have revealed the following: 
1. Items on the STAIC state anxiety scale fall into two distinct factors 
representing the positive and negative items when the levels of anxiety are 
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high. These findings are consistent with the findings of previous research 
using baseline measures of state anxiety. 
2. State anxiety in response to the three scenarios does not significantly differ 
across the grades. 
3. Females reported significantly higher state anxiety in response to the 
operation and friends scenarios. 
Not all of the theoretical hypotheses have been supported in this study. 
1. The first theoretical hypothesis was supported, and shows that there are 
significant differences in the pattern of children's and adolescent's cognitions 
according to anxiety induction scenario. These differences occurred mainly 
with the coping cognitions, and the levels of coping cognitions appeared to 
reflect the amount of control that could be exerted over the different 
situations. 
2. There was no significant effect of grade on any of the four measures of 
cognition, thus the second hypothesis was not supported. 
3. There were no gender differences in the number of any of the cognition 
categories, thus the third hypothesis was not supported. 
4. There was some support for the next hypothesis. There were significant 
positive correlations between threat statements and anxiety, and between 
coping statements and at least trait anxiety. Results suggest that cognitions in 
response to the operation scenario show the strongest and most consistent 
correlations with measures of anxiety. Because of the very low reports of 
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positive statements, this experiment has not been able to assess effectively the 
link between positive statements and anxiety. 
This experiment has provided no evidence of developmental differences or 
gender differences in the report of anxiety-induced cognitions. There is however 
evidence to support the relationship between various types of cognition and 
anxiety. The think-aloud method of measuring cognitions has produced data of 
questionable validity. The next experiment will therefore attempt to circumvent 
the problems with this method of cognition measurement by reporting back to 
children the various categories of cognitive output collected in this experiment 
and measuring the resultant levels of state anxiety. This method will change the 
cognition data from dependent variables to independent variables, and therefore 
provide a means of assessing the causal link between anxiety and cognition. It 
will also attempt to investigate further developmental changes in the 
presentation of anxiety and its resultant cognitions. 
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Chapter 8: Experiment 3- Causal Effects of Positive, Coping 
and Threat Statements 
Experiment 2 used a think-aloud method to measure cognition after exposure 
to three anxiety-inducing scenarios. State anxiety was effectively induced 
using these stimuli and the level remained consistent across grades, thus 
providing an equivalent basis from which to compare cognitive output of the 
various grades. No significant effects of grade were evident in the cognitive 
responses to any of the anxiety-inducing scenarios. Cognitive responses 
varied according to the stimulus situation, particularly the number of coping 
statements. There were correlations between threat statements and anxiety, 
and between coping statements and anxiety although these were generally 
low. The operation scenario showed the clearest and most consistent 
correlations of anxiety with coping and threat statements. 
The data collected in the previous experiment revealed difficulties with the 
use of the think-aloud method. Given these difficulties, the current 
experiment aims to circumvent these by presenting to children selections of 
each of the four cognition categories reported in the previous experiment 
including internal threat statements, external threat statements, coping 
statements and positive statements. So, the cognitive output measured in 
experiment 2 will be employed as independent variables in the current 
experiment to assess the causative effect of these cognitions on state anxiety. 
A self report measure of the resultant cognitions will also be included to 
measure reported cognitions during the anxiety induction procedure. 
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As with the previous experiment, the hypotheses of the current experiment 
address both the methodological and theoretical issues under investigation. 
In experiment 2 the second hypothesis assessed whether there was any 
impact of grade on state anxiety, which established that the scenarios had 
equivalent impact on state anxiety for all grades, thus providing a 
methodological basis from which to assess any changes in cognitive output 
across the grades. Because this experiment does not primarily assess 
cognitive output in response to the scenarios, but assesses state anxiety in 
response to the four different scenarios, levels of state anxiety at different 
grades become of theoretical interest. So, the hypotheses of this experiment 
vary slightly in accordance with this change of focus. Also, state anxiety will 
be analysed for total scale and the two subscale scores. Given these 
considerations, the methodological hypotheses of this experiment are as 
follows: 
1. On a thoughts checklist (TCL), participants will report significantly more 
cognitions on the scale corresponding to the scenario condition with which 
they were presented than cognitions on the other three scales. 
2. That the internal threat statements, external threat statements and coping 
statements scales of the TCL will be significantly positively correlated with 
measures of trait anxiety and that the positive statements scale of the TCL 
will not be significantly correlated with measures of trait anxiety. 
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3. That the coping statements, internal threat statements and external threat 
statements scales of the TCL will be significantly positively correlated with 
each other, and will be unrelated to the positive statements scale. 
Six theoretical hypotheses are also posed: 
1. Based on the previous study, it is hypothesised that there will be no effect 
of grade on the level of state anxiety induced by the four scenarios, 
however, since these scenarios contain four different categories of 
cognition, it is possible that participants of different grades will respond 
differently to the scenarios. 
2. Given the previous findings regarding gender differences, it is also 
hypothesised that female participants will report higher levels of state 
anxiety in response to the scenarios. 
3. Participants presented with the positive statements imagery scenario will 
report lower levels of state anxiety than those in the coping or threat 
scenario conditions. 
4. Based on the previous experiment, there will be no effect of grade on the 
number of reported cognitions in response to the scenarios. 
5. Females will report more threat and coping statements and less positive 
statements on the TCL. 
6. There will be significant positive correlations between state anxiety and the 
number of reported coping and threat cognitions. The role of positive 
statements in anxiety has not been clarified in experiment 2, so this 
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experiment will investigate further the relationship of state anxiety to 
positive statements. 
Method 
Participants 
Three hundred and eleven students from four primary schools and two high 
schools participated in this experiment on a voluntary basis with parent consent. 
Table 3.1 shows a breakdown of these participants by grade and gender. All 
participants completed the experimental scenario, plus the neutral scenario, 
unless time constraints did not allow them to complete the neutral scenario. 
Average age for grade 3 participants was 9 years and 2 months (standard 
deviation 4.4 months), for grade 5 participants 11 years (standard deviation 3.6 
months), for grade 7 participants 13 years and 1 months (standard deviation 4.8 
months) and for grade 10 participants 15 years and 11 months (standard 
deviation 3.7 months). 
Table 3.1: Participants by grade and gender. 
Gender 
Females Males Total 
Grade 
3 41 43 84 
5 37 40 77 
7 32 41 73 
10 40 37 77 
Total 150 161 311 
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Design 
The experiment employed a 4 x 2 x 4 (grade by gender by cognition 
presentation condition) factorial design. Cognition presentation conditions 
were positive statements, coping statements, internal threat statements and 
external threat statements. The experiment was based on the responses to 
one scenario, namely the operation scenario. Participants were therefore 
presented with one of four variations on the operation scenario, each 
containing the same descriptive material, but differing in the cognitive 
content. Measures were also taken of baseline state anxiety, and state anxiety 
in response to a neutral scenario (walking down the street). Experimental 
and neutral scenarios were presented in counterbalanced order. 
Each of the four conditions of the operation scenario employed either positive 
statements, coping statements, external threat statements or internal threat 
statements and were presented within the operation scenario, as this showed 
the strongest correlations with measures of anxiety in experiment 2. 
Scenarios were presented from the child's view, as in experiment 2, and gave 
the cognitions as if they were the child's own. It was suggested in the 
discussion of experiment 2 that the inclusion of response cues from the 
RCMAS and the STAIC may have impacted upon cognition production in 
some manner. The present experiment therefore deletes the anxiety cues 
from the operation scenario, and replaces them with cognitions. 
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Measures 
As with the previous two experiments the Revised Children's Manifest Anxiety 
Scale (RCMAS; Reynolds & Richmond, 1985), the State Trait Anxiety Inventory 
for Children (STAIC; Spielberger, 1973) and the State Trait Anxiety Inventory 
(STAI, Spielberger, 1983) were employed to assess trait and state anxiety. 
A cognitions checklist entitled the Thoughts Checklist (TCL) based on the 
CCAQ (Zatz & Chassin. 1983; 1985) was designed to assess reported 
cognitions after presentation of the anxiety-inducing scenario. It consisted of 
the 40 items used in the four operation conditions, so there were 10 positive 
statements, 10 coping statements, 10 internal threat statements and 10 
external threat statements. Participants responded either 'yes' or 'no' in 
response to each item according to whether they thought it or not during the 
operation scenario. Children therefore received a score ranging from 1 to 10 
on each of the four scales for this self report measure. (see Appendix A6). 
As this checklist has been designed for the experiment, some validity checks 
will be completed. Given what has previously been outlined in the literature 
review of the thesis about the relationships between various types of 
cognitions, there should be positive relationships between the internal threat 
statements, external threat statements and coping statements scales of the 
measure, as these all appear to play a similar role in anxiety and are 
consistently positively related to it (for example, Zatz & Chassin, 1985). While 
there is some uncertainty about the exact role of positive statements in 
anxiety, it is clear that positive statements do not play the same role in anxiety 
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as coping statements or threat statements, so there should either be no 
relationship between the positive statements scale and the other three scales, 
or alternatively, there will be a negative relationships between the measures. 
External reliability must also be established between the checklist and other 
established measures of anxiety. Again, coping and threat statements have 
been found to be positively related to anxiety, so there should be positive 
relationships between these scales and measures of anxiety. Outcomes 
related to the positive statements scale again are difficult to predict. 
Stimulus development 
The operation scenario from the previous experiment was used as a basis for the 
stimulus material in this experiment. All anxiety cues were removed from the 
original operation scenario. Ten cognitions of each type (positive statements, 
coping statements, internal threat statements and external threat statements) 
were selected from the actual reports of children from the previous experiment. 
These represented commonly reported self talk of children in response to the 
operation scenario in each of the categories. The end result of this process was 
four conditions of the operation scenario, each sharing the same basic operation 
story, but each representing a different pattern of cognition. A neutral scenario 
was developed around the situation of 'walking down your street'. This scenario 
contained no response cues nor cognitions, consisting of stimulus material only. 
Scripts for the operation scenario and the neutral scenario can be found in 
Appendix B3. 
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Procedure 
The experiment was conducted in small groups. Grade 3 participants worked in 
smaller groups of no more than four, and the size of the groups became larger 
with older participants. Grade 10 participants generally worked in groups of 
around seven or eight. Participants first completed the RCMAS and then the 
STAIC or STAI (both state and trait versions). This gave two measures of trait 
anxiety and one measure of baseline state anxiety. As with the previous 
experiment, questionnaires were read out to those who had difficulty with 
reading. 
It was then explained to participants that they were required to 'do some 
imagining'. Prior to the experimental imagery, participants practised with the 
birthday scene as they had in the previous experiment. They were asked to close 
their eyes and imagine that they were waking up on their birthday. Those 
students who had difficulty imagining this situation were told to listen to the 
voice of the experimenter and try to imagine, but not to be concerned if they had 
difficulties (note that the previous experiment revealed that clarity of 
visualisation had little impact on reported cognitions). They were then given 
either the operation scenario for their condition (i.e., positive statements, coping 
statements, internal threat or external threat) or the neutral scenario. 
After the imagery activity, children completed a STAIC or STAI state measure 
according to how they felt while they were imagining being in the operating 
theatre, or walking down their street. After the operation scenario, they 
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completed the TCL, and particular emphasis was placed on the instruction which 
stated that this was about what they had been thinking while they were 
imagining, as opposed to how they had been feeling, as Glass and Arnkoff (1982) 
suggest that items of self statement questionnaires can be interpreted as affective 
rather than cognitive. All participants were debriefed following the activity. 
They then completed the second imagery scenario. 
Results 
The results section of this chapter is divided into a methodological and a 
theoretical section. The methodological section initially gives descriptive 
information regarding the population employed in the experiment in terms of 
trait anxiety. The effectiveness of the anxiety induction procedure is also 
investigated in terms of STAI and STAIC state anxiety. Hypotheses related to the 
validity of the TCL are then investigated. The theoretical section then addresses 
the theoretical hypotheses of the experiment. Since trait anxiety is related to 
levels of state anxiety and cognitions, and the reporting of these is likely to vary 
according to an individual's level of trait anxiety, all analyses assessing state 
anxiety and cognitions have taken trait anxiety into account, either through 
calculating partial correlations, hierarchical regression analyses or analysis of 
covariance. 
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Methodological issues 
Sample description: trait anxiety 
Mean trait anxiety scores for males and females across all grades are given in 
table 3.2 below, and the T scores which correspond to these mean scores are also 
provided to gauge the representativeness of the sample. T scores for the STAI 
were based on a high school sample for males and females separately, and these 
results suggest that grade 10 participants reported higher levels of trait anxiety 
on the STAI than the younger participants completing the STAIC (which were 
based on a total primary school sample for males and females separately). On 
the STAI, 13.5 °A) of males and 22.5% of females had scores more than one 
standard deviation above the mean, while on the STAIC 21.8% of females and 
8.9% males were within this range. 
A two way ANOVA was completed on STAIC trait anxiety for grade and gender. 
There was no significant effect of gender on STAIC trait anxiety scores [F(1, 
228)=3.07 ns], however, there was a main effect of grade on STAIC [F(2, 
228)=6.83, p<0.05], with trait anxiety decreasing across the grades. There was no 
significant interaction between grade and gender on STAIC trait anxiety [F(2, 
228)=0.25, ns]. There was no gender difference for STAI trait anxiety [t(75)=1.78, 
ns]. Trait anxiety levels were also assessed according to presentation condition 
of the scenario to ensure that the experimental groups were equivalent. A one 
way ANOVA revealed that there was no significant effect of presentation 
condition on trait anxiety [F(3, 233)=0.88, ns for STAIC and F(3, 76)=0.66, ns for 
STAI]; therefore the experimental groups were equivalent in trait anxiety levels. 
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Table 3.2 also gives mean scores and the corresponding T scores for the RCMAS. 
T scores were based on individual norms for each age group and gender using a 
white population. T scores showed that mean RCMAS scores for males and 
females all fell within the average range. Two way ANOVA for grade and 
gender on the RCMAS revealed that there was a significant effect of grade [F(3, 
302)=5.95, p<0.05], with anxiety decreasing as grade increased, and also a 
significant effect of gender, with females showing significantly higher anxiety 
than males [F(1, 302)=18.64, p<0.05]. There was no significant interaction 
between grade and gender on RCMAS anxiety [F(3, 302)=0.31, ns]. As for STAIC 
trait anxiety, RCMAS trait anxiety levels were assessed according to presentation 
condition of the scenario and an ANOVA revealed that there was no significant 
effect of presentation condition on RCMAS trait anxiety [F(3, 309)=0.94, ns], 
therefore the experimental groups were also equivalent in RCMAS trait anxiety 
levels. 
143 
Table 3.2: Means, standard deviations (in parentheses), T scores and numbers for 
STAI and STAIC trait anxiety and RCMAS score by gender and grade. 
STAI and STAIC Trait Anxiety Scores 
Gender 
Females 
Males 
Total 
Gender 
Females 
Males 
Grade 3 
37.50 (8.9) 
T=50 
n=41 
34.92 (6.0) 
T=45 
n=41 
36.18 (7.6) 
Grade 3 
14.32 (6.3) 
T=53 
n=41 
11.52 (6.0) 
T=51 
n=43 
Grade 5 
36.68 (9.2) 
T=50 
n=37 
34.91 (6.7) 
T=45 
n=40 
35.76 (8.0)  
RCMAS Scores 
Grade 5 
13.65 (6.3) 
T=53 
n=37 
11.38 (6.1) 
T=52 
n=40 
Grade 7 
32.50 (7.1) 
T=43 
n=32 
31.63 (7.0) 
T=42 
n=41 
32.01 (7.0) 
Grade 7 
10.59 (7.3) 
T=53 
n=32 
7.66 (6.0) 
T=48 
n=41 
Grade 10 
45.55 (9.1) 
T=69 
n=40 
42.14 (7.7) 
T=60 
n=37 
43.91 (8.6) 
Grade 10 
12.98 (6.2) 
T=54 
n=40 
8.86 (4.9) 
T=53 
n=37 
Total 	12.90 (6.3) 
	
12.47 (6.3) 	8.95 (6.7) 
	
11.00 (5.9) 
Note that grade 10 students completed the STAI and the students in grades 3,5 and 7 completed the 
STAIC. 
Baseline, neutral and operation state anxiety 
Table 3.3 gives mean scores for the STAIC and STAI state anxiety scale and also 
includes the corresponding T scores for these mean scores. Scores cover baseline 
state anxiety, state anxiety in responses to the operation scenario and state 
anxiety in response to the neutral scenario. State anxiety responses to the 
operation scenario will be investigated according to presentation condition at a 
later point. 
Baseline state anxiety was assessed according to gender and grade using 
ANOVA. There was no main effect of grade or gender [F(2, 224)=0.26, ns for 
grade and F(1, 224)=0.26, ns for gender], however there was a significant 
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interaction between the two factors [F(2, 224)=3.93, p<0.05] with males showing a 
peak in state anxiety in grade 5, and females showing a trough in state anxiety in 
grade 5. Baseline state anxiety was also assessed according to presentation 
condition, to ensure further that the experimental groups were equivalent. 
ANOVA results revealed that there was no significant effect of presentation 
condition on baseline state anxiety [F(3, 229)=0.54 for STAIC and F(3, 76)=0.61, ns 
for STAIL 
According to the T scores corresponding to the means, baseline STAI and STAIC 
state anxiety scores were slightly below the population mean given in the manual 
for state anxiety, suggesting that participants were responding normally, or were 
even slightly more relaxed than the norm. In a normal population, 16% of 
participants would report state anxiety more than one standard deviation above 
the mean, and for this sample, 8.5% of females and 9.7% of males on the STAIC 
were in this upper range, while for the STAI, there 7.5% of females and 13.5% of 
males were within this upper range. 
Operation results were then analysed by grade and gender. There were 
significant main effects of grade [F(2, 228)=6.20, p<0.05] and gender [F(1, 
228)=25.05, p<0.05] on the STAIC state anxiety. There was a significant effect of 
gender on STAI state anxiety in response to the operation scenario [t(74)=3.26, 
p<0.05]. 
Neutral state anxiety was also assessed in this manner. T scores of mean neutral 
state anxiety showed that responses were at or slightly below average. Six point 
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six percent of females and 9.6% of males for STAIC state anxiety and 2.6% 
females and 0% of males for STAI state anxiety reported state anxiety greater 
than one standard deviation above the mean. 
ANOVAs were completed for grade and gender on neutral state anxiety. Results 
showed that there was no significant main effect of gender [F(1, 200)=0.02] on 
neutral state anxiety, but that there was a significant main effect of grade [F(2, 
200)=3.36, p<0.05], with mean scores revealing that state anxiety in response to 
the neutral scenario decreased with age. There was no significant interaction 
between grade and gender on the neutral scenario [F(2, 200)=0.53, ns]. There was 
no significant effect of gender on STAI neutral state anxiety [t(69)=0.33, ns]. 
Effect of anxiety induction on state anxiety 
T scores corresponding to the means for state anxiety in response to the operation 
scenario show that responses were well above the mean responses to the state 
anxiety inventory for males and females in all grades. The percentage of 
participants reporting state anxiety over one standard deviation above the mean 
is 85.5% of females and 65.3% of males responding to the STAIC and 77.5% of 
females and 58.3% of males responding to the STAI. 
Paired t-tests were completed between measures of baseline state anxiety and 
operation state anxiety. In all cases state anxiety was significantly higher for the 
operation than the baseline measure R(229)=19.93, p<0.05 for STAIC state anxiety 
and t(75)=11.17, p<0.05 for STAI state anxiety]. The same was true of the 
comparisons between operation and neutral state anxiety responses 
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R(205)=20.22, p<0.05 for STAIC state anxiety, and t(69)=15.26, p<0.05 for STAI 
state anxiety]. Paired t-tests were also used to assess differences between the 
baseline and neutral measures of anxiety. In all cases there were significantly 
lower levels of state anxiety for the neutral scenario compared with the baseline 
measure for anxiety R(205)=4.94, p<0.05 for STAIC state anxiety and t(70)=5.51, 
p<0.05 for STAI state anxiety]. 
Table 3.3: Mean STAIC and STAI state anxiety scores, standard deviations(in 
parentheses) and T scores for all presentation conditions by gender and grade. 
Baseline 	 Operation 	Neutral 
Female 	3 	28.19 (5.9) 	50.32 (11.0) 27.37 (7.9) 
T=44 	 T=76 	 T=42 
5 	27.65 (5.2) 	50.30 (9.2) 	26.43 (6.6) 
T=44 	 T=76 	 T=40 
7 	30.63 (6.1) 	44.13 (11.0) 	25.41 (4.8) 
T=49 	 T=69 	 T=39 
10 	38.92 (9.7) 	59.53 (9.8) 	30.89 (10.24) 
1=49 	 T=64 	 T=29 
Male 	3 	29.05 (5.2) 	39.05 (10.9) 	28.50 (9.6) 
T=48 	 T=63 	 T=46 
5 	30.00 (6.4) 	45.45 (10.6) 	26.35 (6.7) 
T=51 	 T=69 	 T=42 
7 	27.90 (4.7) 	39.46 (10.4) 	23.94 (4.2) 
T=46 	 T=63 	 1=37 
10 	36.68 (10.1) 	51.17 (12.6) 	30.18 (7.7) 
T=44 	 T=62 	 T=18 
Note that grade 10 students completed the STAI, which has a maximum score of 80, and the students in 
grades 3, 5 and 7 completed the STAIC, which has a maximum score of 60. 
TCL responses by scenario presentation condition 
Analyses of covariance were completed on all four scales of the TCL by 
presentation condition using RCMAS anxiety as a covariate. Table 3.4 presents 
mean scores on the four scales of the checklist for each scenario presentation 
condition. RCMAS anxiety was not a significant covariate for TCL positive 
statements [F(1, 290)=2.48, ns] , and there was a significant main effect of scenario 
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presentation condition on positive statements, with post hoc analysis revealing 
that participants in the positive statements presentation condition reported 
significantly higher levels of TCL positive statements than those in the coping 
and internal threat presentation conditions. RCMAS anxiety was a significant 
covariate for TCL coping statements [F(1, 290)=21.94, p<0.05], and there was no 
significant effect of presentation condition on the coping scale. RCMAS anxiety 
was a significant covariate for TCL external threat [F(1, 290)=52.35, p<0.05] 
however there was no main effect of presentation condition on this scale. Finally, 
RCMAS anxiety was a significant covariate for TCL internal threat statements 
[F(1, 290)=41.82, p<0.051, and there a main effect of presentation condition 
remained on this scale after the covariate was taken into account with post hoc 
analysis revealing that participants in the coping and internal threat presentation 
conditions reported higher levels of TCL internal threat cognitions than those in 
the positive or external threat conditions. 
Table 3.4: Mean TCL scale scores and standard deviations (in parentheses) for 
each presentation condition. 
Scenario Presentation Condition 
Positive Coping External Internal F Score 
TCL Scale 
Positive 5.80 (3.1) 4.79 (2.9) 4.99 (2.9) 4.36 (3.1) F(3, 290)=2.98* 
Coping 5.23 (2.1) 5.79 (2.4) 5.25 (2.6) 5.23 (2.5) F(3, 290)=1.11 
External 3.92 (2.8) 4.92 (2.8) 4.36 (2.7) 5.24 (2.9) F(3, 290)=2.47 
Internal 4.85 (3.5) 6.51 (3.3) 5.05 (3.1) 6.26 (3.1) F(3, 290)=4.86* 
*p <0.05 
Correlations between TCL scales and trait anxiety measures 
Table 3.5 shows correlations between each scale of the TCL and measures of trait 
anxiety. From this table it can be seen that the positive statements scale has no 
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correlation with any measure of trait anxiety. The coping statements scale on the 
other hand correlated positively with all measures of anxiety. Internal and 
external threat measures show positive correlations with the STAIC and the 
RCMAS, but not with the STAI, which may be due to the size of the STAI sample. 
Table 3.5: Trait anxiety measures correlated with the four scales of the TCL 
Cognition Checklist Scales 
Positive Coping Internal External 
Anxiety Measures 
STAIC 	r=0.08 
n=226 
STAI 	 r=0.03 
n=70 
RCMAS 	r=0.10 
r=0.24* 
r=0.29* 
r=0.27* 
r=0.43* 
r=0.19 
r=0.40* 
r=0.34* 
r=0.23 
r=0.37* 
n=295 
*=p<0.05 
Intercorrelations between TCL scales 
Table 3.6 shows intercorrelations between the scales and shows that the positive 
statements scale correlated negatively with both of the threat statements scales, 
but positively with the coping statements scale. The coping statements scale 
correlated positively with the internal threat statements and the external threat 
statements scales and the two threat statements scales correlate positively with 
each other. Partial correlations have also been calculated which control for trait 
anxiety as measured by RCMAS, and these partial correlations are essentially the 
same as the initial correlations, indicating that trait anxiety is not a significant 
contributor to the relationship between the four scales. 
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Table 3.6: Correlations ( r) and partial correlations (r e, controlling for RCMAS 
trait anxiety) between the four TCL scales 
Cognition Checklist Scales 
Positive Coping External Internal 
TCL Scales 
Positive r=1.00 r=0.14* r=-0.31* r=-0.44* 
Coping r =0.18* r=1.00 r=0.45* r=0.44* 
External re=-0.30* r =0.39* r=1.00 r=0.68* 
Internal re=-0.44* r =0.39* r =0.62* r=1.00 
*=p<0.05 
Note that r= Pearson's correlations and r p = partial correlations controlling for the effects of trait anxiety 
as measured by RCMAS 
Theoretical issues 
Operation state anxiety by grade, gender and presentation condition 
Means and standard deviations for STAIC state, p-state and n-state anxiety in 
response to the operation scenario are presented in Table 37 by grade and 
presentation condition. Initially STAIC state anxiety data were investigated using 
a three way ANCOVA for grade by gender by presentation type, with STAIC 
trait anxiety as a covariate. This analysis revealed that trait anxiety was a 
significant covariate [F(1, 209)=7.00, p<0.05]. Main effects for all factors were 
significant despite this [F(2, 209)=5.47, p<0.05 for grade; F(1, 209)=26.09, p<0.05 
for gender and F(3,209=10.18, p<0.05 for presentation type]. Mean scores suggest 
that state anxiety actually peaks in grade 5, and is lowest in grade 7, that it is 
highest in females and that state anxiety is lowest in the positive statements 
presentation condition, but that there is no marked difference between the other 
three presentation conditions. There were no significant interactions between 
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grade and cognition, gender and cognition or gender and grade [F(6, 209)=1.65, 
ns and F(3, 209)=1.16, ns; F(2, 209)=2.71, ns]. 
As there was no significant effect of gender on baseline data, but a significant 
effect of gender on operation data, a change variable was calculated to reflect the 
increase in state anxiety between baseline and induced state anxiety and a one 
way analysis of covariance for gender was completed on this data by gender 
using STAIC trait anxiety as the covariate. Results indicated that trait anxiety 
was not a significant covariate in this case [F(1, 229)=1.71, ns], but that there was 
a significant effect of gender [F(1, 229)=23.63, p<0.05]. This effect is illustrated in 
Figure 3.1 below. 
There were similar findings for p-state anxiety, with trait anxiety being non-
significant as a covariate [F(1, 231)=0.00, nsl, but gender being a significant main 
effect [F(1, 231)=23.63, p<0.051. For n-state anxiety, STAIC trait anxiety was once 
again a non-significant covariate [F(1, 231)=1.88, ns] and the main effect of 
gender was significant [F(1, 231)=17.82, p<0.05]. The effects of gender on the 
amount of change from baseline to induced anxiety for n-state anxiety and p-
state anxiety were essentially the same as the interaction for total state anxiety 
which is illustrated below in Figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1: Effect of anxiety induction on state anxiety scores for males and 
females. 
A three way ANCOVA was completed on the p-state data, with STAIC trait 
anxiety as a covariate. Trait anxiety was not a significant covariate [F(1, 
209)=0.90, ns]. There were significant main effects of grade, presentation type 
and gender [F(2, 233)=3.11, p<0.05, F(3, 233)=5.40, p<0.05 and F(1, 233)=12.79, 
p<0.05 respectively]. There were no significant interactions between any of the 
factors [F(6, 233)=0.85, ns for grade by presentation, F(2, 233)=1.21, ns for grade 
by gender and F(3, 233)=1.82, ns for presentation by gender]. Mean scores 
revealed that p-state anxiety peaks in grade 5, that the positive statements 
presentation condition induces less state anxiety than the other three conditions 
and that females report higher levels of p-state anxiety than males. 
A three way ANCOVA was conducted on the n-state data. STAIC trait anxiety 
was a significant covariate [F(1, 209)=7.16, p<0.05]. There were significant main 
152 
effects of grade, presentation condition and gender [F(2, 209)=8.44, p<0.05, F(3, 
209)=7.82, p<0.05 and F(3, 209)=19.53, p<0.05 respectively]. Mean scores shows 
that n-state anxiety remains fairly constant in grades 3 and 5 and then decreases 
in grade 7, that n-state scores are lower in the positive statements presentation 
condition and that females report higher levels of n-state anxiety than males. 
There were no significant interactions between any of the factors [F(6, 209)=1.14, 
ns for grade by presentation condition, F(2, 209)=2.40, ns for grade by gender, 
and F(3, 209)=1.50, ns for presentation condition by gender]. 
Table 3.7: Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for STAIC total state, 
p-state and n-state anxiety by grade and presentation condition for the operation 
scenario. 
Scenario Presentation Condition 
Positive 	Coping 	External 	Internal 	Total 
Grade 
Total State Anxiety 
3 43.05 (11.3) 45.55 (12.8) 42.55 (14.0) 46.57 (11.2) 44.55 (12.3) 
5 40.21 (9.7) 49.55 (9.7) 51.32 (9.1) 49.95 (8.8) 47.78 (10.2) 
7 32.41 (9.1) 43.61 (9.8) 42.90 (11.0) 46.44 (8.5) 41.51 (10.9 
Total 38.78 (10.9) 46.30 (11.1) 45.49 (12.1) 47.60 (9.7) 44.66 (11.4) 
P-state Anxiety 
3 23.05 (4.3) 24.23 (6.4) 23.55 (7.4) 25.70 (5.2) 24.20 (5.9) 
5 24.11 (6.7) 27.25 (5.3) 27.37 (4.7) 26.84 (3.6) 26.40 (5.3) 
7 20.76 (8.0) 25.94 (4.2) 25.50 (5.6) 26.50 (3.7) 24.75 (5.9) 
Total 22.71 (6.5) 25.75 (5.5) 25.44 (6.1) 26.30 (4.3) 25.10 (5.8) 
N-state Anxiety 
3 19.53 (6.8) 21.36 (7.1) 19.95 (9.1) 20.43 (6.4) 20.36 (7.3) 
5 17.16 (5.7) 22.25 (5.1) 23.95 (5.2) 23.05 (6.0) 21.61 (6.0) 
7 12.88 (4.0) 17.83 (6.6) 17.35 (6.0) 19.94 (6.4) 17.07 (6.3) 
Total 16.65 (6.2) 20.60 (6.5) 20.36 (7.4) 21.12 (6.3) 19.74 (6.8) 
STAI state anxiety scores were then investigated using ANCOVA. Mean scores 
for STAI anxiety by presentation condition are presented in Table 3.8 below. Trait 
anxiety was a significant covariate [F(1, 67)=6.14, p<0.05]. There was a significant 
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main effect of gender [F(1, 67)=9.76, p<0.05], but not of presentation condition 
[F(3, 67)=1.42, ns].  There was no significant interaction between gender and 
presentation condition [F(3, 67)=1.46, nsi. Mean scores revealed that again 
females reported more state anxiety than males. Analysis of covariance was then 
conducted on the change between baseline and induced state anxiety, using STAI 
trait anxiety as a covariate. Trait anxiety was not a significant covariate [F(1, 
73)=0.07, nsl, and the effect of gender on the change variable was not significant 
[F(1, 73)=3.12, ns]. 
Table 3.8: Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for STAI state anxiety 
by presentation condition. 
Scenario Presentation Condition 
Positive 	Coping 	External 	Internal 	Total 
53.26 (13.3) 	58.33 (12.0) 	55.53 (13.2) 	55.30 (9.0) 	55.57 (11.9) 
TCL positive statements scale by grade, gender and presentation condition 
Table 3.9 presents mean TCL positive statements scales by grade and 
presentation condition. A three way ANCOVA was conducted on TCL 
positive statements scale which assessed the effect of grade, presentation 
condition and gender, with RCMAS anxiety as a covariate. RCMAS anxiety 
was not a significant covariate [F(1, 262)=0.32, ns].  There was no significant 
effect of grade on TCL positive statements [F(2, 262)=2.23, ns], and no 
significant effect of gender [F(3, 262)=3.08, p<0.05], but a significant effect of 
presentation condition [F(1, 262)=4.00, p<0.05]. Mean scores show that there 
were more positive statements reported in the positive statements 
presentation condition than the other three conditions. There were no 
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significant interactions between any of the factors [F(9, 262)=1.43, ns for grade 
by presentation condition, F(3, 262)=0.86, ns, for grade by gender and F(3, 
262)=0.61, ns for presentation condition by gender]. 
Table 3.9: Mean (and standard deviations in parentheses) responses to the TCL 
positive statements scale across the four scenario presentation conditions by 
grade. 
Scenario Presentation Condition 
Positive Coping External Internal Total 
Grade 
3 5.32 (3.5) 5.59 (3.1) 4.53 (3.4) 4.87 (3.3) 5.11 (3.3) 
5 5.37 (3.0) 3.50 (2.7) 4.95 (3.0) 3.12 (3.3) 4.25 (3.1) 
7 6.88 (2.7) 5.35 (2.9) 5.55 (2.7) 4.06 (3.4) 5.44 (3.0) 
10 5.74 (3.3) 4.67 (2.7) 4.79 (2.7) 5.10 (2.4) 5.11 (2.8) 
Total 5.80 (3.1) 4.79 (2.9) 4.99 (2.9) 4.36 (3.1) 4.98 (3.1) 
TCL coping statements scale by grade, gender and presentation condition 
Table 3.10 shows the mean scores for the coping statements scale of the TCL 
by grade and presentation condition. A three way ANCOVA assessed the 
effect of grade, gender and presentation condition on the coping statements 
scale with RCMAS as a covariate. RCMAS was a significant covariate [F(1, 
262)=9.45, p<0.05]. There was a significant main effect of gender [F(1, 
262)=8.65, p<0.05], with females reporting more coping statements than 
males. There was no significant effect of presentation condition or grade [F(3, 
262)=0.87, ns and F(2, 262)=0.68, ns respectively]. None of the two way 
interactions were significant [F(3, 262)=1.69, ns for grade by gender, F(9, 
262)=1.62, ns for grade by presentation condition and F(3, 262)=1.83, ns for 
gender by presentation condition]. 
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Table 3.10: Mean (and standard deviations in parentheses) responses to the TCL 
coping statements scale across the four scenario presentation conditions. 
Scenario Presentation Condition 
Positive Coping External Internal Total 
Grade 
3 5.37 (2.5) 6.27 (2.9) 4.13 (3.0) 5.91 (2.0) 5.54 (2.6) 
5 5.79 (2.1) 6.55 (1.8) 6.00 (1.9) 3.88 (2.8) 5.61 (2.3) 
7 4.47 (1.9) 4.82 (2.4) 4.95 (2.4) 5.33 (2.8) 4.90 (2.4) 
10 5.21 (2.0) 5.00 (2.0) 5.68 (2.7) 5.50 (2.3) 5.39 (2.2) 
Total 5.23 (2.1) 5.79 (2.4) 5.25 (2.6) 5.23 (2.5) 5.37 (2.4) 
TCL external threat statements scale by grade, gender and presentation condition 
Table 3.11 shows mean TCL external threat statements scales across grades 
for the four presentation conditions. A three way ANCOVA was completed 
for grade by presentation condition by gender with RCMAS anxiety as a 
covariate. RCMAS was a significant covariate [F(1, 262)=32.99, p<0.051. 
There was no significant effect of grade on TCL external threat cognitions 
[F(3, 262)=0.85, ns] nor gender [F(1, 262)=1.56, ns]. There was a significant 
effect of presentation condition [F(3, 262)=3.03, p<0.05]. There were no 
significant interactions between any of the variables [F(9, 262)=1.66, ns for 
grade by presentation condition, F(3, 262)=2.32 for grade by gender, and F(3, 
262)=1.29, ns for gender by presentation condition]. 
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Table 3.11: Mean (and standard deviations in parentheses) responses to the TCL 
external threat statements scale across the four scenario presentation conditions. 
Scenario Presentation Condition 
Positive Coping External Internal Total 
Grade 
3 4.95 (2.8) 5.41 (3.2) 3.07 (3.0) 5.57 (2.3) 4.90 (2.9) 
5 4.11 (2.8) 6.00 (2.2) 5.47 (2.3) 4.65 (2.9) 5.08 (2.6) 
7 2.65 (1.8) 4.00 (2.8) 3.80 (2.9) 5.83 (3.8) 4.08 (3.1) 
10 3.84 (3.3) 3.50 (1.8) 4.84 (2.4) 4.85 (2.5) 4.34 (2.6) 
Total 3.92 (2.8) 4.92 (2.8) 4.36 (2.7) 5.24 (2.9) 4.61 (2.8) 
TCL internal threat statements scale by grade, gender and presentation condition 
Finally Table 3.12 presents mean TCL internal threat statements scales scores 
across the four presentation conditions and for all grades. A three way 
ANCOVA with RCMAS anxiety as the covariate was used to analyse the data. 
This analysis revealed that anxiety was a significant covariate [F(1, 
262)=28.18, p<0.05]. There was a significant effect of presentation type and 
gender on the TCL internal threat statements scale [F(3, 262)=4.59, p<0.05, F(1, 
262)=5.10, p<0.05]. The main effect of grade was not significant [F(1, 
262)=2.34, ns]. Mean scores show that females reported higher levels of 
internal threat cognitions than males, and that there were higher levels of 
internal threat cognitions reported in the internal threat condition and the 
coping condition than other conditions. There were no significant 
interactions between any of the factors [F(9, 262)=1.27, ns for grade by 
presentation condition, F(3, 262)=2.10 for grade by gender and F(3, 262)=0.93 
ns for presentation condition by gender]. 
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Table 3.12: Mean (and standard deviations in parentheses) responses to the TCL 
internal threat statements scale across the four scenario presentation conditions. 
Scenario Presentation Condition 
Positive Coping External Internal Total 
Grade 
3 5.32 (3.8) 6.36 (3.6) 3.67 (3.4) 6.26 (3.4) 5.57 (3.6) 
5 5.16 (3.6) 8.35 (2.8) 6.84 (2.8) 5.82 (3.3) 6.59 (3.3) 
7 3.41 (3.0) 5.12 (3.3) 4.35 (3.1) 6.50 (3.4) 4.85 (3.3) 
10 5.37 (3.4) 5.67 (2.1) 5.11 (2.6) 6.40 (2.1) 5.64 (2.7) 
Total 4.85 (3.5) 6.51 (3.3) 5.05 (3.1) 6.26 (3.1) 5.67 (3.3) 
Correlations between reported cognitions and state anxiety 
Table 3.13 below reports the correlations between the STAIC and STAI state 
anxiety and p-state and n-state subscales with the TCL scales. Hierarchical 
regression analyses were performed to assess whether state anxiety was still 
significantly correlated with the TCL subscales after allowing for trait anxiety, 
and possible interactions between state and trait anxiety in making additional 
contributions were also assessed. None of the contributions of the 
interactions were significant. Part correlations which were calculated 
through these regression analyses are included in this table. As can be seen 
from these results, the initial correlations with state anxiety were all 
significant with the exception of the correlation between STAI state anxiety 
and coping statements. Note that all correlations between the positive 
statements scale of the TCL and measures of state anxiety are negative. There 
were no notable differences between these correlations and the part 
correlations, which all remained significant after allowing for the effect of 
trait anxiety. Accordingly trait anxiety does not significantly alter the 
relationship between state anxiety and scores on the scales of the TCL. 
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Table 3.13: Correlations (r) and part correlations (r p, controlling for STAI or 
STAIC trait anxiety) between state anxiety measures on the STAI, STAIC (total, p-
state and n-state) and the scales of the TCL. 
Cognition Checklist Scales 
Positive Coping External Internal 
State Anxiety 
STAIC 
n=226
P-state 
n=226
N-state 
n=226
STAI 
n=70 
r=-0.46* 
r=0.45* P -  
r=-0.39* 
r=0.39* P -  
r=-0.45* 
P -  r=0.45* 
r=-0.41* 
r =-0.44* 
P 
r=0.38* 
r =0.33* 
r=0.27* 
r =0.25* 
r=0.37* 
r =0.32* 
r=0.18 
r=0.09 
r=0.58* 
r =0.49* 
r=0.43* 
r =0.38* 
r=0.57* 
r =0.48* 
r=0.50* 
r =0.47* 
r=0.79* 
r =0.73* 
r=0.63* 
r =0.59* 
r=0.73* 
r =0.67* 
r=0.56* 
r =0.52* 
*p<0.05 
rp=part correlation after allowing for the effect of RCMAS trait anxiety. 
Discussion 
Methodological issues 
Sample characteristics: Trait anxiety 
Trait anxiety for all participants has been investigated to assess whether the 
samples are representative of the normal population. According to mean 
measures of trait anxiety on the STAIC, participants appear to be representative 
of the normal population, with mean trait anxiety scores at or slightly below the 
mean reported in the norms. The STAI mean scores fell well above the 
population mean. The RCMAS is again different, showing that mean scores for 
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females remain relatively stable at around the 60th percentile, while for males it 
tends to dip at grade 7 and then increases again in grade 10. This suggests that 
the RCMAS, STAIC and STAI are not equivalent measures of trait anxiety, as the 
RCMAS shows relatively stable trait anxiety levels across the whole age range, 
while the STAI is quite dissimilar to the STAIC. This had already been 
demonstrated in the previous experiment. 
Investigation of these data also shows that STAIC trait anxiety decreases with 
age, which is contrary to the findings reported in experiment 2, where there was 
no effect of grade on this measure. In experiment 1 there was also a significant 
grade effect on STAIC trait anxiety, however in this experiment, it increased to 
grade 5 and then decreased. The current experiment also showed a decrease in 
RCMAS anxiety across the grades, while there was no such decrease in 
experiment 2. In the current experiment there was no gender effect on STAI or 
STAIC trait anxiety, but females did report higher anxiety on the RCMAS than 
males. In experiment 1 females reported greater STAIC trait anxiety, but there 
was no gender difference on STAI. In experiment 2 there were only gender 
differences on RCMAS. So, this suggests that the sample used in the current 
experiment is not equivalent to the ones in previous experiments in terms of trait 
anxiety effects across the grades. 
Baseline, neutral and operation state anxiety 
Mean measures of state anxiety suggest that for the STAIC and the STAI, 
participants reported normal to low levels of state anxiety at baseline and after 
the neutral scenario. The baseline scores were consistent with those reported by 
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Strauss et al. (1988) for the equivalent age group, and the neutral scores were 
slightly lower than those reported in this study. There were no gender 
differences in state anxiety for the baseline measure or in response to the neutral 
scenario; however females consistently reported higher levels of state anxiety 
than males in response to the operation scenario, and there was a significant 
interaction between gender and measurement time in a repeated measures 
ANOVA. This finding indicates that females were actually more reactive to the 
anxiety induction procedure than males. Such a finding has not been reported 
elsewhere. 
Baseline state anxiety did not change with increasing age (although p-state 
anxiety levels increased for females). There was however an interaction between 
grade and gender for baseline state anxiety, which showed that there was no 
difference between genders in grade 3, but in grade 5, females report far lower 
levels of state anxiety, and in grade 7 the situation was reversed. Neutral state 
anxiety decreased across the grades, indicating that older participants found the 
neutral scenario less anxiety inducing. 
Effect of anxiety induction on state anxiety 
Experiment 2 did not measure baseline state anxiety, and therefore it was not 
possible to state that there definitely was an increase in state anxiety after the 
presentation of the operation scenario, although it was clear that state anxiety 
levels were extreme. Experiment 3 has therefore taken a measure of baseline 
state anxiety, as well as employing a neutral scenario, in order to compare 
reported state anxiety after the anxiety induction procedure. There was a 
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significant difference between baseline state anxiety and operation state anxiety, 
and a significant difference between operation state anxiety and neutral state 
anxiety. These results provide more conclusive support for the use of this style of 
anxiety induction by showing that participants report greater state anxiety after 
the anxiety induction procedure, compared with baseline measures, and also that 
they show lower levels of anxiety when presented with a neutral scenario 
compared with the anxiety induction scenario. The results also revealed that 
participants actually reported significantly lower levels of anxiety after the 
neutral scenario compared with the baseline measure of anxiety. There are a 
number of possible reasons for this. Firstly participants may have found the 
neutral scenario relaxing, or secondly their baseline levels of state anxiety may 
have been elevated when beginning the experiment due to the unfamiliar 
situation and task, but that after being given the neutral scenario, they became 
more relaxed and less threatened in the situation. 
Hypothesis 1: TCL responses by scenario presentation condition 
The TCL was designed primarily as a validity check to ensure that participants 
could report back as their own the cognitive content that they had been presented 
in the scenarios. It was therefore hypothesised that there would be significantly 
higher levels of reported cognitions in the scale corresponding to the 
presentation condition of participants. Since experiment 2 provided some 
evidence that trait anxiety was related to the various cognitions, the data were 
analysed using ANCOVA, with RCMAS trait anxiety as a covariate. Results 
revealed that RCMAS was a significant covariate for all but positive statements. 
Only the positive statements scale and the internal threat statements scale gave 
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clear support for this hypothesis. This indicates that the threat and coping scales 
are not independent of one another, that participants who experienced anxiety 
were likely to report not only the cognitive content of their scenario, but cognitive 
content which reflects their level of anxiety. This is further demonstrated by the 
significant correlations between the scales to be discussed later. 
Hypothesis 2: Correlations between TCL scales and trait anxiety measures 
The coping statements and threat statements scales of the TCL have been found 
to correlate as hypothesised with measures of anxiety. The internal threat 
statements, external threat statements and coping statements scales of the TCL 
each correlated positively with measures of trait anxiety, supporting the work of 
others in this area (Fox et al., 1983; Houston et al., 1984; Prins, 1986; Zatz & 
Chassin, 1983, 1985), and providing evidence of the convergent construct validity 
of the scale. It is also noted that the positive statements scale was not correlated 
with measures of trait anxiety, which supports the findings of Fox et al.(1983) 
and Prins et al. (1981) both of whom suggest that positive statements are not 
related to trait anxiety, and gives support to the divergent validity of the positive 
statements scale. 
Hypothesis 3: Intercorrelations between TCL scales 
Intercorrelations between the scales of the TCL were calculated to assess the 
relationships between the scales, and partial correlations taking into account 
RCMAS trait anxiety were also calculated. Since coping statements and threat 
statements scales are all positively related to trait anxiety, it was hypothesised 
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that there would be positive correlations amongst these measures. This 
hypothesis was supported, and the partial correlations remained equivalent for 
these scales, indicating that their relationship is independent of trait anxiety. 
There were moderate significant positive correlations between coping statements 
and the two threat scales, and strong correlations between the two threat 
statements scales, all of which remained equivalent after trait anxiety had been 
taken into account. 
There were also moderate negative correlations between the positive statements 
scale and the internal threat statements and external threat statements scales, but 
there was also a moderate positive correlation between the coping statements 
scale and the positive statements scale. This opposed the hypothesis which 
stated that there would be no relationship between the positive statements scale 
and the other scales of the TCL. This finding demonstrates that positive 
statements and anxiety-related statements (i.e., threat and coping statements) are 
not completely unrelated, and their relationship remains after trait anxiety is 
partialled out. The finding also suggests that the role of coping statements is not 
entirely clear cut. In experiment 2, the expected positive correlations were found 
between coping statements and measures of trait anxiety; however coping 
statements were found to correlate negatively with p-state anxiety in the friends 
scenario, and negatively with STAI state anxiety in the operation scenario, so it 
may be that coping statements have some role to play in reducing state anxiety. 
In summary, results have shown that the four scales of the operation TCL 
demonstrate convergent construct validity, through their correlations with 
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measures of anxiety, and they also display some internal consistency via the 
intercorrelations between the scales, and that this internal consistency is 
independent of their relationship with trait anxiety. While they were originally 
designed to show that participants could report back accurately the cognitive 
content of the scenarios, this has not been adequately demonstrated, probably 
due to the intercorrelations between the scales. Despite this, evidence suggests 
that the different presentation conditions of the scenarios do induce different 
levels of anxiety, thus the cognitions which are inserted into them have had the 
expected effect. 
Theoretical issues 
Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3: Operation state anxiety by grade, gender and presentation 
condition 
It was hypothesised that there would be no effect of grade on the level of state 
anxiety induced by the operation scenario. Data were analysed with ANCOVA, 
using trait anxiety as a covariate for both the STAIC and STAI scales. The results 
show that while trait anxiety was a significant covariate for STAIC there was an 
effect of grade on the reports of state anxiety. Analysis revealed that state anxiety 
in response to the operation scenario was higher in grade 5 participants than 
grade 3 or grade 7 participants, thus an inverted 'U' developmental pattern has 
been found. Such a finding has not been reported elsewhere in the anxiety 
literature. 
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Investigation of male and female data separately suggested that the grade 5 peak 
in state anxiety was found mainly in males, and that females showed a fairly 
steady decrease in state anxiety across the grades. These findings for males and 
females are also at odds with the findings of the previous experiment, which 
revealed no changes in state anxiety in response to the operation scenario across 
the grades for males or females. 
There was no effect of grade on state anxiety in response to the neutral scenario. 
For the baseline measure, there was a significant interaction of grade by gender, 
which revealed that state anxiety in grade 3 participants was similar for males 
and females, but in grade 5 males showed significantly higher state anxiety than 
females, and in grade 7 the females showed significantly higher state anxiety 
than the males. It is therefore possible that the changes in state anxiety in 
response to the operation scenario across the grades may be a consequence of the 
different levels of trait anxiety in this sample compared with the samples used in 
other experiments. 
It was also hypothesised that females would report significantly higher levels of 
state anxiety in response to the operation scenario. Results supported this 
hypothesis, with females reporting significantly higher state anxiety on the STAI 
and STAIC, even when the significant covariate of trait anxiety was taken into 
account. These results support the findings of experiment 1, where females 
responded to the initial FSSC-II fear items with significantly higher levels of fear. 
They also support the findings of experiment 2 where females reported 
significantly higher levels of state anxiety in response to the operation and 
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friends scenario. Finally they support previous findings which point to higher 
levels of anxiety disorders, anxiety-related cognitions and fear in females (for 
example, Kashani et al., 1989, regarding anxiety disorders; Brown et al., 1986; 
Prins et al., 1994; Zatz & Chassin, 1985, regarding cognitive aspects of anxiety, 
and Ferrari, 1986; Gullone & King, 1992b; 011endick & King, 1991, regarding 
fear). It could be argued that males are more likely to under-report anxiety 
symptoms, and that the checklist nature of the STAIC and the STAI is open to 
under-reporting of symptoms. It was also found however that there was no 
difference in anxiety levels between males and females at baseline (although the 
interaction of grade by gender for the STAIC suggests that this is not the case 
across all the grades) or after the neutral scenario, so under-reporting of state 
anxiety by males is unlikely. ANCOVA on the change between baseline and 
induced STAIC, p-state anxiety and n-state anxiety demonstrated that females 
were more reactive to the operation scenario, as there was a significant main 
effect of gender on the change variable. No effect of gender was found for the 
change variable for STAI state anxiety, suggesting that females become less 
reactive as they reach this age. 
There was a significant effect of presentation condition on state anxiety, despite 
trait anxiety being a significant covariate, with participants in the positive 
presentation condition reporting significantly reduced levels of state anxiety 
compared with participants in the other three presentation conditions. These 
results provide support for earlier studies which have shown that coping 
statements, internal threat statements and external threat statements have a 
positive relationship to anxiety (Fox et al., 1983; Houston et al., 1984; Prins, 1986; 
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Zatz & Chassin, 1983, 1985), and that positive statements have a negative 
relationship to anxiety (e.g. Blankstein et al., 1992; Galassi et al., 1981; Zatz & 
Chassin, 1983, 1985). Further, the results suggest that the anxiety levels of 
children can be manipulated by the introduction of positive statements into a 
threatening imagery scenario. The state anxiety responses to the operation will be 
considered in greater detail later. 
The effect of presentation condition on state anxiety could not be accounted for 
by group differences prior to presentation of the scenarios, as there was no effect 
of presentation condition on baseline state anxiety or trait anxiety. While the 
positive statements did not entirely protect against state anxiety, mean STAIC 
results show that those given the positive statements presentation condition 
reported 6.7 points less anxiety than those given the external threat presentation 
condition, 7.5 points less than those given the coping presentation condition and 
8.8 points less than those given the internal threat presentation condition. Given 
that the STAIC has a possible range of 40 points, when converted to percentages, 
those given the positive statements presentation condition reported 17%, 19% 
and 22% less anxiety than those given the coping, internal threat and external 
threat presentation conditions respectively. The positive statements condition 
also induced less p-state and n-state anxiety than the other conditions. 
Investigation of male and female data separately suggests that females were 
more likely to show the ameliorating effect of the positive scenario condition than 
males. 
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There was no effect of presentation condition on the older participants who 
completed the STAI, and there were no interactions between gender and 
presentation condition. This may be due to the smaller sample in this older age 
group, but it may also suggest that older participants are less affected by the 
different presentation conditions than the younger participants. Trait anxiety 
was a significant covariate in this analysis. Grade 10 participants will be 
discussed in further detail when the TCL data are discussed, as these data cover 
the full age range. 
Hypotheses 4, and 5: TCL scales by grade and gender 
The TCL was initially included in this experiment as a validity check on the use 
of different presentation conditions. It can also be used as a measure of cognitive 
activity in response to anxiety-inducing stimuli. There has been some suggestion 
that thoughts checklists measure the affective rather than cognitive responses of 
individuals (Glass & Arnkoff, 1982) and that they measure global distress rather 
than internal dialogue (Kendall & Chansky, 1991). Despite these criticisms, it is 
argued that thoughts checklists are the most reliable and valid measures of 
internal thought (Clark, 1988). Given that the current experiment provides no 
means of assessing whether the TCL is a valid measure of internal thought as 
opposed to a measure of the affective dimensions of anxiety (and given the 
nature of internal thought, it would be virtually impossible to establish this for 
any measure), the results have been interpreted on the basis that the TCL does 
measure internal thoughts during exposure to an anxiety-inducing scenario. In 
addition these data are analysed with ANCOVA, using trait anxiety as a 
covariate, which controls for the role of trait anxiety in the TCL scores. 
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Based on the findings of the previous study, it was hypothesised that there 
would be no efrect of grade on the number of reported cognitions reported on the 
TCL. Trait anxiety was not found to be a significant covariate for TCL positive 
statements, and analysis revealed that there was no effect of grade on this scale of 
the TCL. RCMAS anxiety was a significant covariate for the coping statements 
scale of the TCL, as would be expected given the positive correlation between 
these two measures. There was no effect of grade on responses to the coping 
statements scale of the TCL. Again RCMAS anxiety was a significant covariate 
for the external threat scale of the TCL, however there was no main effect of 
grade on this scale. Finally, RCMAS anxiety was found to be a significant 
covariate for TCL internal threat cognitions. There was no effect of grade on this 
scale of the TCL. It appears that again there were no effects of grade on any of 
the scales of the TCL when trait anxiety was taken into consideration. 
It was hypothesised that females would report significantly more threat and 
coping statements and significantly less positive statements. Since there are 
gender differences in reported trait anxiety, analyses controlled for trait anxiety 
levels. ANCOVA results indicated that trait anxiety was a significant covariate 
for all TCL scales but the positive statements scale. Gender differences were not 
evident in the positive statements or the external threat statements scale of the 
TCL. Females, however, reported significantly more coping statements and 
internal threat statements. These data suggest that females are more reactive to 
the coping and internal threat anxiety induction procedures, which is consistent 
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with the greater reactivity noted in the state anxiety scores of female to the 
anxiety-inducing scenarios. 
Hypothesis 6: Correlations between reported cognitions and state anxiety 
As previously discussed, the coping statements scale, internal threat statements 
scale and external threat statements scale of the TCL each correlated positively 
with the trait scales of the STAIC and the STAI, and the RCMAS. The positive 
statements scale of the TCL is not correlated with these measures of trait anxiety. 
The scales were then correlated with the state scales, and partial correlations 
were also completed to assess the relationship with state anxiety independent of 
trait anxiety. Results indicated that the coping statements and threat statements 
scales are positively related to the STAIC and STAI state anxiety measures 
(supporting the original hypothesis regarding coping and threat statements), and 
that these correlations remain largely unchanged when partial correlations are 
calculated which control for trait anxiety. The positive statements scale of the 
TCL is negatively correlated to state anxiety (both full and partial correlations 
indicate this). This suggests that while positive statements are unrelated to trait 
anxiety, they are related to state anxiety. Watson and Clark (1984) argued that 
the state scale of the STAI consists of items which reflect negative affectivity 
(such as jittery, nervous, relaxed and calm), and items which reflect a more 
general happiness/unhappiness dimension (such as pleasant and upset). The 
factor analysis of STAIC items presented in Chapter 7 did not support this 
conceptualisation of the scale, but revealed that the items fell clearly into two 
factors which simply represent the positive and negative items of the scale. This 
was consistent with the findings of previous factor analytic studies of the STAIC 
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(Cross & Huberty, 1993; Dorr, 1981; Papay & Hedl, 1978). Given that there are no 
positive items in the trait scale of the STAIC, it would be tempting to assume that 
the positive items of the STAIC state scale explain the correlation between the 
TCL positive statements scale and STAIC state anxiety; however the positive 
statements scale of the TCL correlates negatively with both p-state anxiety and n-
state anxiety, (and these correlations remain relatively unchanged when partial 
correlations are calculated which control for trait anxiety), suggesting that the 
two have similar relations to the positive statements scale. 
Conclusions 
This experiment has investigated the role of cognition in anxiety in children. 
Children were asked to imagine themselves having an operation and were 
presented with one of four different patterns of cognition. Three major 
methodological hypotheses were posed. The findings of this experiment 
generally supported these hypotheses by demonstrating the following: 
1. Participants in the positive statements and internal threat statements 
conditions reported significantly more TCL positive statements and 
internal threat statements respectively, than those in the other conditions. 
2. The internal threat statements, external threat statements and coping 
statements scales of the TCL were all significantly positively correlated 
with trait anxiety, thus supporting the stated hypothesis. The positive 
scale of the TCL was not correlated with measures of trait anxiety, which 
again supported the stated hypothesis. 
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3. The internal threat statements, external threat statements and coping 
statements scales of the TCL were all significantly positively correlated 
with one another, even when partial correlations were calculated 
controlling for trait anxiety, thus supporting the stated hypothesis. The 
positive statements scale of the TCL was significantly negatively correlated 
with the two threat scales and significantly positively correlated with the 
coping statements scale of the TCL, which opposed the stated hypothesis. 
Six theoretical hypotheses were posed. There was mixed support for these 
hypotheses, summarised by the following: 
1. It was hypothesised that there would be no effect of grade on reported 
state anxiety. Results showed that there was an effect of grade on state 
anxiety, and that this represented an inverted 'U' developmental pattern of 
state anxiety, with participants in grade 5 reporting higher levels of state 
anxiety than those in other grades. 
2. It was also hypothesised female participants would report higher levels of 
state anxiety in response to the scenarios. This hypothesis was supported. 
Further, these gender differences appear to reflect a greater reactivity to 
anxiety-inducing stimuli in females, as there are no baseline or neutral 
differences in state anxiety between males and females. 
3. It was hypothesised that participants presented with the positive 
statements condition would report lower levels of state anxiety than those 
in the coping or threat statements conditions. This hypothesis was 
supported. 
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4. It was hypothesised that there would be no effect of grade on the number 
of reported cognitions in response to the scenarios. This was supported. 
5. It was hypothesised that females would report more threat statements and 
coping statements and less positive statements on the TCL. While females 
did report significantly more internal threat statements, and coping 
statements, there were no gender differences on the positive statements 
and external threat statements scales of the TCL. 
6. Finally it was hypothesised that there would be significant positive 
correlations between state anxiety and TCL coping statements, internal 
threat statements and external threat statements, and this hypothesis was 
supported. There was no directional hypothesis posed regarding the 
relationship between positive statements and state anxiety, however it was 
found that the positive statements scale of the TCL was negatively related 
to state anxiety. 
These findings represent some significant advances in the study of anxiety 
and cognition in children. In order to establish that the findings are robust, 
the fourth and final experiment in the thesis will attempt to replicate them. 
This fourth experiment will also attempt to generalise the findings of 
experiment 3 to the other situations previously used in experiment 2, namely 
the shark and friends scenario. 
174 
Chapter 9: Experiment 4- Causal Effects of Positive, Coping 
and Threat Statements: A Replication of 
Experiment 3 
Experiment 3 investigated the impact that different patterns of cognitions have 
upon state anxiety and reported cognitions by employing the operation scenario 
from experiment 3 to induce anxiety in children using four different patterns of 
cognitions. The findings of that experiment established that the level of induced 
state anxiety could be influenced by the type of cognitive framework in which 
the anxiety-inducing material is presented by showing that participants given 
material in conjunction with positive statements report less state anxiety than 
those given this same material with coping or threat statements. Further, the 
findings demonstrated that female participants reported higher levels of induced 
state anxiety and more anxiety-related cognitions than their male counterparts. 
The findings demonstrated that state anxiety peaks in grade 5, and that males 
were more likely to show this peak in anxiety in grade 5 than females. 
Investigation of reported cognitions on the TCL suggested that the inverse was 
true of the positive statements checklist, with grade 5 participants reporting less 
positive statements than other grades. Females reported significantly more 
coping statements and internal threat statements on the TCL, and less positive 
statements than their male counterparts. Experiment 3 also established that 
while threat and coping cognitions are positively related to both trait and state 
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anxiety, positive statements are not related to trait anxiety but show a negative 
relationship to state anxiety. 
The findings of experiment 3 are not consistent with previous findings, which 
have suggested that there is an increase in some anxiety-related cognitions across 
the age range (Brown et al., 1986; Vasey, 1994). There have been no reports of an 
inverted 'U' developmental pattern in either state anxiety or reported cognitions. 
Investigation of trait anxiety in the sample used in experiment 3 revealed that 
trait anxiety decreased across the grades. The sample employed was therefore 
not equivalent with the sample employed in experiment 2, where there was no 
such effect of grade on trait anxiety. Experiment 4 therefore aims to replicate the 
findings of experiment 3 using a different sample, to establish whether these 
findings are robust. In addition to replicating the findings of experiment 3, 
experiment 4 will establish whether similar effects occur when the other two 
scenarios from experiment 2 are employed, thus providing evidence that the 
effects found in experiment 3 can be generalised to other situations. 
The methodological hypotheses of this experiment are: 
1. Participants will report significantly more cognitions on the TCL scale 
corresponding to the scenario condition with which they were presented 
than cognitions on the other three scales in all three scenarios. 
2. In all three scenarios, the threat statements and coping statements scales of 
the TCL will be significantly positively correlated with measures of trait 
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anxiety, and the positive statements scales of the TCL will not be correlated 
with trait anxiety. 
3. The coping statements and threat statements scales of the TCL will be 
significantly positively correlated with each other, and significantly 
negatively correlated with the positive statements scale in all three 
scenarios. 
The theoretical hypotheses of this experiment are as follows: 
1. That there will be a significant effect of grade on the level of state anxiety 
induced by the three scenarios, and that there will be a significant increase 
in state anxiety from grade 3 to grade 5, followed by a decrease to grade 7. 
2. That female participants will report significantly higher levels of state 
anxiety in response to all three scenarios, and that there will be significant 
effect of gender on the amount of change from baseline to induced state 
anxiety. 
3. Participants in the positive statements condition will report significantly 
lower levels of state anxiety than those in the coping or threat statements 
conditions in all three scenarios. 
4. That there will be no effect of grade on the coping statements, threat 
statements and positive statements scales of the TCL in any of the three 
scenarios 
5. Females will report more threat and coping statements and less positive 
statements on the TCL in all three scenarios. 
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6. There will be significant positive correlations between state anxiety and the 
coping statements and threat statements scales of the TCL, and significant 
negative correlations between the positive statements scale of the TCL and 
state anxiety in all scenarios. 
Method 
Participants 
Two hundred and forty two students from three primary schools and one high 
school participated in this experiment on a voluntary basis with parent consent. 
Table 4.1 shows a breakdown of these participants by grade and gender. Average 
age for grade 3 participants was 8 years and 8 months (standard deviation 4.9 
months), for grade 5 participants 10 years and 7 months (standard deviation 5.1 
months), for grade 7 participants 12 years and 3 months (standard deviation 5.2 
months) and for grade 10 participants 15 years and 4 months (standard deviation 
5.0 months). 
Table 4.1: Participants by grade and gender. 
Gender 
Females Males Total 
Grade 
3 30 28 58 
5 35 29 64 
7 34 25 59 
10 27 34 61 
Total 126 116 242 
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Design 
The experiment employed a4x2x3x3 (grade by gender by presentation 
condition by scenario) factorial design. As for the previous experiments, 
participants were selected from grades 3, 5, 7, and 10. The scenarios were 
presented in one of three conditions: with positive statements, with coping 
statements or with threat statements. In this experiment, the internal and 
external threat statements have been collapsed to create one threat condition, 
consisting of equal numbers of internal and external threat statements. The 
scenarios were based on the same three employed in experiment 2 outlined in 
Chapter 7: 'having an operation', 'having no friends' and 'sharks' (see Appendix 
B4). All participants completed the three experimental scenarios, plus the neutral 
scenario (the same as that used in experiment 3), unless time constraints did not 
allow them to complete the neutral scenario, or non-attendance at school did not 
allow them to complete all the three scenarios. All scenarios were presented in 
counterbalanced order (see Appendix B4). 
Measures 
As with the previous two experiments this experiment employed the STAIC 
(Spielberger, 1973) to measure both state and trait anxiety in students from 
grades 3, 5 and 7 and the STAI (Spielberger, 1983) was used for the students in 
grade 10. The RCMAS (Reynolds & Richmond, 1985) was employed as an 
additional instrument to measure anxiety in all age groups. 
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Cognition was measured using a separate form of the Thoughts Checklist (TCL) 
for each scenario (See Appendices A7, A8 and A9). Each TCL consisted of the 30 
items used in the three presentation conditions of each of the scenarios, so there 
were 10 positive statements, 10 coping statements and 10 threat statements. 
Participants responded either yes or no in response to each item, and received a 
score ranging from 0 to 10 for each of the three scales. Note that these separate 
forms of the TCL are referred to by their scenario, so there is the operation TCL, 
the shark TCL and the friends TCL. 
Stimulus selection and development 
This experiment aimed to replicate the findings of the previous experiment 
which employed only the operation scenario and attempted to generalise these 
findings to other situations, namely 'having no friends' and 'sharks'. The 
operation scenarios were therefore the same as those used in the previous 
experiment for positive statements and coping statements. Because participants 
responded similarly to the internal and external threat scenarios, these two 
conditions were combined to create a single threat scenario, which included an 
equal number of internal and external threat cues. Each scenario had the anxiety 
cues removed, and replaced by either positive statements, coping statements or 
threat statements, each of which was taken from experiment 2. Scenarios were 
then developed for the friends and the shark scenarios along the same lines as 
explained in the previous chapter for experiment 3. The notable exception was 
that there were very few reported positive statements in response to the shark 
scenario in experiment 2. Items were therefore created for this scenario using the 
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few existing positive items and the criteria outlined in experiment 2 as 
guidelines. The same neutral scenario was employed as in experiment 3. 
Procedure 
The procedure was essentially the same as experiment 3. Due to the inclusion of 
two more scenarios, the experiment was conducted over two separate sessions on 
different days about one week apart. This helped to guard against fatigue, and 
was also more acceptable to the schools. Participants completed the anxiety 
inventories in the first session, plus one of the four scenarios (i.e., neutral, 
operation, friends or shark), and completed the remaining conditions in the 
second session. 
Results 
As for the previous experiment, the results section of this chapter is divided into 
a methodological and a theoretical section. The methodological section initially 
provides descriptive information regarding the sample employed in the 
experiment in terms of trait anxiety and state anxiety. The methodological 
hypotheses are then explored. The theoretical hypotheses of the experiment are 
then addressed. As for the previous experiment, all analyses assessing state 
anxiety and cognitions have taken trait anxiety into account, either through 
calculating partial correlations, hierarchical regression analyses or analysis of 
covariance. 
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Because the two subsidiary scales of the STAIC state scale did not add to the 
interpretation of data in the previous experiment, they have been omitted from 
the results section of this chapter except where particularly relevant. STAIC state 
anxiety subscales means and standard deviations for baseline, the operation, 
friends, shark and neutral scenarios are presented in Appendices C12 and C13, 
and further analyses for these data are presented in Appendices C14 and C15. 
Methodological issues 
Sample description 
Mean trait anxiety scores and their corresponding T scores for males and females 
across all grades are presented in Table 4.2 below. As for the previous 
experiments, the T scores of the STAIC were based on the total sample of grades 
3, 4 and 5 students for males and females separately and the T scores for the STAI 
were based on a high school sample for males and females separately. T score 
results suggest that grade 10 participants reported higher levels of trait anxiety 
on the STAI than the younger participants completing the STAIC, which is 
consistent with the findings in experiment 3. Analysis of raw data showed that 
8.1% of males and 13.1% of females had STAIC trait anxiety scores which were 
more than one standard deviation above the expected mean, while for STAI trait 
anxiety 14.7% of males and 18.5% of females were within this upper range. 
A two way ANOVA of grade by gender on the STAIC trait measure revealed that 
there was no significant effect of grade [F(2, 179)=0.54, ns] or gender [F(1, 
179)=0.07, ns], and there was no significant interaction between grade and gender 
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[F(3, 179)=0.04, ns]. An independent samples t test revealed that there was no 
significant effect of gender on STAI trait anxiety [t(1, 59)=1.37, ns]. 
Table 4.2 also gives mean scores and the corresponding T scores for the RCMAS. 
As in the previous experiments, T scores are based on white populations of 
students in separate age groups and genders. T scores on the RCMAS for males 
and females show that, in relative terms, anxiety increased across the grades, but 
for females this stays within the average range of scores. Mean RCMAS scores 
for males in grades 7 and 10 were at least one standard deviation above the 
mean. Two way ANOVA of grade by gender on the RCMAS showed that there 
was no significant effect of grade on RCMAS raw scores [F(2, 179)=0.37, ns] or of 
gender [F(2, 228)=0.96, ns]. There was no significant interaction between grade 
and gender on RCMAS [F(3, 228)=0.17, ns]. 
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Table 4.2: Means, standard deviations (in parentheses), T scores and numbers 
for STAI and STAIC trait anxiety and RCMAS score by gender and grade. 
STAI and STAIC Trait Anxiety Scores 
Grade 3 
11.37 (5.0) 
T=42 
n=30 
10.11 (5.5) 
T=44 
n=28 
10.76 (5.2) 
Note that grade 10 students completed 
11.91 (6.8) 	11.30 (6.3) 
the STAI and the students in grades 3, 5 and 
Gender 
Females 
Males 
Total 
Gender 
Females 
Males 
Total 
STAIC. 
Grade 3 
34.50 (4.1) 
T=45 
n=30 
34.00 (5.9) 
T=44 
n=28 
34.26 (5.0) 
Grade 5 
35.37 (7.6) 
T=47 
n=35 
35.49 (8.2) 
T=45 
n=30 
35.43 (7.9)  
RCMAS Scores 
Grade 5 
12.40 (7.4) 
T=53 
n=35 
11.43 (6.3) 
T=59 
n=30 
Grade 7 
34.64 (7.1) 
T=47 
n=34 
34.22 (6.2) 
T=44 
n=25 
34.77 (7.2) 
Grade 7 
11.21 (6.4) 
T=60 
n=34 
11.43 (6.4) 
T=66 
n=25 
Grade 10 
44.37 (8.9) 
1=65 
n=27 • 
41.18 (9.2) 
1=56 
n=34 
42.59 (9.1) 
Grade 10 
11.88 (6.4) 
T=57 
n=27 
10.59 (7.2) 
T=70 
n=34 
11.21 (6.8) 
7 completed the 
Baseline, neutral and induced state anxiety 
Table 4.3 includes raw scores and corresponding T scores for STAIC and STAI 
state anxiety, by gender and grade at baseline, after the operation scenario, after 
the friends scenario, after the shark scenario and after the neutral scenario. State 
anxiety responses to the anxiety-inducing scenes will be analysed according to 
presentation condition later. State anxiety responses at baseline and in response 
to the four scenarios are presented by presentation condition and grade in 
Appendix C4, and by gender in Appendix C5. 
According to the T scores, mean baseline STAI and STAIC state anxiety scores 
were well within the average range for state anxiety, apart from grade 10 males 
whose mean score was well below the expected mean for a normal population. 
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For the three anxiety-inducing scenarios, females STAIC mean scores were at 
least two standard deviations above the norm, and the mean scores for males 
were at least one standard deviation above this mean. Over all, grade 10 females 
responded at a slightly lower level than the younger females, but their mean 
score was still greater than one standard deviation above the norm, as was the 
mean for grade 10 males. In response to the neutral scene, T scores of mean 
STAIC state anxiety scores suggest that both male and female participants were 
generally responding within the low average range of state anxiety, while their 
grade 10 counterparts were responding well below the average range of state 
anxiety. 
Gender differences for state anxiety at baseline and after the neutral scenario 
were assessed using independent samples t tests. There were no differences 
between males and females on the STAIC or STAI baseline state anxiety 
R(181)=0.45, ns and t(59)=1.58, ns respectively]. The neutral scenario induced 
significantly higher state anxiety in females on the STAI, but not the STAIC 
R(34)=2.72, p<0.05 and t(140)=0.25, ns respectively]. Gender and grade effects for 
the experimental scenarios will be considered at a later point. 
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Table 4.3: Mean STAIC and STAI state anxiety scores, standard deviations (in 
parentheses) and T scores for all scenarios by gender and grade. 
Gender Grade Baseline 	Operation Friends 	Shark 
	
Female 3 	27.86 (4.0) 	44.86 (10.2) 44.64 (9.6) 	49.86 (10.0) 
T=44 	T=70 
	
T=70 
	
T=76 
5 	29.54 (7.0) 	46.60 (10.1) 45.31 (9.1) 
	
48.74 (9.9) 
T=46 	T=72 
	
T=70 
	
T=74 
7 	30.59(6.2) 	48.09 (8.0) 
	
46.33 (9.9) 
	
52.30 (6.6) 
T=52 	T=73 
	
T=71 
	
T=78 
10 	36.04 (9.8) 	59.62 (12.7) 59.15 (13.6) 66.31 (15.0) 
T=41 	T=65 
	
T=64 
	
T=70 
Male 	3 	28.36 (4.3) 	41.00 (1.0) 	39.89 (11.0) 41.82 (12.2) 
T=46 	T=65 
	
T=63 
	
T=66 
5 	28.91 (5.5) 	42.50 (10.9) 44.10 (9.9) 
	
46.97 (9.3) 
T=48 	T=66 
	
T=68 
	
T=71 
7 	30.09 (6.1) 	45.96 (7.0) 
	
44.14 (11.0) 49.33 (7.1) 
T=51 	T=70 
	
T=68 
	
1=72 
10 	31.68 (11.4) 54.56 (16.7) 57.12 (16.1) 60.15 (13.1) 
T=26 	T=66 
	
T=68 
	
1=70  
Neutral 
26.13 (5.2) 
T=40 
27.57 (8.7) 
1=44 
26.57 (4.1) 
1=42 
25.48 (20.9) 
1=12 
27.58 (6.8) 
T=46 
25.21 (5.4) 
T=39 
27.44 (5.6) 
T=44 
25.86 (5.6) 
T=10 
Note that grade 10 students completed the STAI, which has a maximum score of 80, and the students in 
grades 3, 5 and 7 completed the STAIC, which has a maximum score of 60. 
Effect of anxiety induction on state anxiety 
Analysis of raw state anxiety data showed that there were generally less 
participants reporting state anxiety more than one standard deviation above the 
mean than would be expected in a normal population for the baseline and 
neutral measures of state anxiety. In response to the three anxiety-inducing 
scenarios, there were more participants whose state anxiety scores were more 
than one standard deviation above the mean than would be expected in a normal 
population. Table 4.4 illustrates the percentage of scores within this range for 
males and females across all measures of state anxiety. 
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Table 4.4: Percentage of state anxiety scores more than one standard deviation 
above the mean. 
Gender Scale Baseline Operation Friends Shark Neutral 
Female STAIC 9.3% 81.7% 76.7% 90.6% 5.5% 
STAI 7.4% 65.4% 66.7% 88.5% 6.7% 
Male 	STAIC 14.0% 72.8% 72.7% 78.2% 8.7% 
STAI 2.9% 65.6% 69.7% 81.8% 0% 
Note, mean is based on the norms given in the manuals for the STAI and STAIC. 
Paired t-tests were completed between measures of baseline state anxiety and the 
anxiety-inducing scenarios state anxiety. STAIC state anxiety scores were 
significantly higher for each of the anxiety-inducing scenarios than baseline 
[t(166). 16.84, p<0.05 for the friends scenario; t(171)=18.82 p<0.05 for the 
operation scenario and t(171)=22.45 p<0.05 for the shark scenario]. STAI state 
anxiety scores were significantly higher for each of the anxiety-inducing 
scenarios than for the baseline measure R(59)=11.15, p<0.05 for the friends 
scenario; t(57)=10.31 p<0.05 for the operation scenario and t(58)=14.28, p<0.05 for 
the shark scenario]. STAIC state anxiety in response to each of the anxiety-
inducing scenarios was significantly higher than STAIC neutral state anxiety 
responses R(128)= 19.35, p<0.05 for the friends scenario; t(130)=17.98 p<0.05 for 
the operation scenario and t(133)=21.65 p<0.05 for the shark scenario]. STAI state 
anxiety responses were significantly higher in response to the anxiety inducing 
scenarios than the neutral scenario measures R(33)=12.89, p<0.05 for the friends 
scenario; t(33)=9.40 p<0.05 for the operation scenario and t(33)=12.89 p<0.05 for 
the shark scenario]. 
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TCL responses by scenario presentation condition 
ANCOVAs were conducted on all three scales of the operation, friends and shark 
forms of the TCL by presentation condition with RCMAS anxiety as a covariate. 
Table 4.5 shows mean scale scores on the each form of the TCL. 
Table 4.5: Mean TCL scale scores and standard deviations (in parentheses) for 
each presentation condition and F scores for the RCMAS as a covariate and main 
effect of presentation condition. 
Scenario Presentation Condition 
Positive Coping Threat F Score 
RCMAS 
F Score 
Presentation 
TCL Scale 
Operation 
Positive 5.47(3.1) 4.59(2.7) 4.39(2.9) F(1, 214)=0.61 F(2, 214)=3.70* 
Coping 5.46(2.4) 5.35(2.8) 5.81(2.0) F(1, 214)=12.87* F(2, 214)=0.87 
Threat 5.16(3.3) 5.81(2.8) 6.51(2.9) F(1, 214)=20.03* F(2, 214)=5.86* 
Friends 
Positive 5.17(2.7) 3.84(2.7) 3.37(2.9) F(1, 213)=4.00* F(2, 213)=9.29* 
Coping 5.96(2.7) 7.00(2.1) 5.77(2.5) F(1, 213)=0.03 F(2, 213)=5.28* 
Threat 5.22(3.3) 5.89(2.6) 6.61(3.3) F(1, 213)=17.03* F(2, 213)=3.51* 
Shark 
Positive 3.43(3.2) 2.85(2.5) 2.66(2.5) F(1, 206)=3.30 F(2, 206)=1.34 
Coping 7.41(2.4) 7.88(2.0) 7.71(1.7) F(1, 206)=3.23 F(2, 206)=0.77 
Threat 7.00(2.5) 7.25(2.5) 7.64(2.7) F(1, 206)=9.79* F(2, 206)=1.02 
*p<0.05 
Correlations between TCL scales and trait anxiety measures 
Table 4.6 shows correlations between each scale of the operation, friends and 
shark forms of the TCL and measures of trait anxiety. This table shows that there 
are significant negative correlations between the positive statements scales of the 
shark and friends TCL and trait anxiety, but not between the positive statements 
scale of the operations TCL and trait anxiety, and that the threat statements scale 
of all three TCL forms correlate with the STAIC and RCMAS, but not with the 
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STAI. The operation TCL coping statements are significantly positively 
correlated with the RCMAS and the shark TCL coping statements scales are 
significantly positively correlated with STAIC trait anxiety. 
Table 4.6: Trait anxiety measures correlated with the positive statements, coping 
statements and threat statements scales of the three forms of the TCL. 
Thoughts Checklist Scales 
Positive Coping Threat 
Anxiety Measures 
Operation 
STAIC 
n=168 
r=-0.04 r=0.13 r=0.27* 
STAI 
n=57 
r=0.00 r=0.08 r =0.09 
RCMAS 
n=218 
r=-0.03 r=0.24* r=0.27* 
Friends 
STAIC 
n=167 
r=-0.24* r=0.04 r=0.34* 
STAI 
n=59 
r=-0.02 r=-0.02 r=0.15 
RCMAS 
n=217 
r=-0.11 r=-0.02 r=0.26* 
Shark 
STAIC 
n=161 
r=-0.19* r=0.16* r=0.25* 
STAI 
n=58 
r=-0.01 r=-0.03 r=0.10 
RCMAS r=-0.11 r=0.11 r=0.21* 
n=210 
*.p<0.05 
Intercorrelations between TCL scales 
Table 4.7 shows intercorrelations between the three scales for each form of the 
TCL. The positive statements scale correlates negatively with the threat 
statements scale, on all forms of the TCL, and negatively with the coping 
statements scale on the shark form of the TCL. The coping statements scale 
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correlated positively with the threat statements scales on all forms of the TCL. 
Partial correlations have also been calculated which control for trait anxiety as 
measured by RCMAS, and these partial correlations are essentially the same as 
the initial correlations, indicating that trait anxiety is not a significant contributor 
to the relationship between the three scales. 
Table 4.7: Correlations (r) and partial correlations (r e, controlling for RCMAS 
trait anxiety) between the three TCL scales 
TCL Scales 
Positive Coping Threat 
TCL Scales 
Operation (n=225) 
Positive r=1.00 r=-0.01 r=-0.45* 
Coping rp=0.01 r=1.00 r=0.52* 
Threat r =0.47* P re=0.48* r=1.00 
Friends (n=226) 
Positive r=1.00 r=0.02 r=-0.51* 
Coping re=0.03 r=1.00 r=0.39* 
Threat r =0.52* P re=0.41* r=1.00 
Shark (n=219) 
Positive r=1.00 r=-0.17* r=-0.48* 
Coping r=0.14* P -  r=1.00 r=0.51* 
Threat re=-0.47* re=0.51* r=1.00 
*=p<0.05 
Note that r= Pearson's correlations and r p = partial correlations controlling for the effects of trait anxiety 
as measured by RCMAS 
Theoretical issues 
As the data in this section are extensive, mean scores for state anxiety by 
presentation condition and grade have been included in Appendix C4, and by 
gender in Appendix C5. Mean TCL scores by presentation condition and grade 
and by gender are included in Appendices C6 to C11 for each of the three forms 
of the TCL. Within this section results are presented by ANCOVA analyses 
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controlling for STAI and STAIC trait anxiety, with the interactions illustrated in 
figures. 
State anxiety by grade, gender, presentation condition and scenario 
As a preliminary analysis STAIC state anxiety data were assessed by a repeated 
measures ANCOVA for grade by gender by presentation condition by scenario 
(operation, friends, shark) with STAIC trait anxiety as a covariate. There were 
significant main effects for all between subjects factors [F(2, 135)=4.64, p<0.05 for 
grade; F(1, 135)=15.71, p<0.05 for gender and F(2,135)=23.71, p<0.05 for 
presentation condition] and trait anxiety was a significant covariate [F(1, 
135)=10.23, p.05]. The within subjects factor of scenario was not significant [F(2, 
270)=2.60, ns], however there was a significant interaction between presentation 
condition and scenario [F(4, 270)=3.08, p<0.05], indicating that the effect of 
presentation condition varied across the three different scenarios. This suggests 
that the most effective means of understanding the data is to assess each scenario 
separately. This also allows comparison between this experiment and the 
former. 
STAI state anxiety responses to the scenarios were also investigated using a 
repeated measures ANCOVA for gender by presentation condition across all 
three anxiety-inducing scenarios. Mean scores revealed that there were higher 
state anxiety responses to the shark scenario than the other scenarios and that 
there were lower state anxiety responses to the positive statements condition (see 
Appendix C4 for mean scores). Results showed that trait anxiety was not a 
significant covariate [F(2, 98)=0.17, ns] and there were not main effects of 
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between or within subjects factors [F(2, 98)=0.53, ns for scenario, F(2, 49)=0.24, ns 
for presentation condition, F(1, 98)=1.00, ns for gender]. The interaction between 
scenario and presentation condition was not significant [F(2, 98)=0.49]. To 
maintain consistency and to allow comparisons between this and experiment 3, 
STAI data were also analysed separately for each scenario. 
Operation state anxiety by grade, gender and presentation condition 
A three way ANCOVA was conducted on the STAIC state anxiety responses to 
the operation scenario for grade by gender by presentation condition with STAIC 
trait anxiety as a covariate. Results of this ANCOVA are given in Table 4.8, and 
mean scores are given in Appendix C4. Mean scores revealed that state anxiety 
increased across the grades, that females reported more state anxiety than males 
and that state anxiety was lowest in the positive statements condition. As can be 
seen from Table 4.8, all of these were significant main effects, despite the trait 
anxiety being a significant covariate. There was also a significant interaction 
between grade and presentation condition, and this is illustrated in Figure 4.2 
which demonstrates that the ameliorating effect of positive statements on state 
anxiety is most pronounced in grade 3 participants. 
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Table 4.8: Analysis of covariance results on STAIC state anxiety responses to the 
three scenarios for grade, gender and presentation condition with STAIC trait 
anxiety as the covariate. 
Operation Friends Shark 
STAIC trait anxiety F(1, 155)=9.91* F(1, 148)=16.67* F(1, 155)=3.26* 
Gender F(1, 155)=7.68* F(1, 148)=3.97* F(1, 155)=10.08* 
Presentation F(2, 155)=31.19* F(2, 148)=17.41* F(2, 155)=6.33* 
Grade F(2, 155)=3.68* F(3, 148)=2.07 F(3, 155)=4.36* 
Grade x Gender F(2, 155)=0.28 F(2, 148)=0.92 F(2, 155)=2.23 
Grade x Presentation F(4, 155)=3.30* F(4, 148)=3.36* F(4, 155)=2.45* 
Gender x Presentation F(2, 155)=0.11 F(2, 148)=0.41 F(2, 155)=1.13 
Grade x Gender 
x Presentation F(4, 155)=1.09 F(4, 166)=3.40* F(4, 173)=1.37 
*p <0.05 
As there was no significant effect of gender on baseline state anxiety scores, but a 
significant effect of gender on operation state anxiety scores, a change variable 
was calculated between baseline and induced state anxiety. A one way 
ANCOVA assessing the effect of gender on this variable with STAIC trait anxiety 
as a covariate was conducted. Results indicated that trait anxiety was not a 
significant covariate [F(1, 169)=0.00, ns], but that the main effect of gender was 
significant [F(1, 169)=4.51, p<0.05[. This effect is illustrated in Figure 4.1 which 
demonstrates that the females show a greater increase in state anxiety than 
males. The same procedure was adopted for STAI state anxiety data. An 
ANCOVA was conducted on the change variable, with STAI trait anxiety as the 
covariate. In this instance, trait anxiety was a significant covariate [F(1, 55)=5.42, 
p<0.05[ and there was no effect of gender [F(1, 55)=0.09, nsl. 
193 
20 
Female Male 
50 
State Anxiety 
Baseline 
M Operation 
Gender 
Figure 4.1: Effect of the operation scenario on males' and females' STAIC state 
anxiety scores. 
A two way ANCOVA was then conducted on STAI state anxiety responses to the 
operation scenario by gender and presentation condition with trait anxiety as a 
covariate. Mean scores (in Appendix C4 and C5) suggest that state anxiety was 
higher for females and that there were lower levels of reported state anxiety in 
the positive statements conditions. ANCOVA results on STAI state anxiety in 
response to the operation scenario are presented in Table 4.9 and indicate that 
trait anxiety was not a significant covariate, that there were no significant main 
effects, and no significant interactions between either of the factors. 
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Table 4.9: Analysis of covariance results on STAI state anxiety responses to the 
three scenarios by grade, gender and presentation condition with STAI trait 
anxiety as the covariate. 
Operation Friends Shark 
STAI Trait Anxiety F(1, 51)=0.02 F(1, 53)=0.57 F(1, 52)=0.36 
Gender F(1, 51)=1.93 F(1, 53)=0.20 F(1, 52)=3.86 
Presentation F(2, 51)=0.79 F(2, 53)=1.33 F(2, 52=0.96 
Gender x Presentation F(2, 51)=0.31 F(2, 53)=0.17 F(2, 52)=1.74 
*p <0.05 
Friends state anxiety by grade, gender and presentation condition 
A three way ANCOVA was conducted on STAIC state anxiety in response to the 
friends scenario for grade by gender by presentation condition. Results of this 
ANCOVA are given in Table 4.8 with mean scores in Appendix C4. Mean scores 
show that state anxiety was lowest in the positive statements presentation 
condition, and highest in the external threat condition and that females reported 
higher state anxiety levels. These were both significant main effects. This was 
despite a trait anxiety being a significant covariate. There was a significant 
interaction between grade and presentation condition, and this interaction is 
illustrated in Figure 4.3 which demonstrates that the ameliorating effect of 
positive statements on state anxiety is most pronounced in grade 3 participants. 
Since there was no significant effect of gender on baseline data, but a significant 
effect of gender on friends state anxiety responses, a change variable was 
calculated between baseline and induced state anxiety. A one way ANCOVA 
assessing the effect of gender on this variable with STAIC trait anxiety as a 
covariate was conducted. Results indicated that trait anxiety was not a 
significant covariate [F(1, 164)=0.54, ns],  and that the main effect of gender was 
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not significant [F(1, 164)=2.12, ns]. The same procedure was adopted for STAI 
state anxiety responses to the friends scenario. An ANCOVA was conducted on 
the change variable, with STAI trait anxiety as the covariate. In this instance, trait 
anxiety was a significant covariate [F(1, 57)=4.05, p<0.05[ and there was no effect 
of gender [F(1, 57)=0.02, ns]. 
Two way ANCOVAs were then conducted on STAI state anxiety in response to 
the friends scenario by gender and presentation condition with trait anxiety as a 
covariate. Mean scores (in Appendix C4 and C5) indicate that state anxiety was 
lower in response to the positive statements condition, and was lower in males. 
ANCOVA results presented in Table 4.9 indicate that trait anxiety was not a 
significant covariate, that there were no significant main effects of either gender 
or presentation condition, and that there were no significant interactions between 
the factors. 
Shark state anxiety by grade, gender and presentation condition 
A three way ANCOVA was conducted on STAIC state anxiety in response to the 
shark scenario for grade by gender by presentation condition. Mean state anxiety 
responses to the shark scenario show that state anxiety increased as grade 
increased, that females reported significantly more state anxiety and that state 
anxiety was greatest in response to the threat presentation condition. These were 
all significant main effects, despite STAIC trait anxiety being a significant 
covariate. Results of this ANCOVA are given in Table 4.8, and mean scores are 
reported in Appendix C4 and C5. There was also a significant interaction 
between grade and presentation condition, and this is illustrated in Figure 4.4, 
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and demonstrates the ameliorating effect of positive statements on state anxiety 
is most pronounced in grade 3 participants, and is consistent with the operation 
and friends scenarios. 
As there was no significant effect of gender on baseline data, but a significant 
effect of gender on STAIC state anxiety responses to the shark scenario, a change 
variable was calculated between baseline and induced state anxiety. A one way 
ANCOVA assessing the effect of gender on this variable with STAIC trait anxiety 
as a covariate was conducted. Results indicated that trait anxiety was not a 
significant covariate [F(1, 169)=0.20, ns], but that the main effect of gender was 
significant [F(1, 169)=6.50, p<0.05]. This effect is similar to the effect reported in 
the operation scenario and illustrated in Figure 4.1, with females showing a 
greater increase in state anxiety than males. The same procedure was adopted for 
STAI state anxiety responses to the shark scenario'. An ANCOVA was conducted 
on the change variable, with STAI trait anxiety as the covariate. In this instance, 
trait anxiety was a significant covariate [F(1, 56)=10.97*, p<0.05] and there was no 
effect of gender [F(1, 56)=1.21, ns]. 
Two way ANCOVAs were then conducted on STAI state anxiety in response to 
the shark scenario by gender and presentation condition. Mean scores (in 
Appendix C4 and C5) indicate that state anxiety was lower in response to the 
positive statements condition, and was lower in males. ANCOVA results 
presented in Table 4.9 indicate that there were no significant main effects or 
interactions, and that trait anxiety was not a significant covariate. 
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Figure 4.2: STAIC state anxiety in response to the operation scenario for grade by 
presentation condition. 
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Figure 4.3: STAIC state anxiety in response to the friends scenario for grade by 
presentation condition. 
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Figure 4.4: STAIC state anxiety in response to the shark scenario for grade by 
presentation condition. 
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Operation TCL scales by grade, gender and presentation condition 
Separate three way ANCOVAs were conducted on each of the three scales 
(positive, coping and threat) of the operation TCL for grade by gender by 
presentation condition with RCMAS anxiety as a covariate. Results of these 
ANCOVA's are given in Table 4.10 with mean scores reported in Appendix C6 
and C7. 
Table 4.10: Analysis of covariance results for the operation TCL scales by grade, 
gender and presentation condition with RCMAS anxiety as a covariate. 
Positive Coping Threat 
RCMAS F(1, 193)=0.14 F(1, 193)=15.02* F(1, 193)=21.58* 
Gender F(1, 193)=1.74 F(1, 193)=4.29* F(1, 193)=1.88 
Presentation F(2, 193)=4.29* F(2, 193)=1.20 F(2, 193)=5.83* 
Grade F(3, 193)=0.91 F(2, 193)=4.00* F(3, 193)=2.82* 
Grade x Gender F(3, 193)=0.15 F(3, 193)=0.36 F(3, 193)=0.08 
Grade x Presentation F(6, 193)=2.40* F(6, 193)=2.84* F(6, 193)=0.41 
Gender x Presentation F(2, 193)=0.15 F(2, 193)=0.13 F(2, 193)=0.16 
Grade x Gender 
x Presentation F(6, 193)=1.96 F(6, 193)=1.48 F(6, 193)=3.01* 
*p<0.05 
Mean scores revealed that scores on the operation TCL positive statements scale 
were highest in grades 3 and 10, that they were higher in males than females and 
that there were more positive statements in response to the positive scenario than 
the other conditions. Table 4.10 shows that only the presentation condition main 
effect was significant. RCMAS was not a significant covariate. There were also 
significant interactions between grade and presentation condition, and this is 
illustrated in Figure 4.5. 
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Figure 4.5: Grade by presentation condition for the operation TCL positive 
statements 
Mean scores revealed that responses to the operation TCL coping statements 
scale were reported at the highest levels in grades 3 and 7, that they were higher 
in females than males but that there was no notable difference between the 
number of coping statements reported according to the presentation condition. 
Table 4.10 shows that the main effects for grade and gender were significant, 
despite RCMAS being a significant covariate. There was a significant interaction 
between grade and presentation condition, and this is illustrated in Figure 4.6 
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Figure 4.6: Grade by presentation condition for the operation TCL coping 
statements 
Mean scores revealed that responses to the operation TCL threat statements 
scale were reported at the highest levels in grade 7, that they were higher in 
females and that there were more of threat statements than coping or positive 
statements in response to the threat condition. Table 4.10 shows that the main 
effect for presentation condition and grade were both significant, as was 
RCMAS as a covariate. There were no significant interactions between any of 
the variables for threat statements. 
Friends TCL scales by grade, gender and presentation condition 
Separate three way ANCOVAs were conducted on the three scales of the friends 
TCL for grade by gender by presentation condition. Results of these ANCOVAs 
are given in Table 4.11, with mean scores given in Appendix C8 and C9. 
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Mean scores on the friends TCL positive statements scale decreased as age 
increased, were higher in response to the positive condition in comparison to 
the coping and threat conditions and were lower in females. There were 
significant main effects of gender and presentation condition. None of the two 
way interactions was significant (see Table 4.11 for details), and the covariate 
of RCMAS was not significant. 
Mean scores on the friends TCL coping statements scale revealed coping 
statements tend to decrease as grade increases, that females report more 
coping statements, and that there were more coping statements reported in 
response to the coping scenario than the others. ANCOVA results in Table 
4.11 show that the main effects for grade and presentation condition were 
both significant. There were no significant two way interactions between 
variables, however the three way interaction was significant. RCMAS anxiety 
was not a significant covariate for the friends coping scale. 
Mean scores on the friends TCL threat statements scale show that there were 
no clear grade differences, but that there were more threat statements 
reported in response to the threat scenario than the other scenarios. Only the 
presentation condition shows a significant main effect, however RCMAS 
anxiety was s significant covariate, as can be seen in Table 4.11. There were 
no significant interactions between variables. 
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Table 4.11: Analysis of covariance results on the three scales of the friends and 
shark TCL by grade, gender and presentation condition with RCMAS as the 
covariate. 
Friends 	 Positive Coping Threat 
RCMAS F(1, 192)=1.90 F(1, 192)=0.19 F(1, 192)=16.60* 
Gender F(1, 192)=6.89* F(1, 192)=3.49 F(1, 192)=2.21 
Presentation F(2, 192)=8.07* F(2, 192)=5.17* F(2,192)=3.48* 
Grade F(3,192)=2.24 F(2, 192)=2.88* F(3, 192)=1.82 
Grade x Gender F(3, 192)=0.53 F(3, 192)=0.29 F(3, 192)=0.43 
Grade x Presentation F(6, 192)=0.92 F(6, 192)=0.55 F(6, 192)=1.03 
Gender x Presentation F(2, 192)=0.75 F(2, 192)=1.93 F(2, 192)=0.14 
Grade x Gender 
x Presentation F(6, 192)=0.77 F(6, 192)=2.27* F(6, 192)=1.89 
Shark Positive Coping Threat 
RCMAS F(1, 185)=1.07 F(1, 195)=5.51* F(1, 185)=8.33* 
Gender F(1, 185)=7.15* F(1, 195)=11.87* F(1, 185)=12.84* 
Presentation F(2, 185)=1.76 F(2, 195)=0.81 F(2,185)=1.38 
Grade F(3,185)=5.09* F(2, 195)=2.00 F(3, 185)=0.33 
Grade x Gender F(3, 185)=0.34 F(3, 195)=1.78 F(3, 185)=0.10 
Grade x Presentation F(6, 185)=0.76 F(6, 195)=3.56* F(6, 185)=1.92 
Gender x Presentation F(2, 185)=0.66 F(2, 195)=2.34 F(2, 185)=2.48 
Grade x Gender 
x Presentation F(6, 185)=0.74 F(6,195)=3.23* F(6, 185)=2.70* 
*p <0.05 
Shark TCL scales by grade, gender and presentation condition 
Mean scores on the shark TCL positive statements scale decreased as age 
increased, were higher in response to the positive condition in comparison to 
the coping and threat conditions and were lower in females. There were 
significant main effects of grade and gender only. There were no significant 
interactions between any of the factors (see Table 4.11 for details), and 
RCMAS anxiety was not a significant covariate. 
Mean scores on the shark TCL coping statements scale decreased across the 
grades and were reported at higher levels in females. ANCOVA results in 
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Table 4.11 show that the only significant main effect was for gender. There 
was a significant interaction between grade and presentation condition, 
which is illustrated in Figure 4.7. RCMAS was a significant covariate. There 
was also a significant three way interaction between all variables. 
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Figure 4.7: Grade by presentation condition for the shark TCL coping 
statements. 
Mean scores on the shark TCL threat statements scale were reported at higher 
levels in response to the threat statements scenario and were reported at 
higher levels by females. As can be seen from Table 4.11, the main effect of 
gender was significant, and RCMAS anxiety was a significant covariate. 
There were no significant two way interactions, however the three way 
interaction was again significant. 
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Correlations between reported cognitions and state anxiety 
Table 4.12 reports the correlations between the STAIC and STAI state anxiety 
and p-state and n-state subscales with the three TCL scales. Hierarchical 
regression analyses were used to assess whether state anxiety was still 
significantly correlated with the TCL subscales after controlling for trait 
anxiety. Possible interactions between state and trait anxiety in making 
additional contributions were also assessed by including their product as a 
predictor. As indicated in the table the contributions of these interactions 
were significant in some cases, indicating that in these cases trait anxiety does 
have an effect on these scales of the TCL in interaction with state anxiety. 
Part correlations calculated through these regression analyses are included in 
Table 4.12. There were no notable differences between the initial correlations 
and the part correlations, which all retained their level of significance after 
allowing for the effect of trait anxiety. Accordingly trait anxiety does not 
significantly alter the relationship between state anxiety and scores on the 
scales of the TCL. 
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Table 4.12: Correlations (r) and part correlations (rp, controlling for STAIC and 
STAI trait anxiety) between STAIC state anxiety, p-state, n-state and STAI state 
anxiety with the three scales of the operation, friends and shark TCL. 
Cognition Checklist Scales 
Positive Coping Threat 
Operation 
STAIC 
n=166 
P-state 
n=161
N-state 
n=160 
STAI 
n=59 
r=-0.46* 
rp=-0.46* 
r=-0.42* 
r =-0 . 42* P 
r=-0.45* 
r =-0.45* 
P 
 
r=-0.75* 
r=0.79* P -  
r=0.39* 
r,=0.38 * 
r=0.30* 
r =0.29* i 	 P  
r=0.40* 
r =0.38* 
r=0.20 
r=0.20 
r=0.61* 
r =0.57* 
r=0.49* 
r =0.48* 
r=0.63* 
r =0.58* 
r=0.79* 
r =0.78* 
Friends 
STAIC 
n=166
P-state 
n=161
N-state 
n=160
STAI 
n=59 
r=-0.52* 
r=0.48* 
P
-  
r=-0.52* 
r=0.50* 
P
-  
r=-0.41* 
rP=-0.36* 
r=-0.51* 
r =-0.52* 
P  
r=0.10 
r=0.09 
r=0.04 
r=0.04 
r=0.20* 
r =0.19* 
P 
 
r=0.20 
r=0.20
r=0.60* 
r =0.54* 
r=0.47* 
r =0 '44*1 P 
r=0.65* 
r =0.59* 
r=0.54* 
r =0.53* 
Shark 
STAIC 
n=166 
P-state 
n=161
N-state 
n=160
STAI 
n=59 
r=-0.45* 
rP=-0.42* 
r=-0.41* 
r=0.43* P - 
r=-0.44* 
rP=-0.42* 
r=-0.53* 
r =-0.53* 
r=0.28* 
rp=0.25* 
r=0.24* 
r =0.25* 
P 
r=0.32* 
r=0.31* 
r=0.57* 
r =0.58* 
P 
r=0.51* 
r =0 .46*, P 
r=0.45* 
r =0.44* 
r=0.53* 
rp=0.51* 
r=0.66* 
r =0.66* 
P 
*=p<0.05 
rp denotes part correlation after allowing for the effect of RCMAS trait anxiety. 
indicates that there is a significant additional contribution due to the interaction of trait and state 
anxiety when the product is included in the regression equation. 
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Discussion 
Methodological issues 
Sample characteristics 
As for the previous experiments, trait anxiety has been investigated to assess 
whether the sample used in this experiment accurately reflects the normal 
population. Mean trait anxiety scores for the STAIC were within the normal 
range, and the percentage of scores more than one standard deviation above the 
mean were less than expected in a normal population. The measures of STAI 
trait anxiety were higher than those for the STAIC, and this is supported by the 
greater proportion of scores over one standard deviation above the mean. T 
scores of mean RCMAS scores for males and females show that in relative terms, 
anxiety increased across the grades, but for females this stays within the average 
range of scores. The sample employed in this study therefore appears 
representative albeit slightly lower than the normal population in terms of trait 
anxiety. 
Analysis of variance results suggest that there was no effect of grade or gender 
on the STAIC trait anxiety scale. This is in contrast to experiment 3, where 
STAIC trait anxiety decreased across the grades. Experiment 2 similarly revealed 
no effect of grade on STAIC trait anxiety, therefore the samples from the previous 
experiment and the current one are not equivalent in terms of the developmental 
profile of STAIC trait anxiety. In experiment 1 there was also a significant grade 
effect on STAIC trait anxiety. 
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ANOVA results show that there was no effect of gender or grade on RCMAS raw 
scores in the current experiment. In experiment 3 there was a decrease in 
RCMAS across grades, and a significant effect of gender, while in experiment 2 
there was an effect of gender but not grade. In light of these findings, it is 
difficult to compare the developmental results of these three experiments. 
Baseline, neutral and induced state anxiety 
Mean measures of STAIC and STAI state anxiety were within the average range 
for baseline and neutral state anxiety, apart from grade 10 male participants 
whose mean scores for the neutral scenario were well below average. As in the 
previous experiment, there were no effects of grade or gender on baseline or 
neutral state anxiety scores (although grade 10 females reported significantly 
higher state anxiety in responses to the neutral scenario compared with males). 
After each of the three anxiety-inducing scenarios, mean female STAIC scores 
were at least two standard deviations above the norm, while male STAI and 
STAIC state anxiety scores were at least one standard deviation above the norm. 
Grade 10 females did not report such high levels of state anxiety, but their mean 
scores were still were at least one standard deviation above the norm. These 
findings suggest that the anxiety induction procedure was effective. Further, 
there were significant differences between the baseline measures and the induced 
measures of state anxiety and between neutral measures and induced state 
anxiety. These findings are consistent with the experiment 3 findings. State 
anxiety after the neutral scenario was significantly lower than at baseline, which 
is also consistent with experiment 3. As suggested in the previous chapter, this 
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may have been either because the neutral scenario was in itself relaxing, or 
simply because the participants had become more relaxed in the situation by the 
time they completed the STAIC and STAI for the neutral scenario. 
Hypothesis I: TCL responses by scenario presentation condition 
The TCL was designed as a validity check to ensure that participants could 
report back as their own the cognitive content with which they had been 
presented during the scenarios. Since the coping and threat scales have been 
found to correlate with measures of trait anxiety, analyses have taken this into 
account. It was hypothesised that participants would report significantly more 
cognitions on the TCL scale corresponding to the scenario condition with which 
they were presented than cognitions on the other two scales. This hypothesis 
was confirmed for the positive statements scale and the threat statements scale of 
the operation TCL, that is, those given the positive condition reported more 
positive statements than those given the other scales, and those in the threat 
condition reported back more threat statements than those given the other 
conditions. The hypothesis was also confirmed for all scales of the friends form 
of the TCL, with participants reported back more positive, coping and threat 
statements in their respective presentation conditions. There was no support for 
the hypothesis on the shark TCL, as there was no effect of presentation condition 
on any of the three scales of this measure. Perhaps the threatening nature of the 
shark scenario interfered with the reporting of cognitions. 
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Hypothesis 2: Correlations between trait anxiety and TCL scales 
It was hypothesised that the threat statements and coping statements scales of 
the TCL would be significantly positively correlated with measures of trait 
anxiety, and that the positive statements scale would not be correlated with trait 
anxiety. The positive statements scale of the operation TCL was not correlated 
with any of the measures of trait anxiety, which was consistent with the findings 
of the previous experiment, and confirmed the hypothesis. The threat statements 
scale of the operation TCL correlated positively with the STAIC and RCMAS but 
not the STAI, which again is consistent with the previous experiment and 
confirms the hypothesis. No significant positive correlations were found 
between the STAI and the coping statements scale of the operation TCL in this 
experiment, where the previous experiment had found significant positive 
correlations between the coping statements scale and all measures of trait 
anxiety. However significant positive correlations were found between the 
coping scale and the RCMAS. These findings are consistent with previous 
research which suggests that positive statements are not related to trait anxiety 
(Fox et al., 1983; Prins et al., 1981), and that coping and threat statements are 
positively related to trait anxiety (Fox et al., 1983; Houston et al., 1984; Prins, 
1986; Zatz & Chassin, 1983, 1985). 
The positive statements scales of the friends and shark forms of the TCL were 
both negatively correlated with STAIC trait anxiety, but not with RCMAS or 
STAI trait anxiety. The hypothesis that the positive statements scales of the TCL 
would not be correlated with trait anxiety could not therefore be supported by 
these findings. The coping statements scale was not correlated with trait anxiety 
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on the friends TCL. On the shark TCL there was a positive relationship between 
coping statements and only the STAIC trait anxiety, which is consistent with 
previous research which has established this link, and confirms the hypothesis 
(Fox et al., 1983; Houston et al., 1984; Prins, 1986; Zatz & Chassin, 1983, 1985). It 
is therefore possible that coping statements are not related to trait anxiety in all 
situations. Finally, the threat statements scales of the TCL were found to 
correlate positively with STAIC and RCMAS trait anxiety on the friends and the 
shark forms of the TCL but not with STAI trait anxiety, which is also consistent 
with experiment 3, and again confirms the stated hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 3: Intercorrelations between TCL scales 
As in the previous experiment, intercorrelations between the scales of the TCL 
were calculated to assess the relationships between the three scales, and partial 
correlations were calculated which controlled for RCMAS trait anxiety. It was 
hypothesised that the coping statements and threat statements scales would be 
significantly positively correlated with one another, and significantly negatively 
correlated with the positive statements scale. There were positive correlations 
between the threat statements scales and coping statements scales for each form 
of the TCL, and these correlations remained relatively unchanged in the partial 
correlations. There were negative correlations between the positive statements 
scale and the threat statements scale for each form of the TCL, and again these 
remained relatively unchanged for the partial correlations. These findings 
confirmed the hypothesis, thus replicating the findings of experiment 3 and 
generalising these findings to the shark and friends scenarios. 
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There were no significant correlations between the coping statements scale and 
the positive statements scale in the operation and friends forms of the TCL, and a 
negative correlation between the coping statements and positive statements scale 
in the shark form of the TCL. This was unlike experiment 3, where a positive 
correlation was found between the coping and positive scales of the operation 
form of the TCL. These findings suggest that the coping statements scale of the 
shark TCL has a different structure to the equivalent scale used with the other 
scenarios. This may reflect the nature of the coping statements on this scale, 
where they often related to escaping the situation. 
Theoretical issues 
Hypothesis 1: State anxiety by grade 
It was hypothesised that there would be a significant effect of grade on the level 
of state anxiety induced by the three scenarios, and that this would be shown in 
an inverted 'U' pattern, with higher state anxiety in grade 5 participants. When 
STAIC state anxiety data were analysed across grades for all scenarios, 
controlling for the effect of trait anxiety, state anxiety increased across the grades. 
The grade effect was not consistent with the previous experiment where state 
anxiety increased in grade 5 and decreased again in grade 7. Since ANCOVA has 
been used, it is unlikely that this is due to the differences in the levels of trait 
anxiety across the grades. When each scenario was assessed separately using 
ANCOVA, the effect of grade was significant for the operation and shark 
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scenarios, but not the friends scenario despite trait anxiety being a significant 
covariate for all three scenarios. 
There was an interaction between presentation condition and grade for all three 
scenarios. This interaction shows that state anxiety increased significantly across 
the grades in the positive condition, but there was no effect of grade in the other 
two conditions. At grade 3 level the effect of the positive statements condition is 
far more marked than it is in grade 7, in fact there appears to be little change in 
the state anxiety levels of those in the coping and threat statements conditions 
across the grades for all three scenarios. This suggests that the positive 
statements were more effective in ameliorating the effect of the anxiety-inducing 
scenarios in the younger children. When analyses assessed the effect of 
presentation condition separately for each grade for the operation scenario, grade 
3 was the only grade which showed an effect of presentation condition. There 
was no effect of presentation condition in the higher grades. With the friends 
scenario, there was a significant effect of presentation at grade 3 and grade 7, and 
for the shark scenario the effect of presentation condition was only significant at 
grade 3. 
Hypothesis 2: Gender differences in state anxiety 
It was hypothesised that female participants would report significantly higher 
levels of state anxiety in response to all three scenarios. This hypothesis was 
supported despite trait anxiety being a significant covariate for all of the 
scenarios, replicating the findings of experiment 3 and generalising these 
findings to the shark and friends scenarios. These gender differences are also 
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consistent with other research (e.g., Ferrari, 1986; Gullone & King, 1992b; 
011endick & King, 1991). 
In addition to these findings, ANCOVAs for the change between baseline and 
induced state anxiety by gender with trait anxiety as a covariate were calculated. 
Results revealed that trait anxiety was not a significant covariate for any of the 
scenarios, but that there was a significant effect of gender on STAIC state anxiety 
change for the operation and the shark scenarios. This effect indicated that while 
there was no gender difference in state anxiety responses at baseline, after 
anxiety induction, females reported significantly higher levels of state anxiety 
than males. What is important here is the fact that there were no gender 
differences in state anxiety at baseline, therefore, these results suggest that 
females were more reactive to the anxiety induction procedures. For the STAI 
data, trait anxiety was a significant covariate for the all scenarios, but there was 
no effect of gender on any of the scenarios. This suggests that females are more 
reactive to anxiety induction, but that this only occurs in the younger group of 
participants. Once participants reach grade 10, the effect is not found. These 
findings are consistent with the findings of experiment 3. There have been few 
studies which specifically address gender differences in anxiety, and none which 
demonstrate an effect of gender on the increase in state anxiety after anxiety 
induction, or which demonstrate this effect occurring only in a younger 
population. 
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Hypothesis 3: Impact of positive statements on state anxiety levels 
It was hypothesised that participants in the positive statements scenario 
condition would report significantly lower levels of state anxiety than those in 
the coping or threat scenario conditions. Analyses revealed that there was a 
significant main effect of presentation condition on STAIC state anxiety, and that 
STAIC state anxiety was lowest in the positive statements condition, followed by 
the coping statements condition and then the threat statements condition. This 
effect was found despite the fact that trait anxiety was a significant covariate for 
state anxiety in all three scenarios. This effect was not replicated in the older 
group who completed the STAI, which is consistent with the findings in the 
previous study. As previously discussed, there were significant interactions 
between grade and presentation condition in all three scenarios which revealed 
that positive statements were more effective in ameliorating anxiety in grade 3 
participants than the other grades, which is probably consistent with the finding 
which indicated that there was no effect of the positive statements scenario in the 
older group who completed the STAI. There was also an interaction between 
scenario and presentation type, which showed that positive statements were 
more effective in reducing state anxiety in the operation and friends scenarios 
than in the shark scenario. The shark scenario induced the highest levels of state 
anxiety overall, so it is possible that the positive statements were less effective in 
ameliorating state anxiety at these higher levels. 
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Hypothesis 4: TCL scale by grade 
It was hypothesised that there would be no effect of grade on reported cognitions 
in any of the scenarios. Data were analysed using ANCOVA, with RCMAS trait 
anxiety as a covariate. As there were three separate TCL forms, one for each 
scenario, this section will deal with each form of each TCL form in turn. 
RCMAS anxiety was a significant covariate for the coping and threat scales of the 
operation TCL, but not the positive scale, which is consistent with the findings of 
the previous experiment. The positive statements scale of the operation TCL 
revealed no significant effect of grade. These results have not replicated the 
findings in experiment 3, and have not supported the hypothesis. 
There was a significant effect of grade on the coping statements scale of the 
operation TCL, where grade 3 and 7 participants produced higher levels of 
coping statements than grade 5 and grade 10 participants, where there was a 
marked reduction in the number of reported coping statements. Again the 
interaction between presentation condition and grade was significant. This 
interaction showed that while the number of coping statements reported in the 
coping and threat statements condition remained reasonably consistent, the 
number of coping statements reported in the positive condition were high in 
grades 3 and 7, and low in grades 5 and 10. This interaction was not consistent 
with that reported for the equivalent data in experiment 3, and has not supported 
the stated hypothesis. 
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The threat statements scale of the operation TCL did not show a main effect of 
grade, and there were no significant interactions with grade. In experiment 3 
there was no effect of grade on either of the TCL threat statements scales, so this 
has replicated the previous experiment. 
RCMAS anxiety was a significant covariate only for the threat scale of the friends 
TCL. For the positive statements scale of the friends TCL there was no effect of 
grade and there were no significant interactions with grade, thus supporting the 
hypothesis. For the coping statements scale of the friends TCL there was a 
significant effect grade which suggested that coping statements increased to 
grade 7, and then decreased in grade 10. For the threat statements scale of the 
friends TCL there were no grade effects and there were no significant interactions 
with grade. These data show some consistency with the findings for the 
operation scenario and the previous experiment. 
For the shark scenario, RCMAS was a significant covariate for the coping and 
threat scales. There was a significant main effect of grade on the positive 
statements scale of the shark TCL, which showed that positive statements 
decreased across the grades. This is consistent with the increase in state anxiety 
responses to the shark scenario across the grades reported earlier. There were no 
interactions with grade on the shark TCL positive statements scale. There were 
no significant main effects of grade on the coping statements or threat statements 
scales of the shark TCL, and there were no interactions with grade on these 
scales. In summary these findings are generally consistent with the results 
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found in the operation scenario in the previous experiment and therefore give 
some support to the hypothesis. 
In summary, the operation TCL data collected in this experiment has to some 
extent replicated the findings of experiment 3 in relation to the effect of grade. It 
appears that there is little evidence of age related changes in the production of 
the three types of cognition measured in these three scenarios. There is some 
evidence to suggest that there is a decrease in positive statements across the 
grades on the positive statements scale of the shark TCL, which Was consistent 
with the increase in state anxiety in response to the shark scenario. 
Hypothesis 5: Gender differences in TCL scales 
It was hypothesised that females would report more threat and coping 
statements and less positive statements on the operation, friends and shark forms 
of the TCL. 
Once trait anxiety is taken into account, females reported significantly more 
coping statements on the coping statements scales of the operation and shark 
forms of the TCL and significantly more threat statements on the shark TCL. 
Males reported significantly more positive statements on the friends and shark 
forms of the TCL. There were no interactions between gender and other factors. 
While these results do not provide complete support for the hypothesis, it is clear 
that there are some gender differences in the number of reported cognitions, and 
that these are consistent with the hypothesis. Participants reported the highest 
levels of state anxiety in response to the shark scenario, and it is in the shark TCL 
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that gender differences occur in all three scales. This suggests that gender 
differences are more likely to come to the fore in situations of high induced state 
anxiety. This finding is consistent with the finding which has shown that gender 
differences only become evident in situations of induced state anxiety. 
Hypothesis 6: Correlations between state anxiety and TCL scales 
It was hypothesised that there would be significant positive correlations between 
state anxiety and the coping statements and threat statements scales of the TCL, 
and significant negative correlations between the positive statements scale of the 
TCL and state anxiety in all three scenarios. Since correlations between trait 
anxiety and the scales of the TCL are important in understanding the 
relationships between anxiety and cognition, these findings are also included in 
this discussion. Hierarchical regressions analyses have also been conducted, 
taking into account the role of trait anxiety and possible interactions between 
state and trait anxiety by including the product of the two measures in the 
regressions. 
The current experiment has succeeded in replicating some of the correlations 
between trait anxiety and cognition measures reported in experiment 3 for the 
operation scenario. In the previous experiment, the positive statements scale of 
the operation TCL was not correlated with any measures of trait anxiety, and the 
same was true for the current experiment. In the current experiment the positive 
statements scale of the operation TCL was negatively correlated with STAI and 
STAIC state anxiety (and both the subscales of p-state and n-state anxiety) in this 
and the previous experiment. In this experiment, there was a significant effect of 
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the product term for STAIC state anxiety and p-state anxiety, indicating that trait 
anxiety is related to these measures, but only in interaction with state anxiety. 
Part correlations indicate that the relationship between positive statements and 
the various measures of state anxiety remain relatively unchanged once trait 
anxiety has been taken into account. 
There were positive correlations between the coping statements scale and all 
measures of trait anxiety in the previous experiment, but in the current 
experiment there were only correlations between this scale and the RCMAS. The 
coping statements scale of the operation TCL was positively correlated with STAI 
and STAIC state anxiety (and both the subscales of p-state and n-state anxiety) in 
this and the previous experiment, and there was no effect of the product term. 
The correlations remain relatively unchanged when trait anxiety is controlled for 
via the part correlations. 
Finally, in experiment 3 the threat statements scales was positively correlated 
with STAIC trait and RCMAS, and in the present experiment equivalent results 
were found. The threat scale was positively correlated with all measures of state 
anxiety in this and the previous experiment, and again, part correlations indicate 
that trait anxiety does not significantly effect these results. 
The results from the operation scenario suggest that while reported positive 
statements are not correlated with trait anxiety, they are negatively correlated 
with state anxiety (although trait anxiety does play a role in interaction with 
STAIC state anxiety and p-state anxiety). Coping and threat statements on the 
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other hand correlate positively with both trait and state anxiety. These findings 
replicate the findings of experiment 3. 
The findings were not however replicated with the friends and shark scenarios. 
Firstly, the coping statements scales of the TCL were not correlated with trait 
anxiety in the friends or the shark scenario, with the exception of a very weak 
correlation between the coping statements scale and STAIC trait anxiety in the 
shark scenario. In the friends scenario, coping statements were correlated 
significantly only with n-state anxiety. In the shark scenario, they were 
positively correlated with all measures of state anxiety. Again, part correlations 
indicate that the role of trait anxiety in these correlations is not important, the 
correlations remain relatively unchanged when trait anxiety is controlled for. 
The threat statements scales in the friends and the shark scenarios were 
positively correlated with STAIC and RCMAS trait anxiety, but not STAI trait 
anxiety. Results showed that the threat statements scales correlated negatively 
with state anxiety (including p-state and n-state) in both the friends and shark 
scenarios, and these did not vary significantly when trait anxiety was taken into 
account. 
In both of the friends and the shark scenarios, positive statements correlated 
negatively with STAIC trait anxiety. Both of these correlations would be 
considered small (Cohen, 1992). Correlations between the TCL scales and state 
anxiety in the friends and shark scenarios showed that the positive statements 
scales correlated negatively with all measures of state anxiety and only the STAI 
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state anxiety was impacted on by the product of state and trait anxiety. These 
correlations did not vary after trait anxiety was taken into account. 
In summary the threat statements scale is consistently positively correlated with 
trait and state anxiety in all three scenarios. The correlations between the threat 
statements scales and state anxiety are consistently stronger than the correlations 
between the threat statements scales and trait anxiety. The coping statements 
scales of the TCLs on the other hand show strong consistent correlations with 
state anxiety in the shark and the operation scenarios, but are correlated only 
weakly with trait anxiety in these scenarios, with this the strongest correlation 
found in the operation scenario. The positive statements scale of the TCL shows 
strong consistent negative correlations with state anxiety (including both p-state 
and n-state), but only limited correlations with trait anxiety. Part correlations 
calculated through hierarchical regression analysis indicate that when trait 
anxiety is controlled for there is no notable change in any of these correlations. 
Conclusions 
This chapter has described the fourth and final experiment in the thesis. It aimed 
to replicate and generalise the findings of experiment 3. The sample who 
participated in this experiment was not equivalent to the sample who 
participated in experiment 3 in terms of trait anxiety, so the inclusion of trait 
anxiety as a covariate or controlling for it in correlational analyses is particularly 
important. The anxiety induction procedure has again been effective, and state 
anxiety in response to the three scenarios was significantly higher than baseline 
measures of state anxiety and state anxiety in response to the neutral scenario. 
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Three methodological hypotheses were posed in this experiment, and the 
findings in relation to these are summarised as follows: 
1. There were significantly more positive statements reported in response to the 
operation and friends forms of the TCL in the positive condition than in the 
other conditions. There were also significantly more coping statements 
reported in response to the coping condition than in other conditions in the 
friends scenario. There were significantly more threat statements reported in 
response to the operation and friends forms of the TCL by those in the threat 
conditions than in the other conditions. So, there was support for this 
hypothesis on the operation and friends forms of the TCL, but not on the shark 
form of the TCL. 
2. There were significant positive correlations between the trait anxiety and 
threat statements scales for the operation, friends and shark forms of the TCL. 
The coping statements scales of the operation and shark TCL showed limited 
positive correlations with trait anxiety. The positive statements scales of the 
friends and shark TCL also showed limited negative correlations with 
measures of trait anxiety. 
3. There were significant positive correlations between the threat statements 
scales of all forms of the TCL with the coping statements scales. There were 
significant negative correlations between the threat statements scales of all 
forms of the TCL with the coping statements scales. There was a significant 
negative correlation between the coping statements scale and the positive 
statements scale of the shark TCL. 
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Six theoretical hypotheses were proposed in this experiment, and the findings in 
relation to these are summarised as follows: 
1. There were some significant effects of grade on state anxiety levels in response 
to the three scenarios, however, these were not consistent with the grade 
effects found in experiment 3. The developmental effects which were reported 
show that state anxiety becomes less able to be reduced by positive statements 
as age increases. 
2. Female participants reported significantly higher levels of state anxiety in 
response to all three scenarios. The gender effects in this experiment have been 
consistent with the previous experiment, which suggest that while there are 
no differences between genders on state anxiety at the baseline level, but that 
differences become apparent when males and females are placed under 
anxiety-inducing circumstances. This effect was not evident in the grade 10 
participants. 
3. There was a main effect of presentation condition on state anxiety which 
revealed that those in the positive statements condition reported significantly 
less state anxiety than those in the other conditions. The interaction between 
grade and presentation condition revealed that this anxiety reducing quality 
of positive statements was limited to participants in grade 3. 
4. There were no consistent effects of grade on TCL scales, thus giving limited 
support to this hypothesis. 
5. Females reported significantly more threat statements and coping statements 
on the TCL, and males reported significantly more positive statements on the 
TCL, but these effects were not found on all forms of the TCL. 
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6. Positive statements were strongly and consistently negatively correlated with 
state anxiety, but they did not show such a strong or consistent relationship to 
trait anxiety, while threat statements appear to be related to both state and 
trait anxiety. Coping statements were positively correlated to state anxiety in 
the operation and shark scenarios, but showed weaker and less consistent 
relationships to trait anxiety. 
The final chapter in the thesis will consider these findings more thoroughly in 
light of methodological issues and will give an integrated interpretation of the 
findings in relation to previous research. Consideration will also be given to 
directions for future research. 
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Chapter 10: Summary of Methodological and Theoretical 
Findings and Implications for Future Research 
The preceding four chapters have described the four experiments which 
comprise the thesis. These experiments have been guided by the literature 
reviewed in Chapters 2,3 and 4 and the hypotheses set out in Chapter 5. The 
discussion section of each chapter has outlined how each experiment has 
answered these hypotheses. 
Chapter 6 described the first experiment of the thesis, where three fear stimuli 
were selected as the basis for anxiety induction in the following experiments. 
These items were selected on the basis of the responses of 311 children aged from 
9 years to 15 years. 
Chapter 7 described experiment 2 of the thesis which developed these three 
items into scenarios which were used to induce anxiety in children and 
adolescents. The think-aloud method was used to collect the cognitive responses 
of 121 children aged from 9 to 15 years of age. These cognitions were categorised 
into positive statements, coping statements, internal threat statements and 
external threat statements. This experiment found little evidence of 
developmental or gender differences in the presentation of these cognitions. The 
experiment demonstrated some correlations between the cognition measures and 
measures of anxiety. 
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Chapter 8 described experiment 3, which used some of the cognition data 
collected in experiment 2 as anxiety stimuli, to assess how these cognitions 
differentially affected state anxiety in participants in response to the operation 
scenario. The results were based on the STAI and STAIC state anxiety reports 
and the Thoughts Checklist (TCL) responses of 311 children aged between 9 and 
15 years of age. Significant developmental effects were found in relation to state 
anxiety. 
Chapter 9 described experiment 4, which attempted to replicate the findings of 
experiment 3 and then to generalise them to other situations. The results of this 
experiment were based on the STAI and STAIC state anxiety reports and the TCL 
responses of 242 participants in response to three different scenarios. The 
developmental profiles for STAIC state anxiety found in the previous experiment 
were not replicated. However, consistent developmental profiles were found in 
response to all three scenarios. Results suggest that positive statements lower 
reports of state anxiety, but this effect is primarily found in grade 3 participants. 
This final chapter will be divided into three main sections. Firstly consideration 
will be given to some of the most important methodological issues raised by the 
four experimental chapters. Secondly the theoretical findings of the experimental 
chapters will be discussed in relation previous research. Finally, considerations 
will be given to directions for future research. 
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Methodological issues 
Data analysis 
Chapter 5 stated that the alpha level to be used in the four experiments of the 
thesis would be 0.05. At this point it is important to underline the reasons for 
this decision, as the use of 0.05 alpha level with the number of tests used in these 
four experiements would normally be considered inadequate. No conclusion in 
this series of experiments rests on the findings of one statistical test, each finding 
has been either replicated in a subsequent experiment, or shown to be true in 
different parts of the one experiment. The research progress has been cumulative 
and based on investigating similar problems from a range of different directions, 
therefore the chances of type one errors occurring has been adequately 
minimised. 
The think-aloud method 
The think-aloud method was originally chosen because it allows participants to 
report their own thoughts, rather than constraining them to items on a checklist, 
and it allows participants to report thoughts as they happen (or as close to as 
possible). Genest and Turk (1981) suggest that it is appropriate to use such a 
method in the early stages of research, as it allows collection of unanticipated yet 
relevant information. Ericsson and Simon (1980) suggest that because of this, the 
think-aloud method more accurately reports the essential characteristics of the 
cognitive products. The think-aloud method is not reliant on retrospective 
memory and distortions, and therefore minimises participants' causal inferences 
(Genest & Turk, 1981). This method was therefore seen as a means of gaining 
data on the cognitive activity of children under experimentally induced anxiety. 
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Research using the think-aloud method with children (Diener & Dweck, 1978; 
Fox, Houston & Pittner, 1983; Houston, Fox & Forbes, 1984) has shown that it can 
be effectively used to stimulate self talk. However, the data collected in this 
experiment were problematic. Firstly, participants reported relatively few 
cognitions. This difficulty was magnified when the data were categorised, as the 
number of statements in any one category was small. In the case of positive 
statements, the mean number reported was as low as 0.06 in the shark scenario. 
Even the most prolific category, external threat statements, reached only a mean 
of 3.76 in the operation scenario. Secondly the range of responses was large, 
leading to standard deviations which usually exceeded the mean. The reason for 
this was probably that participants were given fairly free rein to report what they 
were thinking, with only the use of the two prompts to constrain them. 
The studies by Fox et al. (1984) and Houston et al. (1985) constrained the output 
of their participants by allowing them two minutes in which to report their 
thoughts. In addition to this the experimenter was out of the room while the 
participant was reporting his or her thoughts in these studies, which probably 
helped participants to feel less self conscious. Genest and Turk (1981) suggest 
this is an important factor in the success of the think-aloud method. Given the 
fact that experiment 2 required children to respond to scenarios split into four 
sections, with responses required between each of these sections, it was decided 
that having the experimenter out of the room was not possible, as she was 
required to structure the think-aloud sessions. While analysis of covariance did 
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control for the differing length of output by using total number of utterances as a 
covariate, the usefulness of these data is in question. 
Informal observation suggested that even with the standard training that was 
afforded participants, some were reluctant to report their thoughts. This may 
have been due to self consciousness (as Genest and Turk, 1981, suggest), or 
perhaps the use of the imagery scenario did not produce thoughts as effectively 
as in vivo methods have done in past studies. Whatever the case, future research 
would need to evaluate this method before using it in this same manner. A pilot 
was completed prior to experiment 2, and children reported adequate amounts of 
data. This pilot may have used more verbal children, who were familiar to the 
researcher, and therefore had no difficulties producing relatively high output. 
Imagery induced anxiety 
The use of imagery to induce anxiety is recommended by Davison et al. (1983, 
1985). This method has the advantage of providing a range of different anxiety 
stimuli which it would not be possible to implement with in vivo exposure. 
Hermecz and Melamed (1984) used imagery induction to assess physiological 
responses of children to dental treatment. Their study suggested that children 
given response imagery responded with heightened anxiety. It was for this 
reason that response cues were included in the imagery scenarios of experiment 
2. These response cues were both physiological and emotional in nature and 
were taken from the STAIC and the RCMAS. In experiments 3 and 4, the 
response cues were replaced with cognitive responses. This form of anxiety 
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induction has effectively induced anxiety in the participants in all the 
experiments which used the technique. 
Results also demonstrated that responses to the anxiety induction scenarios were 
significantly higher than responses to the neutral scenario. It was also noted that 
the neutral scenario was associated with significantly lower levels of state anxiety 
than was reported at baseline. It is possible that the neutral scenario (an imagery 
scene about taking a walk down the child's street) was either anxiety reducing, or 
that participants became more relaxed after baseline when they were more aware 
of what was expected of them in the situation, and this was reflected in the 
neutral state anxiety scores. 
Experiment 2 included an imagery questionnaire to assess the level of imagery 
that participants had achieved. This was based on the same model as that used 
by Hermecz and Melamed (1984) and is included in Appendices A3 to A5. 
Analysis showed that there was a significant positive correlation between the 
total number of reported cognitions and the level of reported imagery in the 
operation scenario, but not in the friends or shark scenarios. So, it is possible that 
greater clarity of imagery led to greater number of reported cognitions. It was 
encouraging to note that there were no correlations of the visual imagery scale 
with any of the anxiety scales, including the lie scale of the RCMAS. 
In addition to this, the imagery method induced different levels of state anxiety 
according to the style of self talk that was included in the imagery scenarios in 
experiments 3 and 4. was sensitive to differences in presentation condition, as 
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seen in experiments 3 and 4. So, it appears that the imagery induction technique 
used in these experiments was an effective means of inducing anxiety. 
Use of the STAI for grade 10 participants 
In the initial experiment of the thesis it was decided to use the STAIC for grade 3 
to grade 7 participants and the STAI for grade 10 participants. This remained 
unchanged throughout the four experiments. This decision was made on the 
basis of the recommendations of the manuals, and of the study by Brown, 
O'Keeffe, Sanders and Baker (1986), which used similar age cut-offs for the use of 
these two measures. In addition, the content of the STAIC, was not considered 
age appropriate for most 15 year old students. The use of the STAI for grade 10 
students made it difficult to compare state and trait anxiety across the grades. In 
retrospect, although the difficulties cited above are valid, it may have been more 
useful to employ the STAIC with all four grades. 
Another option would have been to convert all STAI and STAIC scores to T 
scores to allow comparison across grades. There are three main reasons why this 
would not have been a sensible decision. Firstly, comparison of the T scores for 
the RCMAS, with the T scores for the STAIC and STAI indicates that the 
developmental profile of the RCMAS was not equivalent to the profile indicated 
by the T scores of the STAIC and STAI. Secondly, the STAI is scored on a four 
point scale, and the STAIC on a three point scale. Thirdly, the trait scale of the 
STAI includes both positively and negatively valenced items while the STAIC 
trait scale consists of only negatively valenced items. 
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The thoughts checklist 
The TCL was designed for the experiment, based on the cognitive response items 
used in the imagery scenarios. Items were selected from the think-aloud 
cognition data reported in experiment 2. Each item was chosen by the researcher 
on the basis that it was a commonly reported cognition of the participants in 
response to the scenarios. These cognitions had been rated by two independent 
raters in experiment 2 indicating that they accurately represented the category 
which they represent. The positive scales of the three TCLs were based on fewer 
cognitions than the items on the coping and threat scales. In the shark scenario it 
was necessary to create new positive items as there were so few positive items 
reported in response to the shark scenario in experiment 2. It is possible 
therefore that the positive scales of the TCLs were not as valid as the other scales. 
The TCL was firstly assessed for convergent construct validity, by correlating the 
scales of the TCL with measures of trait anxiety. Research suggests that there 
should be positive correlations of trait anxiety with the coping statements and 
threat statements scales (Fox, Houston & Pittner, 1983; Houston, Fox & Forbes, 
1984; Prins, 1986), but it was not clear whether the positive statements scale 
would be negatively correlated with trait anxiety (e.g., Blankstein, Flett, Boase & 
Toner, 1990; Galassi et al, 1981; Zatz & Chassin, 1983, 1985), or show no 
correlation (Fox, et al., 1983; Kendall et al. 1991; Prins et al., 1994; Schwartz, 1986). 
In both experiment 3 and 4, the threat statements scales of the TCL correlated 
positively with all measures of trait anxiety (although correlations with the STAI 
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trait anxiety were not always significant), which supports the convergent validity 
of these scales, and supports previous theoretical findings. In experiment 3, the 
positive statements scale of the TCL was not correlated with trait anxiety, and in 
experiment 4 the positive scales of only the shark and friends TCL were 
negatively correlated with the trait scale of the STAIC. These findings suggest 
that while the positive statements scales do have a negative relationship with 
trait anxiety, this is limited. As will be discussed later, there was no measure of 
depression included in these experiments, so it is not possible to assess whether 
the positive statements scales correlate with depression, as was demonstrated by 
Ambrose and Rholes (1993). 
The coping statements scales of the TCL showed variable correlations with trait 
anxiety depending on the scenario. In experiment 3, the coping statements scale 
was positively correlated with all measures of trait anxiety. In experiment 4 
however, these correlations disappeared, only to be found between RCMAS and 
the operation TCL coping scale, and between the trait scale of the STAIC and the 
coping scale of the shark TCL. These findings suggest that the coping statements 
scale of the TCL showed less convergent validity than the other scales. This can 
probably be traced back to the coping cognitions reported in experiment 2 used 
to create the scale. It was coping statements which varied the most across the 
three scenarios, with very low levels in the operation TCL, followed by higher 
levels in the friends TCL and even higher levels in the shark TCL. It was 
suggested that responses to the coping scales varied as a function of the level of 
control that the individual felt he or she had over the various situations. 
Therefore, it seems that active coping, such as that included in the shark scenario, 
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is not so highly correlated with trait anxiety as is the less action oriented coping 
included in the operation scenario. 
Adequate internal validity has been demonstrated for most scales through the 
intercorrelations between the scales. Given the previous research, it would be 
expected that the threat statements and coping statements scales should correlate 
positively with each other, and these scales should show either no correlation or 
negative correlations with the positive statements scale. The operation TCL used 
in experiment 3 revealed that the threat statements and coping statements scales 
showed the expected correlations with each other. The strongest correlation was 
found between the two threat statements scales (r=0.68) in experiment 3. The 
positive statements scale was found to show negative correlations with both of 
the threat statements scales, but a positive correlation with the coping statements 
scale. In experiment 4, the coping statements scale was correlated positively with 
the threat statements scale on all three TCL forms, and the threat statements scale 
was correlated negatively with the positive statements scale on all three TCL 
forms. These findings remained unchanged when partial correlations were 
calculated to control for trait anxiety. These results support the internal validity 
of these scales by demonstrating that threat and coping statements are positively 
related, and positive statements are negatively related to threat statements. The 
coping statements scale however showed no correlation with the positive 
statements scale in the operation and friends scenarios, but was negatively 
correlated with the positive statements scale in the shark scenario. It appears that 
the validity of the coping statements scale of the TCL is doubtful and varies 
according to the TCL form. 
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Glass and Arnkoff (1982) suggest that cognitive questionnaires can be responded 
to as affective rather than cognitive questions. If this is the case, then the 
correlations between the TCL and the affective measures do not represent 
convergent validity, but concurrent validity. While every effort was made to 
ensure that participants responded to the TCLs as cognitive measures, there is 
still the possibility that they responded as if the items were affective. Participants 
sometimes had trouble understanding the TCL. Observation of the type of 
questions asked by participants suggested that they were trying to answer the 
items as if they were affective rather, than cognitive. This particularly included 
items which were worded as questions, e.g., 'What will I do when I finish my 
lunch?' 
The measurement of depression 
These experiments did not include a measure of depression, as some studies in 
the area have (e.g., Ambrose & Rholes, 1993). The literature review investigated 
this issue, and concluded that scales such as the RCMAS, the STAIC and the 
STAI can at best be considered measures of negative affectivity, as can the CDI. 
Given that the experiments which comprise the thesis were concerned primarily 
with induced anxiety, as measured by state anxiety and the role of cognition in 
this, a scale of depression was considered irrelevant to this investigation. 
However, it is recognised that a measure of depression could have further 
clarified the role of positive statements. 
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Theoretical issues 
Cognition, anxiety and grade 
There have been two studies which have demonstrated developmental changes 
in the anxious thoughts of children, one which points toward an increase in 
coping strategies across the age range (Brown et al., 1985) and the other which 
points toward an increase in the reports of possible threatening consequences of 
situations (Vasey et al., 1994). On the basis of these studies, it would not have 
been surprising to find an increase in coping statements and threat cognitions 
across the grades. Vasey et al. (1994) found an increase in the ability to generate 
worrisome thoughts in children over the age of 8 years. They argued that the 
reason for the increased ability to worry across the age range is that children 
become more capable of elaborating the potential negative outcomes of a given 
situation as their age increases. The current experiments focussed only on 
children above 8 years of age. Perhaps this is the critical age. If so, it is possible 
that differences may be found in the reported cognitions of younger children. 
The investigation of cognition occurred in two separate ways in the thesis. 
Firstly it was measured via the think-aloud method, and secondly it was 
measured on a checklist via the TCL. In addition to these direct measures of 
cognition, the effect of presenting different types of cognitions to participants 
was measured via the state anxiety responses of participants. This section will 
discuss the two direct measures of cognition and the impact of different types of 
cognition on state anxiety. 
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The major aim of experiment 2 was to assess whether there were any changes in 
the pattern of cognitions reported via the think aloud method according to grade. 
The important difference between this experiment and others which have 
assessed anxiety-related cognitions across the age range was that there was no 
difference in the reported state anxiety in response to the stimuli used to induce 
anxiety across the grades, so the scenarios induced equivalent levels of state 
anxiety in grades 3,5 and 7. It is therefore argued that any changes in the 
number of reported cognitions across the grades are truly related to age level, 
and are not associated with differences in the fear responses to the stimulus 
items. 
The think-aloud results of experiment 2 demonstrated that the children under 
investigation reported cognitions which could be categorised as positive 
statements, coping statements, internal threat statements and external threat 
statements. The most frequently reported cognitions were external threat 
statements. The least frequently reported cognitions were positive statements. 
While there were some problems with the think-aloud data, which have been 
outlined previously, the important finding of this experiment was that there was 
no effect of grade on the number of reported cognitions for any of these four 
categories. 
Experiments 3 and 4 assessed cognitions via the TCL. The TCL questionnaires 
were designed primarily to assess how effectively the different presentation 
conditions had impacted on the cognitions of participants, and they were 
generally found to reflect the cognitive content of the scenarios. However they 
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have also been used as a measure of internal thoughts in response to the 
scenarios. There were few clear consistent effects of grade on the TCL responses 
of participants. 
Perhaps the major finding of the thesis was that state anxiety can be affected by 
the type of cognitions that are presented to participants with an anxiety-inducing 
scenario. The results of the final two experiments revealed that state anxiety was 
lower in those participants given the positive statements scenario. To reiterate, 
positive statements include positive self statements (e.g., 'I am good at making 
friends', 'I can cope with this') and positive affect statements (e.g., 'I feel OK', 
'I'm feeling relaxed about this'). The data therefore show that positive statements 
are capable of ameliorating state anxiety levels in children. 
Further investigation of the ameliorating effect of positive statements on state 
anxiety in experiment 4 showed clear consistent interactions between grade and 
presentation condition. These interactions showed that the effect of positive 
statements is most evident at the grade 3 level for all scenarios. Perhaps the most 
likely reason for these interactions is that the younger children are more easily 
influenced by the positive statements in the scenario, while older children focus 
on the factual content of the scenarios, rather than the cognitive content of the 
scenarios. Further to this, experiments 3 and 4 demonstrated that there was no 
effect of presentation condition on grade 10 participants. There was little 
evidence to suggest that TCL positive statements were actually more prevalent in 
the younger group of children, although the operation scenario showed that 
positive statements were more prevalent in grade 3 participants in the coping 
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and positive statements conditions. This finding suggests that younger children 
may be more receptive to cognitive behavioural programs aimed at reducing 
anxiety, such as those developed by Barrett, Dadds and Rapee (1996). 
The findings of experiment 3 and 4 also revealed that positive statements were 
consistently negatively correlated with state anxiety, which further supports the 
finding that the use of positive statements in imagery scenarios ameliorates state 
anxiety. This finding suggests that trait anxiety and state anxiety have different 
relationships with positive statements. Previous studies have not assessed the 
relationship of cognition with state and trait anxiety separately. Measures of 
state anxiety are rarely taken, and when they are, they tend to be used to show 
that anxiety has been heightened by the experimental procedure (e.g., Galassi et 
al., 1981; Prins et al., 1994). Prins et al. (1994) demonstrated that positive self 
evaluations are related to test performance, but they did not take the further step 
required to show whether they are related to state anxiety. These findings may 
help to clarify the understanding of the role of positive statements in anxiety. 
Kendall et al. (1991) proposed that anxiety is associated with increased negative 
cognitions, not decreased positive statements, that is, it is the 'power of non-
negative thinking' which ameliorates anxiety. The low correlations between trait 
anxiety and reported positive statements in these experiments are probably not 
enough to dispute this position. However, the strong negative correlations 
between reported positive cognitions and state anxiety which are demonstrated 
consistently in experiments 3 and 4, suggest that this position is untenable in the 
case of state anxiety. These studies have shown that positive statements are 
240 
implicated in the experience of state anxiety, and further that in some cases 
(particularly grade 3 children), they act to reduce state anxiety in comparison to 
threat and coping cognitions. 
Watson and Clark (1984) suggest that state anxiety (as measured by the STAI) is 
not a pure measure of transient negative affectivity, but also measures a more 
general happiness/ unhappiness dimension. Watson and Clark (1984) argued 
that some items on this scale reflect negative affectivity (for example, jittery, 
nervous and upset as well as relaxed and calm) while others reflect more general 
happiness/ unhappiness items (for example, joyful and content as well as 
regretful). Given the above argument, the state anxiety scale of the STAIC would 
be expected to show a factor structure which reflects these dimensions. Previous 
research using baseline measures of state anxiety (Cross & Huberty, 1993; Dorr, 
1981; Papay & Hedl, 1978) and the results of experiment 2, which used high 
levels of state anxiety, show that the items fall neatly into two factors which 
represent the positively and negatively valenced items of the scale. So, it is 
possible that these two factors represent positive and negative affectivity 
respectively, rather than the items which Watson and Clark (1984) suggest. If 
this were the case, it would be expected that positive statements would correlate 
with the p-state scale, and not the n-state scale. However, data show that the 
positive statements scale of the TCL correlates with both scales of the STAIC state 
anxiety at an equivalent level, even when trait anxiety is controlled for. This does 
not answer the question of why positive statements show strong correlations 
with state anxiety, but weak or non existent correlations with trait anxiety. 
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It has been demonstrated that anxiety is related to self esteem (Rawson, 1992). 
High self esteem is understood to reflect a positive perception of personal worth. 
Research has shown that self esteem correlates negatively with self report 
measures of anxiety and depression (Rawson, 1992). Given that positive 
perceptions of self worth are central to high levels of self esteem, and the positive 
statements scale of the TCL includes positive self statements, it is not surprising 
that the positive statements scale of the TCL correlated with measures of anxiety. 
Further, a study reported by Matthews and Odom (1989) reports that self esteem 
is correlated with state anxiety, but not trait anxiety. Another study reported by 
Greenberg et al. (1992) shows that adults report lower levels of state anxiety in 
response, to a stressor when given positive feedback about their personality. 
These studies are consistent with the findings reported in this study, and suggest 
that state anxiety is more closely related to positive self image than is trait 
anxiety. 
The role of gender 
Kashani, Orvaschel, Rosenberg, and Reid (1989) and Muris, Merckelbach, Mayer, 
and Meesters (1998) have shown that there are higher levels of anxiety disorders 
symptomatology among females. Ferrari (1986), Gullone and King (1992b) and 
011endick and King (1991) have demonstrated that females report higher levels of 
fear. The separate norms for males and females given in the manuals for all 
anxiety inventories used in the experiments (Reynolds & Richmond, 1985; 
Spielberger, 1973, 1983) reflect these findings. In the four experiments, females 
reported higher levels of trait anxiety on at least one of the measures of trait 
anxiety in each experiment. However, there were no significant differences 
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between males and females in baseline state anxiety in the two experiments 
where this was measured (experiments 3 and 4), and there were no gender 
differences in response to the neutral scenario in experiments 3 and 4 apart from 
on the STAI in one scenario of experiment 4. However, STAIC state anxiety was 
significantly higher in females in response to the experimental scenarios in all 
instances apart from the shark scenario in experiment 2. (STAI state anxiety 
showed limited effects of gender, possibly due to smaller sample sizes.) These 
findings are supported by the significant interactions found between state 
anxiety measurement time (baseline/experimental state anxiety) and gender in 
all but the friends scenario in experiment 4. These findings suggest that females 
do not report higher levels of state anxiety in normal conditions, but that they are 
more reactive to anxiety induction than males. 
Consistent gender differences were found in response to the TCL scales. In 
experiment 3, females reported significantly more coping, internal threat and 
external threat statements. In experiment 4, females reported less positive 
statements in response to the friends and shark scenarios, but more coping 
statements in response to the operation and shark scenarios, and more threat 
statements in response to the shark scenario. These findings support those 
reported elsewhere to suggest that females report less positive statements and 
more threat and coping statements (Brown et al., 1986; Houston et al., 1984; Prins 
et al., 1994; Zatz & Chassin, 1985). So, it seems that in addition to higher fear 
levels and higher levels of anxiety and anxiety disorders in females, there is 
evidence to suggest that females react more to anxiety producing situations and 
report more anxiety-related cognitions. 
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Future directions 
Given the findings of the four experiments reported in the thesis, there are 
numerous directions that further research in this area could take. 
Perhaps of most interest is the relationship between positive statements and 
anxiety. This research has suggested that positive statements show a far stronger 
and more consistent relationship to state anxiety than they do to trait anxiety. 
Further investigation of this phenomenon is warranted. As there were so few 
positive statements reported in experiment 2, it was not possible to assess the 
relationship between positive statements and anxiety. Given the problems 
associated with the use of self statements questionnaires however, further 
investigation of the relationship between positive statements and anxiety using 
another method of cognition measurement would further clarify this 
relationship. Positive statements are implicated in depression, so the inclusion of 
measures of depression could help to clarify further the role of positive 
statements in anxiety. 
This research has also provided evidence that grade 3 children are more likely to 
show the ameliorating effects of positive statements than older children. This 
may simply show that younger children are more likely to be influenced by the 
researcher through the scenarios, or it may reflect a different means of processing 
such information in younger children. If the latter is the case, then treatment 
strategies for younger children with anxiety might include training in the use of 
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positive self statements. Studies assessing the effectiveness of cognitive-
behavioural approaches to anxiety treatment could investigate differences in the 
responses of children of different ages to cognitive restructuring activities. On 
the basis of the findings of the thesis, it is possible that younger children would 
be more responsive to such treatment strategies. 
The results which demonstrate that females are more reactive to anxiety 
induction than males also warrant further investigation. While there have been 
studies which report gender differences in anxiety and fear, there have been none 
which have reported findings equivalent to these. These findings could have 
implications for the investigation of the development of anxiety disorders in 
females versus males. If females are more likely to react with greater increases in 
state anxiety than males, then this phenomenon may be one of the keys to explain 
why anxiety disorders are more common in females than males. Further, studies 
could assess this phenomenon in younger children to ascertain whether there is a 
certain age at which this phenomenon becomes evident. 
In closing 
The investigation which comprises the thesis has provided a greater 
understanding of anxiety and cognition in children and adolescents with 
particular reference to age and gender. Experiment 2 has demonstrated that 
when the anxiety-inducing qualities of a stimulus are equivalent for all ages, then 
there is no effect of age on the reported cognitions associated with this anxiety-
inducing stimulus. This experiment has also shown that reported cognitions 
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tend to vary according to the demands of a situation, and particularly that coping 
thoughts vary greatly according to the situation. Experiments 3 and 4 have 
shown that positive statements are implicated in anxiety, and that they are 
particularly relevant to state anxiety. Experiments 3 and 4 have also shown that 
gender is an important consideration in understanding anxiety in children, 
showing that girls are more reactive to anxiety stimuli than boys, which has not 
been demonstrated elsewhere. It has also been shown that females tend to report 
higher levels of anxiety-related cognitions than boys, and lower levels of positive 
statements. It has also been demonstrated that younger children are more likely 
to be influenced by positive statements than are older children. The questions 
posed in the thesis have aimed to broaden the understanding of the issues 
involved in anxiety and cognition in children and adolescents. It is hoped that 
these findings will spur others on to further investigate the role of cognition in 
the development of anxiety in children. 
246 
References 
Ambrose, B. A., & Rholes, W.S. (1993). Automatic cognitions and the symptoms 
of depression and anxiety in children and adolescents: An examination of the 
content specificity hypothesis. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 17, 289-310. 
Angold, A., & Costello, E. J. (1993). Depressive co-morbidity in children and 
adolescents: Empirical, theoretical, and methodological issues. American 
Journal of Psychiatry, 150, 1779-1791. 
Auerbach, S. M. (1973). Trait-state anxiety and adjustment to surgery. Journal of 
Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 40, 264-271. 
Barlow, D.H. (1988). Anxiety and its disorders. New York: Guilford. 
Barrett, P.M., Dadds M.R., & Rapee R.M. (1996) Family treatment of childhood 
anxiety: A controlled study. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 64, 
333-342. 
Beck, A. T., Brown, G., Steer, R., Eidelson, J.I., & Rislcind, J.H. (1987). 
Differentiating anxiety and depression: A test of the cognitive content-
specificity hypothesis. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 96, 179-183. 
247 
Blankstein, K. R., Flett, G.L., Boase, P., & Toner, B.B. (1990). Thought listing and 
endorsement measures of self-referential thinking in test anxiety. Anxiety 
Research, 2, 343-357. 
Borkovec, T. D., Shadick, R.N., & Hopkins, M. (1991). The nature of normal and 
pathological worry. In R.M. Rapee & D.H. Barlow (Eds.), Chronic Anxiety: 
Generalised Anxiety Disorder and Mixed Anxiety-Depression, pp. 29-51. New York: 
Guilford Press. 
Brady, E. U., & Kendall, P.C. (1992). Co-morbidity of anxiety and depression in 
children and adolescents. Psychological Bulletin, 111, 244-255. 
Brown, J. M., O'Keeffe, J., Sanders, S.H., & Baker, B. (1986). Developmental 
changes in children's cognition to stressful and painful situations. Journal of 
Paediatric Psychology, 11, 343-357. 
Castenada A., McCandless, B., & Palermo, D. (1956). The children's form of the 
Manifest Anxiety Scale. Child Development, 27, 317-326. 
Cate11, R. B., & Scheier, I.H. (1961). The meaning and measurement of neuroticism and 
anxiety. New York: Ronald Press. 
Clark, D. A. (1988). The validity of measures of cognition: A review of the 
literature. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 12, 1-20. 
248 
Clark, D. A., &. Watson., D. (1991). Tripartite model of anxiety and depression: 
psychometric evidence sand taxonomic implications. Journal of Abnormal 
Psychology, 100, 316-336. 
Cole, D. A., Truglio, R. & Peeke, L. (1997). Relation between symptoms of anxiety 
and depression in children: a multitrait-multimethod-multigroup assessment. 
Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 65, 110-119. 
Craighead, W. E. (1991). Cognitive factors and classification issues in adolescent 
depression. Special Issue: The emergence of depressive symptoms during 
adolescence. Journal of Youth and Adolescence, 20, 311-326. 
Craighead, W. E., Kimball, W. H., & Rehak, P. J. (1979). Mood changes, 
physiological responses, and self-statements during social rejection imagery. 
Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 47, 395-396. 
Cross, R. W., &. Huberty, T.J. (1993). Factor analysis of the state-trait anxiety 
inventory for children with a sample of seventh- and eighth-grade students. 
Journal of Psychoeducational Assessment, 11, 232-241. 
Crowley, S. L., & Emerson, E. N. (1996). Discriminant validity of self-reported 
anxiety and depression in children: Negative affectivity or independent 
constructs. Journal of Clinical Child Psychology, 25, 139-146. 
249 
Davison, G. C., Navarre, S. G., & Vogel, R. S. (1995). The articulated thoughts in 
simulated situations paradigm: A think-aloud approach to cognitive 
assessment. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 4, 29-33. 
Davison, G. C., Robins, C., & Johnson, M.K. (1983). Articulated thought during 
simulated situations: A paradigm for studying cognition in emotion and 
behaviour. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 7, 17-40. 
Diener, C. I., &. Dweck., C.S. (1978). An analysis of learned helplessness: 
Continuous changes in performance, strategy, and achievement cognitions 
following failure. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 36, 451-462. 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition. (1994) 
Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association. 
Dorr, D. (1981). Factor structure of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory for Children. 
Personality and Individual Differences, 2, 113-117. 
Eason, L.J., Finch, Jr, A. J., Brasted, W., & Saylor, C. F., (1985). The assessment of 
depression and anxiety in hospitalized paediatric patients. Child Psychiatry 
and Human Development, 16, 57-64. 
Eifert, G. H., & Lauterbach, W. (1987). Relationships between overt behaviour to 
a fear stimulus and self-verbalisations measured by different assessment 
strategies. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 11, 169-183. 
250 
Ericsson, K. A., & Simon, H. A. (1980). Verbal reports as data. Psychological 
Review, 87, 215-251. 
Fernandez, D., & Allen, G.J. (1989). Test anxiety, emotional responding under 
guided imagery and self talk during an academic examination. Anxiety 
Research, 2, 15-26. 
Ferrari, M. (1986). Fears and phobias in childhood: Some clinical and 
developmental considerations. Child Psychiatry and Human Development, 17, 75- 
87. 
Fox, J. E., Houston, K., & Pittner, M.S. (1983). Trait anxiety and children's 
cognitive behaviours in an evaluative situation. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 
7, 149-154. 
Francis, G. (1988). Assessing cognitions in anxious children. Behaviour 
Modification, 12, 267-280. 
Friedman, A. G., Campbell, T., & Okifuji, A. (1991). Specific fears as predictors of 
generalised anxiety in children. Journal of Psychopathology and Behavioral 
Assessment, 13, 45-52. 
251 
Galassi, J. P., Frierson, H.T., & Sharer, R. (1981). Behaviour of high, moderate and 
low test anxious students during an actual test situation. Journal of Consulting 
and Clinical Psychology, 49, 51-62. 
Genest, M., & Turk, D.C. (1981). Think-aloud approaches to cognitive 
assessment. In T.V. Merluzzi, C.R. Glass & M. Genest (Eds.), Cognitive 
assessment (pp. 233-269). New York: The Guilford Press. 
Glass, C.R., & Arnkoff, D.B. (1982). Think cognitively: selected issues in cognitive 
assessment and therapy. In P.C. Kendall (Ed.), Advances in cognitive behavioural 
research and therapy (Vol. 1). New York: Academic Press. 
Greenberg, J., Solomon, S., Pyszczynski, T., Rosenblatt, A., Burling, J., Lyon, D., 
Simon, L., & Pinel, E. (1992). Why do people need self-esteem? Converging 
evidence that self-esteem serves an anxiety-buffering function. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 63, 913-922. 
Gullone, E. (1992). Normative fear in childhood and adolescence: Patterns and 
correlates. The Australian Educational and Developmental Psychologist, 9, 39-53. 
Gullone, E., & King, N.J. (1992a). Psychometric evaluation of a revised fear 
survey schedule for children. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 33, 
987-998. 
252 
Gullone, E., & King, N.J. (1992b). The fears of youth in the 1990's: Contemporary 
normative data. The Journal of Genetic Psychology, 154, 137-153. 
Gullone, E., & King, N.J. (1997). Three-year follow-up of normal fear in children 
and adolescents aged 7 to 18 years. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 
15, 97-111. 
Hagborg, W. J. (1991). The revised children's manifest anxiety scale and social 
desirability. Educational and Psychological Measurement, 51, 423-427. 
Hartmann, D. P. (1977). Considerations in the choice of interobserver reliability 
estimates. Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis, 10, 103-116. 
Hathaway, S.R., & McKinley, J. C. (1942). The Minnesota Multiphasic Personalty 
Inventory. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Hermecz, D. A., &. Melamed., B.G. (1984). The assessment of emotional imagery 
in fearful children. Behavior Therapy, 15, 156-172. 
Hodges, W. F., &. Spielberger., C.D. (1966). The effects of threat of shock on heart 
rate for subjects who differ in manifest anxiety and fear of shock. 
Psychophysiology, 2, 287-294. 
253 
Houston, B. K., Fox, J.E., & Forbes, L. (1984). Trait anxiety and children's state 
anxiety, cognitive behaviours and performance under stress. Cognitive Therapy 
and Research, 8, 631-641. 
Inderbitzen, H. M., & Hope, D.A., (1995). Relationship among adolescent reports 
of social anxiety, anxiety, and depressive symptoms. Journal of Anxiety 
Disorders, 5, 385-396. 
Ingram, R. E., & Kendall, P.C. (1987). The cognitive side of anxiety. Cognitive 
Therapy and Research, 11, 523-536. 
Jackson, H.J., & King, N.J. (1981). The emotive imagery treatment of a child's 
trauma-induced phobia. Journal of Behaviour Therapy and Experimental 
Psychiatry, 12, 325-328. 
Joiner, T.E., & Blalock, J.A. (1995). Gender differences in depression: the role of 
anxiety and generalized negative affect. Sex Roles, 33, 91-108. 
Jolly, J. B., & Dykman, R.A. (1994). Using self report data to differentiate anxious 
and depressive symptoms in adolescents: Cognitive specificity and global 
distress? Cognitive Therapy and Research, 18, 25-37. 
254 
Kashani, J.H., Ovaschel, H., Rosenberg, T.K., & Reid, J. (1989) Psychopathology 
among a community sample of children and adolescents: a developmental 
perspective. Journal of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, 
28, 701-706. 
Kashani, J. H., Dandoy, A. C., Vaidya, A. F., & Soltys, S. M. (1990). Risk factors 
and correlates of severe psychiatric disorders in a sample of in-patient 
children. American Journal of Psychiatry, 147, 780-784. 
Kashani, J. H., Dandoy, A.C., & Orvaschel, H. (1991). Current perspectives on 
anxiety disorders in children and adolescents: An overview. Comprehensive 
Psychiatry, 32, 481-495. 
Kendall, P. C. (1983). Methodology and cognitive-behavioural assessment. 
Behavioural Psychotherapy, 11, 285-301. 
Kendall, P. C. (1994). Treating anxiety disorders in children: results of a 
randomized clinical trial. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 62, 100- 
110. 
Kendall, P. C. (1991). Child and adolescent therapy: Cognitive behavioural procedures. 
New York: The Guilford Press. 
Kendall, P. C., & Chansky, T.E. (1991). Considering cognition in anxiety-
disordered children. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 5, 157-185. 
255 
Kendall, P. C., Chansky, T.E., Friedman, M., Kim, R., Kortlander, E., Sessa, F.M., 
& Siqueland, L. (1991). Treating anxiety disorders in children and adolescents. 
In P. C. Kendall (Ed.), Child and adolescent therapy: cognitive-behavioural 
procedures (pp. 131-161). New York: The Guilford Press. 
Kendall, P.C., & Hollon, S.D. (1981). Assessing self-referent speech: Methods in 
the measurement of self-statements. In P.C. Kendall & S.D. Hollon (Eds.), 
Assessment strategies for cognitive behavioural interventions (pp. 85-118). New 
York: Academic Press 
King, N. J. (1988). Children's Phobias: A Behavioural Perspective. Great Britain: John 
Wiley and Sons Ltd. 
King, N.J., Cranstoun, F., & Josephs, A. (1989). Emotive imagery and children's 
night-time fears: a multiple baseline design evaluation. Journal of Behaviour 
Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 20, 125-135. 
King, N.J., 011endick, T.H., & Gullone, E. (1990). Desensitisation of childhood 
fears and phobias: psychophysiological analyses. Behaviour Change, 7, 66-75. 
Kovacs, M., Gatsonis, C., Paulauskas, S.L., & Richards, C. (1989). Depressive 
disorders in children: IV. a longitudinal study of co-morbidity with and risk 
for anxiety disorders. Archives of General Psychiatry, 46, 776-782. 
256 
Kovacs, M. (1992) Children's Depression Inventory manual. North Tonawanda 
NY: Multi-Health Systems, Inc. 
La Greca, A. M. (1991, August) The development of social anxiety in children. 
Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Psychological 
Association, San Francisco, CA. 
Lang, P. J. (1979). Presidential address, 1978. A bio-informational theory of 
emotional imagery. Psychophysiology, 16, 495-512. 
Lang, P.J., Kozak, M.J., Miller, G.A., Levin, D.N., & McLean, A. (1980). Emotional 
imagery: conceptual structure and pattern of somato-visceral response. 
Psychophysiology, 17, 179-192. 
Lang, P.J., Levin, D.N., Miller G.A., & Kozac, M.J. (1983). Fear behaviour, fear 
imagery, and the psychophysiology of emotion: the problem of affective 
response integration. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 97, 276-306. 
Last, C. G., Barlow, D.H., & O'Brien, G.T. (1985). Assessing cognitive aspects of 
anxiety: Stability over time and agreement between several methods. Behaviour 
Modification, 9, 72-93. 
257 
Lee, S. W., Piersel, W.C., & Unruh, L. (1989). Concurrent validity of the 
physiological subscale of the revised children's manifest anxiety scale: A 
multitrait-multimethod analysis. Journal of Psychoeducational Assessment, 7, 246- 
254. 
Lonigan, C. J., Carey, M. P., & Finch, A. J. (1994). Anxiety and depression in 
children and adolescents: Negative affectivity and the utility of self-reports. 
Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 62, 1000-1008. 
Lucas, C. P. (1993). Diagnosis and classification of anxiety disorders in children 
and adolescents. Current Opinion in Psychiatry, 6, 494-499. 
Martin, M., Horder, P., & Jones, G.V. (1992). Integral bias in the naming of phobia 
related words. Cognition and emotion, 6, 479-486. 
Martinez-Urritia, A. (1975). Anxiety and pain in surgical patients. Journal of 
Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 43, 437-442. 
Mathews, A. (1990). Why worry? the cognitive structure of anxiety. Behaviour 
Research and Therapy, 28, 455-468. 
Matthews, D. B., & Odom, B. L. (1989). Anxiety: A component of self-esteem. 
Elementary School Guidance and Counseling, 24, 153-159. 
258 
Mattison, R.E., Bagnato, S.J., & Brubaker, B.H. (1988). Diagnostic utility of the 
revised children's manifest anxiety scale in children with DSM-III anxiety 
disorders. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 2, 147-155. 
McCathie, H., & Spence, S.H. (1991). What is the revised fear survey schedule for 
children measuring? Behaviour Research and Therapy, 29, 495-502. 
Muris, P., Merckelbach, H., Mayer, B., & Meesters, C. (1998). Common fears and 
their relationship to anxiety disorders symptomatology in normal children. 
Personality and Individual Differences, 24, 575-578. 
Norvell, N., Brophy, C., & Finch, A.J. (1985). The relationship of anxiety to 
childhood depression. Journal of Personality Assessment, 49, 150-153. 
011endick, T. H. (1983). Reliability and validity of the revised fear survey 
schedule for children (FSSC-R). Behaviour Research and Therapy, 21, 685-692. 
011endick, T. H., & Yule, W. (1990). Depression in British and American children 
and its relation to anxiety and fear. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 
58, 126-129. 
011endick, T. H., & King, N.J. (1991). Origins of childhood fears: An evaluation of 
Rachman's theory of fear acquisition. Behavior Research and Therapy, 29, 117- 
123. 
259 
Papay, J.P., & Hedl, J.J. (1978). Psychometric characteristics and norms for 
disadvantaged third and fourth grade children the State Trait Anxiety 
Inventory for Children. Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology, 6, 115-120. 
Prins, P. J. (1986). Children's self speech and self-regulation during a fear 
provoking behavioural test. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 24, 181-191. 
Prins, P. J. M., Groot, M. J. M., & Hanewald, G. J. F. P. (1994). Cognition in test-
anxious children: the role of on-task and coping cognition reconsidered. 
Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 62, 404-409. 
Rawson, H. E. (1992). The interrelationship of measures of manifest anxiety, self-
esteem, locus of control, and depression in children with behavior problems. 
Journal of Psychoeducational Assessment, 10, 319-329. 
Reed, L. J., Carter, B.D, & Miller, L.C. (1992). Fear and anxiety in children. In C. E. 
Walker & Roberts, M.C. (Eds.), Handbook of Clinical Child Psychology, 2nd 
Edition (pp. 237-260). New York: John Wiley & Sons. 
Reynolds, C. R. (1980). Concurrent validity of what I think and feel: the revised 
children's manifest anxiety scale. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 
48, 774-775. 
260 
Reynolds, C. R., & Paget, K.D. (1981). Factor analysis of the revised children's 
manifest anxiety scale for blacks, whites, males, and females with a national 
normative sample. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 49, 352-359. 
Reynolds, C. R., & Richmond, B.O. (1978). What I think and feel: A revised 
measure of children's manifest anxiety. Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology, 6, 
271-280. 
Reynolds, C.R., & Richmond, B.O. (1985). Revised Children's Manifest Anxiety 
Scale: Manual. Los Angeles, CA: Western Psychological Services. 
Scherer, M. W., & Nakamura, C. Y. (1968). A Fear Survey Schedule for Children 
(FSS-FC): A factor analytic comparison with manifest anxiety (CMAS). 
Behaviour Research and Therapy, 6, 173-182. 
Schwartz, R. M. (1986). The internal dialogue: on the asymmetry between 
positive and negative coping thoughts. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 10, 591- 
605. 
Silverstone, P. H. (1991). Low self-esteem in different psychiatric conditions. 
British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 30, 185-188. 
Spielberger, C. D. (1966). Theory and research on anxiety. In C. D. Spielberger 
(Ed.), Anxiety and behaviour New York: Academic Press. 
261 
Spielberger, C. D. (1973). Preliminary manual for the state trait anxiety inventory for 
children. In Palo Alto, California: Consulting Psychologists Press, Inc. 
Spielberger, C. D. (1983). Manual for the state-trait anxiety inventory. Palo Alto, 
California: Mind Garden Inc. 
Stark, K.D., Humphrey, L.L., Laurent, J., Livingston, R., & Christopher, J. (1993). 
Cognitive, behavioral, and family factors in the differentiation of depressive 
and anxiety disorders during childhood. Journal of Consulting and Clinical 
Psychology, 61, 878-886. 
Strauss, C. C., Last, C.G., Hersen, M., & Kazdin, A.E. (1988). Association between 
anxiety and depression in children and adolescents with anxiety disorders. 
Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology, 16, 57-68. 
Tannenbaum, L. E., Forehand, R., & Thomas, A. M. (1992). Adolescent self-
reported anxiety and depression: Separate constructs or a single entity. Child 
Study Journal, 22, 61-72. 
Vasey, M. W. (1993). Development and Cognition in Childhood Anxiety. In T. H. 
011endick & Prinz, R.J. (Eds.), Advances in Clinical Child Psychology, Volume 15 
(pp. 1-39). New York: Plenum Press. 
Vasey, M. W., Cmic, K.A., & Carter, W.G. (1994). Worry in childhood: A 
developmental perspective. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 18, 1-21. 
262 
Vasey, M. W., & Daleiden, E.L. (1994). Worry in children. In G. C. L. Davey & 
Tallis, F. (Eds.), Worrying: Perspectives on Theory, Assessment and Treatment (pp. 
185-207). John Wiley & Sons Ltd. 
Vasey, M. W., Daleiden, E.L., Williams, L.L., & Brown, L.M. (1995). Biased 
attention in childhood anxiety disorders: A preliminary study. Journal of 
Abnormal Child Psychology, 23, 267-279. 
Watkins, P. L., Clum, G.A., Borden, J.W., Broyles, S., & Hayes, J. (1990). Imagery-
induced arousal in individuals with panic disorder. Cognitive Therapy and 
Research, 14, 37-46. 
Watson, D., & Clark, L.A. (1984). Negative affectivity: the disposition to 
experience aversive emotional states. Psychological Bulletin, 96, 465-490. 
Wisniewski, J. J., Mulick, J.A., Genshaft, J.L., & Coury, D.L. (1987). Test-retest 
reliability of the revised children's manifest anxiety scale. Perceptual and Motor 
Skills, 65, 67-70. 
Wolf, V.V., Finch, A.J., Saylor, C.F., Blount, R.L., Pallmeyer, T.P., & Carek, D.J. 
(1987). Negative affectivity in children: A multitrait-multimethod 
investigation. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 55, 245-250. 
263 
Zatz, S., & Chassin, L. (1983). Cognitions of test anxious children. Journal of 
Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 51, 526-534. 
Zatz, S., & Chassin, L. (1985). Cognitions of test-anxious children under 
naturalistic test-taking conditions. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 
53, 393-401. 
264 
Appendix A: Checklists and Questionnaires 
Al: FSSC-II- Experiment 1 
What Makes Me Scared 
Name: 	  
Age (in years): 	  
School: 	  
Directions 
Below are written a list of things that make some people scares. Read each one 
carefully and tick the box in front of the words that best describe how scared you 
are. 
There are no right or wrong answers. 
Remember, find the words that best describe how scared you are. 
1 Being teased LINOT SCARED 'SCARED LIVERY SCARED 
2 Rides like the big dipper LINOT SCARED 'SCARED LIVERY SCARED 
3 Being alone 'NOT SCARED LISCARED LIVERY SCARED 
4 Riding in a car or bus LINOT SCARED 'SCARED LIVERY SCARED 
5 Being criticised by others UNOT SCARED 'SCARED UVERY SCARED 
6 Mice 1:INOT SCARED USCARED LIVERY SCARED 
7 Losing my friends UNOT SCARED USCARED LIVERY SCARED 
8 Being in closed places 'NOT SCARED 'SCARED 'VERY SCARED 
9 Going to the doctor LINOT SCARED LISCARED 'VERY SCARED 
10 Getting bad marks at school LINOT SCARED USCARED LIVERY SCARED 
11 Our country being invaded UNOT SCARED USCARED LIVERY SCARED 
12 Darkness LINOT SCARED 'SCARED LIVERY SCARED 
13 Nuclear war LINOT SCARED 'SCARED LIVERY SCARED 
14 Taking dangerous drugs LINOT SCARED LISCARED LIVERY SCARED 
15 Going to the dentist LINOT SCARED 'SCARED LIVERY SCARED 
16 Having to talk in front of my class 'NOT SCARED LISCARED LIVERY SCARED 
17 Violence on TV LINOT SCARED LISCARED 'VERY SCARED 
18 Spiders LINOT SCARED LISCARED LIVERY SCARED 
19 Murderers [NOT SCARED LISCARED UVERY SCARED 
20 My parents criticising me LINOT SCARED CISCARED UVERY SCARED 
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21 Being in a fight UNOT SCARED USCARED LIVERY SCARED 
22 Being kidnapped 'NOT SCARED LISCARED LIVERY SCARED 
23 Getting a serious illness LINOT SCARED LISCARED LIVERY SCARED 
24 Meeting someone for the first time LINOT SCARED USCARED LIVERY SCARED 
25 Fire 'NOT SCARED 'SCARED LIVERY SCARED 
26 Having an operation I:INOT SCARED LISCARED LIVERY SCARED 
27 Having to go to school LIINOT SCARED LISCARED [VERY SCARED 
28 Someone in my family dying 'NOT SCARED LISCARED LIVERY SCARED 
29 Making mistakes 'NOT SCARED USCARED DVERY SCARED 
30 My parents arguing [NOT SCARED LISCARED EVERY SCARED 
31 Cyclones LINOT SCARED 'SCARED LIVERY SCARED 
32 Myself dying LINOT SCARED LISCARED LIVERY SCARED 
33 Being hit by a car or truck 'NOT SCARED LISCARED [VERY SCARED 
34 Being sent to the principal LINOT SCARED 'SCARED LIVERY SCARED 
35 Ghosts or spooky things LINOT SCARED 'SCARED LIVERY SCARED 
36 Being threatened with a gun LINOT SCARED USCARED LIVERY SCARED 
37 Bushfires LINOT SCARED LJSCARED [VERY SCARED 
38 Not being able to breathe LJNOT SCARED LISCARED LIVERY SCARED 
39 Getting punished by my dad LINOT SCARED LISCARED 1:IVERY SCARED 
40 Failing a test DNOT SCARED LISCARED L:IINTERY SCARED 
41 Drunk people UNOT SCARED LISCARED UVERY SCARED 
42 Snakes LINOT SCARED LISCARED LIVERY SCARED 
43 My parents separating or 
getting divorced [NOT SCARED LISCARED LIVERY SCARED 
44 Getting an electric shock LINOT SCARED LISCARED LIVERY SCARED 
45 Someone in my family having 
an accident I:IINOT SCARED USCARED LIVERY SCARED 
46 Getting lost in a crowd LINOT SCARED LISCARED UIVERY SCARED 
47 Having no friends 'NOT SCARED LISCARED UVERY SCARED 
48 Someone in my family getting sick 'NOT SCARED LISCARED LIVERY SCARED 
49 Strange looking people UNOT SCARED SCARED VERY SCARED 
50 Getting punished by my mum 'NOT SCARED LISCARED LIVERY SCARED 
51 A burglar breaking into our house LINOT SCARED SCARED LIVERY SCARED 
52 Having bad dreams 'NOT SCARED USCARED LIVERY SCARED 
53 Being alone at home UNOT SCARED LISCARED OVERY SCARED 
54 Rats [NOT SCARED USCARED LIVERY SCARED 
55 Going to a new school LINOT SCARED 'SCARED LIIVERY SCARED 
56 Earthquakes LJNOT SCARED USCARED LIVERY SCARED 
57 Getting an injection from a nurse 
or doctor LIINOT SCARED LISCARED [VERY SCARED 
58 Bees [NOT SCARED LISCARED [VERY SCARED 
59 Sitting for a test UNOT SCARED USCARED [VERY SCARED 
60 Being bullied UNOT SCARED LISCARED UIVERY SCARED 
61 Getting my school report LINOT SCARED LISCARED DIVERY SCARED 
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62 	Thunder UNOT SCARED LISCARED LIVERY SCARED 
63 	Lizards ILIINOT SCARED USCARED LIVERY SCARED 
MAIDS LINOT SCARED LISCARED LIVERY SCARED 
65 	Creepy houses 'NOT SCARED [SCARED [VERY SCARED 
66 	Tigers LINOT SCARED L1SCARED LIVERY SCARED 
67 	Dead people UNOT SCARED LISCARED UIVERY SCARED 
68 	Getting lost in a strange place LINOT SCARED USCARED [VERY SCARED 
69 	Thunderstorms 'NOT SCARED USCARED [VERY SCARED 
70 	Cemeteries 121NOT SCARED 'SCARED 1:IVERY SCARED 
71 	Dingoes ILINOT SCARED (SCARED LIVERY SCARED 
72 	The sight of blood LINOT SCARED LISCARED UIVERY SCARED 
73 	Looking foolish 'NOT SCARED LISCARED 'VERY SCARED 
74 	Flying in a plane LINOT SCARED LISCARED LIVERY SCARED 
75 	Strangers LINOT SCARED LISCARED [VERY SCARED 
76 	Having to go to hospital LINOT SCARED ILIISCARED VERY SCARED 
77 	Falling from high places LINOT SCARED LISCARED LIVERY SCARED 
78 	Sharks LINOT SCARED LISCARED LIVERY SCARED 
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A2: FSSC-II Shortened Version- Experiment 2 
What Makes Me Scared 
Name: 	  
Age (in years): 	  
School: 	  
Directions 
Below are written a list of things that make some people scares. Read each one 
carefully and tick the box in front of the words that best describe how scared you 
are. 
There are no right or wrong answers. 
Remember, find the words that best describe how scared you are. 
1 Losing my friends (NOT SCARED ILISCARED LIVERY SCARED 
2 Being in closed places LINOT SCARED LISCARED UIVERY SCARED 
3 Our country being invaded LINOT SCARED LISCARED LIVERY SCARED 
4 Being teased LINOT SCARED LISCARED LIVERY SCARED 
5 Nuclear war LINOT SCARED [SCARED LIVERY SCARED 
6 Having to talk in front of my class LINOT SCARED ILIISCARED LIVERY SCARED 
7 Spiders LINOT SCARED LISCARED LIVERY SCARED 
8 AIDS (NOT SCARED LISCARED LIVERY SCARED 
9 Being kidnapped LINOT SCARED LIISCARED LIVERY SCARED 
10 Getting a serious illness [NOT SCARED LISCARED [LIVERY SCARED 
11 Having an operation LINOT SCARED ILISCARED LIVERY SCARED 
12 Myself dying LINOT SCARED LIISCARED UIVERY SCARED 
13 Being sent to the principal LINOT SCARED LISCARED [LIVERY SCARED 
14 Violence on TV LINOT SCARED 1LIISCARED LIIVERY SCARED 
15 Not being able to breathe LINOT SCARED LISCARED LIVERY SCARED 
16 Someone in my family having 
an accident LINOT SCARED LISCARED LIVERY SCARED 
17 Having no friends UNOT SCARED ILISCARED UVERY SCARED 
18 Someone in my family getting sick LINOT SCARED LISCARED [LIVERY SCARED 
19 Going to a new school LINOT SCARED LISCARED UIVERY SCARED 
20 Dead people LINOT SCARED LISCARED UIVERY SCARED 
21 Sharks LINOT SCARED LISCARED [LIVERY SCARED 
22 Falling from high places LINOT SCARED LISCARED UVERY SCARED 
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A3: Visual Imagery Scale- Experiment 2 (Operation) 
How Vividly Did You Imagine? 
The Operation Scene 
1. The hospital bed? 
_ 
--• 
_ _ __. 
:;•■• •■ 
't 
...
.. 
:01;•-■R.7•11.= ••.•%•s..s.s e.e.e.e.e. ••■••••■ •%-s. .•• ■••■••■••••• 
• •■••■•%•%•1. r•e•e•e•••• ••••."•%•%, 1:1;e:./.0.: 
.1'.7•-r.Rt.R.7% •%.%.1,...... .e.e. •%••■•••■ 	. nee" ol"40%, 	. 
0•••:e• .••••••••6 pe.1.1. 
. 
•so -.. 
." .411 %.A. 
r..t,' 
I. _.• 
Li Li 
Perfectly clear 	Clear and 	Moderately 	Vague and 	No image at 
and as vivid as 	reasonably 	dear and dim. 	all, you only 
normal vision. vivid, vivid, 	 know you are 
thinking about it. 
2. The trolley ride to the operating theatre? 
— 
-- 
irSTStNi es. ••.. • • .. 
•• 
.: 	.q4.V. 
C.: 
0•. 	i -. 
— 
sI% 
.4.,* 
••■
•• . I 
.. 
0 	Z• 
•%.%•%•%•%: •••.e.e.....••, •%•%••.•%," ...e.e•e•,•., •%.%••■...s.•% .••/..0.e.e• ••••••••.•%•% ev,:e;e•.•.. 
.t.tftftf: .e.e. •■••%•% 	. .e.e. ....v.% 	. e•e:e• .•%•%••. 1.0••". -. -- -. 
, 
Li 
	
Li Li 
Perfectly clear 	Clear and 	Moderately 	Vague and 	No image at 
and as vivid as 	reasonably 	dear and dim. 	all, you only 
normal vision. vivid, vivid, 	 know you are 
thinking about it. 
3. The operating theatre? 
--- 
. 
A. 
•■ •••C 	
1 
06.1,06•101. .e...0.e.e. •■••■•%.•%•% •e•e•r•e. .5".•.•5..% •e•e•e•e• •So01.01.0.%•• sediesesee 
elo 
"... 
,0•  " 	Nr....r..4 70 0......0 
.% e.... 
".•:.P.  
.10AAVO4.04 .0.e. 
.04...V*1 
efeee %.vm1 	. 
001.•%•% e•e•e• -. -. — 
Li 
	
Li 
	
CI - 
	
Li 
	
Li 
Perfectly clear 	Clear and 	Moderately 	Vague and 	No image at 
and as vivid as 	reasonably 	dear and dim. 	all, you only 
normal vision, vivid, vivid, 	 know you are 
thinking about it 
269 
A4: Visual Imagery Scale- Experiment 2 (Friends) 
How Vividly Did You Imagine? 
No Friends Scene 
1. The playground at school? 
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A5: Visual Imagery Scale- Experiment 2 (Shark) 
How Vividly Did You Imagine? 
The Shark Scene 
1. Your favourite beach? 
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A6: Thoughts Checklist (Operation) Experiment 3 
What Did You Think? 
People think lots of different things while they are having an operation. Here are some 
things that people may or may not think. Read each sentence and decide whether you 
thought it while you were imagining having an operation. If you did think it, tick yes. If 
you did not think it, tick no. There are no right or wrong answers. 
1. I'll try and pretend to be brave 	  
YES 
CI 
No SCALE 
C 
2. I feel a lot more confident knowing that it will be over soon ... CI P 
3. I'm really worried about this 	  0 CI I 
4. I can see the needle and it's big and pointy 	  I Li X 
5. I'll try and enjoy the time before I go in  LI LI C 
6. I feel OK about this 	  0 LI P 
7. Those lights are glaring right in my face and hurting my eyes LI LI X 
8. I just feel really weird 	LI LI I 
9. I'm feeling really nervous about this operation 	 0 CI I 
10. Should I just start crying? 	  LI LI C 
11.What if I wake up in the middle of the operation? 	 CI 0 X 
12. I feel alright at the moment 	  CI LI P 
13. I don't believe a word that the nurse says 	  0 CI X 
14. I don't feel scared 	  LI LI P 
15. I will close my eyes while they put the needle in 	 CI LI C 
16.My heart's beating really really fast 	  LI LI I 
17.They are taking me closer and closer to where I might die CI LI X 
18. I'm getting more and more frightened 	  LI LI I 
19. I may as well get this over and done with  CI LI C 
20. I feel alright 	  LI LI P 
21. Should I say I'm scared? 	  LI LI C 
22. I feel sick in my stomach  CI LI I 
23.They don't look very friendly 	  LI LI X 
24. I'm feeling really really scared  CI LI I 
25. What if it doesn't work? 	  0 0 X 
26. I know I don't have to worry 	  CI LI P 
27. Should I say how I feel? 	  LI LI C 
28. I don't have to worry  CI LI P 
29. I'm really terrified now 	  CI CI I 
30. What if it all goes wrong?  CI 0 X 
31. I'm feeling quite calm really 	  CI LI P 
32. I've got butterflies in my stomach 	  CI 0 I 
33. I'll try to think that this is just a dream 	  CI LI C 
34. I'm really feeling quite relaxed about this  CI LI P 
35. I'll try and close my eyes 	  LI LI C 
36. It's going to really hurt  CI CI X 
37. I'll try and think of something else while I lie here 	 CI LI C 
38. I know I don't have to be nervous 	  .L1 LI P 
39. I'm going cold all over 	  CI LI I 
40. Everyone is staring at me  CI LI X 
Note: P= Positive scale, C= Coping scale, X= external threat scale and I= internal threat scale 
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A7: Thoughts Checklist (Friends) Experiment 4 
What Did You Think? 
No Friends 
People think lots of different things when they have no friends. Here 
are some things that people may or may not think. Read each sentence 
and decide whether you thought it while you were imagining having no 
friends. If you did think it, tick yes. If you did not think it, tick no. 
There are no right or wrong answers. 
YES No SCALE 
1. I've got butterflies in my stomach 	 101 Li T 
2. I have made good friends near my home anyway 	Li Li P 
3.What am I going to do without any friends to do things with?01 Li C 
4. I'm really nervous 	 01 Li T 
5. It's alright, I am good at making friends 	  0 Li P 
6. I'm happier on my own anyway 	  0 Li P 
7. I'd like to go somewhere else to eat my lunch 	  0 Li C 
8. Nobody likes me 	  01 Li T 
9. Everyone is staring at me 	  Li Li T 
10.Maybe I should just walk around looking confident 	 Li Li C 
11.I'll go and find a quiet place to sit down 	  Li Li C 
12.I know I will make some friends soon  I Li P 
13.I feel good just sitting here listening to them 	  0 Li P 
14.I'm so upset 	  0 Li T 
15.I will just stay here until lunch is over 	  Li Li C 
16. I don't want to eat my lunch at all  Li Li T 
17. I am happy sitting on my own 	  Li Li P 
18.I don't mind them ignoring me  Li Li P 
19.What will I do when I finish my lunch? 	  Li Li C 
20.I just want to go to the library or the computer room 	 rj Li c 
21.I am happy sitting here 	  0 Li P 
22. I am trying to see if there's someone who is my friend 	 1:1 Li c 
23. It's OK, I can cope with this 	  Li Li P 
24. I'll look around and see if there's anyone I know 	 ID Li C 
25. None of the other kids like me 	  0 Li T 
26.It's not fair, I have to sit here all by myself 	  Li Li T 
27. I feel like I'm going to cry in a minute  0 Li T 
28. I feel OK 	  10 Li P 
29. I think I will go off and do something by myself 	 0 Li C 
30. I'm scared that they might gang up on me 	  0 Li T 
Note: P. Positive scale, C. Coping scale and T. threat scale 
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A8: Thoughts Checklist (Operation) Experiment 4 
What Did You Think? 
Operation 
People think lots of different things while they are having an operation. 
Here are some things that people may or may not think. Read each sentence 
and decide whether you thought it while you were imagining having an 
operation. If you did think it, tick yes. If you did not think it, tick no. There 
are no right or wrong answers. 
YES No SCALE 
1. I'll try and close my eyes and pretend to be brave 	 U U C 
11.I don't feel scared 	  U U P 
12.I will close my eyes while they put the needle in 	 U U C 
13.My heart's beating really really fast 	  U U T 
2. I feel a lot more confident knowing that it will be over soon ...0 U P 
3. I'm really worried about this 	  U U T 
4. I can see the needle and it's big and pointy 	  1=1 U T 
5. I'll try and enjoy the time before I go in  U U C 
6. I feel OK about this 	  U U P 
7. I'm feeling really nervous about this operation 	 U U T 
8. Should I just start crying? 	  U U C 
9. What will I do if I wake up in the middle of the operation? U U C 
10. I feel alright at the moment 	  U U P 
14.I'm getting more and more frightened 	  U U T 
15.I may as well get this over and done with  U U C 
16.I feel alright 	  U U P 
17.Should I say I'm scared? 	  U U C 
18.They don't look very friendly 	  U U T 
19.What if it doesn't work? 	  U U T 
20.I know I don't have to worry  U U P 
21.Should I say how I feel? 	  U U C 
22.I don't have to worry  U U P 
23.I'm really terrified now 	  U U T 
24.What if it all goes wrong?  U U T 
25.I'm feeling quite calm really 	  U U P 
26.I'm really feeling quite relaxed about this 	  U U P 
27.I'll try and close my eyes 	  U U C 
28.It's going to really hurt  U U T 
29.I'll try and think of something else while I lie here 	 U U C 
30.I know I don't have to be nervous 	  U U P 
Note: P= Positive scale, C= Coping scale and T= threat scale 
274 
A9: Thoughts Checklist (Shark) Experiment 4 
What Did You Think? 
Shark 
People think lots of different things when they see a shark. Here are 
some things that people may or may not think. Read each sentence and 
decide whether you thought it while you were imagining seeing that 
shark in the water. If you did think it, tick yes. If you did not think it, 
tick no. There are no right or wrong answers. 
YES No SCALE 
1. I should get someone's attention 	 U U C 
2. No one knows that I'm out here U U T 
3. It's OK, I'm a good swimmer 	 U U P 
4. What if it's a shark 	 U U T 
5. What am I going to do? 	 U U C 
6. I feel good swimming through the water so easily 	U U P 
7. It might come up and bite my leg off 	 U U T 
8. I don't have to worry, I know what to do if it's a shark 	U U P 
9. If only I could do something so this thing would go away 	U U C 
10. I'm really really scared now 	 U U T 
11. I've got to be careful it doesn't get me 	 U U C 
12. I can feel my heart thumping really fast U U T 
13. It's OK, I am feeling relaxed 	 U U P 
14. I feel terrified 	 U U T 
15. I've got to get back in before it gets me 	 U U C 
16. They tell me to stay calm when you see a shark 	U U C 
17. I've got to keep my eyes on it, watch it carefully U U C 
18. I feel OK about this 	 U U P 
19. I am really excited, I haven't seen a shark before 	U U P 
20. I am feeling safe, it's not too far to the shore 	 U U P 
21. I won't have any trouble swimming that far back to shore 	U U P 
22. What if it chomps me straight up 	 U U T 
23. I'm trying to pretend that I am not there 	 U U C 
24. I think its teeth would be really sharp U U T 
25. I am a great swimmer, I will be OK 	 U U P 
26. I'm trying to swim faster and faster away from it. 	U U C 
27. I have to swim as fast as I can 	 U U C 
28. If I keep swimming it might get really angry 	 U U T 
29. I am so scared 	 U U T 
30. I feel great swimming out here 	 U U P 
Note: P= Positive scale, C= Coping scale and T= threat scale 
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Appendix B: Instructions to Participants (Including Scenarios) 
Bl: Administration Instructions: Experiment 1 
Today we are going to look at some things that make some people scared. I am 
going to give you a list of these things and I Want you to look at them think about 
whether they scare you. First, write your name along the top line. Next write 
down how old you are. Finally write down the school you go to, which 
is 	 Now tick the box saying if you are male or female. Now we will 
read the first bit together: 
Below are written a list of things that make some people scared. Read each one 
carefully and tick the box in front of the words that best describe how scared you 
are. There are no right or wrong answers. Remember, find the words that best 
describe how scared you are. 
Lets try one first (Have this example written on the board). Teddy bears/sausage 
rolls...., now, are you not scared, scared or very scared of teddy bears/sausage 
rolls? If you are not scared of teddy bears/sausage rolls, you would tick this box, 
if you were scared, then you would tick this box, and, if you were very scared, 
you would tick this box. Does everyone understand how to do it? Are there any 
questions? 
FOR GRADE 7 & 10: Work on your own. If there are any words that you don't 
know, or you have any questions, put your hand up and I will come and help 
you. You can start now. 
FOR GRADE 3,4 &5: Now, I will read aloud each one of the questions, and as I 
read them I want you to decide how you feel about it and tick the right box. 
Work on your own, I want to know how you feel about it. If you're not sure, try 
to answer as well as you can. If you have any questions, put up your hand. 
Administer FSSC and collect completed forms. 
STAI/C: Now we are going to do another one. This one is all about how you 
feel. First of all, write your name and age at the top of the page, and then the 
date today. The date today is 	 Read along with me while I read out the 
directions: 
A number of statements which boys and girls use to describe themselves are 
given below. Read each statement, and decide if it is hardly ever, or sometimes, 
or often true for you. Then for each statement, put an X in the box in front of the 
word that seems to describe you best. There are no right or wrong answers. Do 
not spend too much time on any one statement. Remember, choose the word 
which seems to describe how you usually feel. 
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Lets try one on the board. I eat all of my dinner/do all my home work 	 Now if 
you eat all of your dinner/do all your homework hardly ever, you would put an 
x in this box, if you eat all of you dinner/do all your homework sometimes, you 
would put an x in this box, and if you eat all of your dinner/do all your 
homework often, you would put an x in this box. Remember to place an x in 
front of the statement which best describes how you feel, either hardly ever, 
sometimes or often. Does everyone understand? Are there any questions? 
FOR GRADE 7 & 10: Work on your own, I want to know how you feel about it. If 
there are any words that you don't know, or you have any questions, put your 
hand up and I will come and help you. You can start now. 
FOR GRADE 3,4 & 5: Now, I will read aloud each one of the questions, and as I 
read them I want you to decide how you feel about it and tick the right box. 
Work on your own, I want to know how you feel about it. If you're not sure, try 
to answer as well as you can. If you have any questions, put up your hand. 
Administer STAI- Trait and collect completed forms. 
Discussion on fears may then begin as a follow up to the session. 
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B2: Administration Instructions: Experiment 2 
First administer 
STAI (Trait) 
Mod FSSC-R 
RCMAS 
Today we are going to do some imagination work. I am going to ask you to 
imagine a situation very clearly in your mind, and then I am going to ask you to 
tell me all the things that come into your mind while you are imagining the 
situation. Do you know what I mean when I ask you about the things that come 
into your mind? Just imagine I could climb into your head and hear all the 
things that you say to yourself. They could be about yourself and how you are 
feeling, or about what you are imagining, or about things that have happened to 
you before, all sorts of things. The main part of this is that I want you to say out 
loud as many things as you can that pop into your mind, even if they don't seem 
to be important. While you are saying them, I am going to record what you say 
on my tape recorder so that I don't forget. First I will record your name and 
school, so that I know who this is when I play it back. 
You know when you read cartoons, and the characters have the thought bubbles 
above their heads? Like this? I want you to tell me the things that are 
happening in your thought bubble. Lets have a practice. Sit back in your chair 
and get yourself really comfortable. I want you to close your eyes and just listen 
to my voice and imagine what I am saying as clearly as you can, as if you were 
actually there. 
Imagine it is your birthday. You have just woken up in bed and you realise that 
it is your birthday. Really put yourself there in your bed, all nice and cosy, 
thinking about your birthday. Can you see it? You are feeling very excited as 
you think about the presents that you will get. You are feeling very happy and 
excited. Look around you and see what your room looks like. Really put 
yourself there. Without opening your eyes, keep imagining the situation and 
say out loud what is going through your mind as you are lying there in bed on 
your birthday. 
If child has trouble: Lets try it with me imagining. I want you to ask me to 
imagine my birthday, and I will tell you all the things that come into my mind as 
I imagine it. 
(Now you have another go.) Think of what it is like lying there in your bed. It's 
still early and you know that no one else is awake, so you can't get up yet, you 
just have to lie in bed for a while. You are feeling very excited, and thinking 
about all the presents you might get. You are feeling very happy because it is 
your birthday. Really see yourself there. Without opening your eyes, keep 
imagining the situation and say out loud what is going through your mind as 
you are lying there in bed on your birthday. 
Keep going until the child is verbalising fluently. 
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Well done, that's great, you have the idea now. Do you have any questions 
about what to do? Are you sure you have the idea? OK now you have the idea 
of it I want you to do some more imagining for me. These ones will be a bit 
longer, so I want you to concentrate really hard and tell me all the things that 
run through you mind while you are imagining them. will stop you a few times 
through them, so make sure you keep imagining until I tell you to stop. 
Remember that the main part of this is that I want you to say as many things as 
you can that pop into your mind, even if they don't seem to be important. 
Having No Friends 
Prelude: 
1. Do you have lots of friends at school? 
2. Can you imagine a time when you didn't? 
OK, sit back in your chair and get yourself really comfortable. I want you to 
close your eyes and just listen to my voice and imagine what I am saying as 
clearly as if you were actually there. 
Part 1 
It's lunch time at school and you are going outside to eat your lunch. Really see 
yourself walking outside to eat your lunch. Can you see yourself there? You 
know that there will be no one to have lunch with because you don't have any 
friends. You are feeling a bit sick in the stomach because you hate to go out and 
sit by yourself in the playground with no friends. You are feeling nervous. 
Look around you and see where you are walking. Really see yourself there 
walking outside to have your lunch, walking outside, feeling upset. You are 
standing outside now, feeling afraid, looking around at everyone else who is 
laughing and talking with their friends. Your hands are starting to feel sweaty, 
because you know that you will have to sit down by yourself outside. You feel 
like crying. See the other kids there, running around, laughing and talking. 
Really put yourself there. 
Without opening your eyes, keep imagining the situation and say out loud what 
is going trough your mind as you are standing there watching the other kids 
with their friends. 
What else is going through your mind? (if only 1 or 2 responses) 
Part 2 
You go over to where there are a group of others sitting. Can you see yourself 
there? Really see the playground and look at where you are walking to. You are 
feeling nervous. Look around you and see the other kids talking and laughing, 
having fun together. You are feeling sick in the stomach, and you sit yourself 
down and open your lunch. You don't feel like having your lunch. You are 
feeling a bit upset and your hands are feeling sweaty. Really imagine yourself 
there, sitting all by yourself looking down at your lunch. You can see all the 
other children playing and eating their lunch. You can hear them laughing and 
talking, sounding really happy. You are feeling like you are going to cry, and 
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you feel very worried. Look around you and see what is happening around 
you, hear the other kids playing, laughing and having fun. 
Without opening your eyes, keep imagining the situation and say out loud what 
is going through your mind as you sit there by yourself in the playground. 
What else is going through your mind? (if only 1 or 2 responses) 
Part 3 
You are sitting there all by yourself with no friends, starting to eat your lunch. 
Can you see yourself there? Some other kids come and sit down near you. 
There are 3 of them sitting next to you, they are all in your class. Really see them 
there, talking to each other and laughing and ignoring you. Your hands are 
feeling sweaty. See them there ignoring you really see them there, really see 
their faces. You can feel yourself getting nervous, and you feel sick in the 
stomach. You are feeling like you want to cry. Really put yourself there. One 
of them looks up at you, and says "What are you looking at?" Really hear 
him/her saying that. Listen to his/her voice. As they say that you can feel your 
heart start to beat faster. You are feeling really scared now, and very upset. 
Really imagine yourself there, sitting there, trying to eat you lunch with that 
girl/boy saying that to you. 
Without opening your eyes, keep imagining the situation and say out loud what 
is going through your mind as you are sitting there with the other kids ignoring 
you. 
What else is going through your mind? (if only 1 or 2 responses) 
Part 4 
As you sit there, a boy/girl from your class comes over and sits down. "Where 
were you? We were looking for you. We need someone else on our team." Can 
you see yourself there? You are feeling much happier now, knowing that there 
are some people who want to do things with you, it's just that today they weren't 
around when you came out to have your lunch. The boy/girl looks at you and 
you can see there is a bit of a smile on his/her face. You are feeling much better 
now, your stomach is suddenly feeling much better and you notice you don't 
feel sick any more, but hungry. Really see yourself there, you are sitting there, 
and all of a sudden you feel a lot more like eating your lunch. You notice that 
the sun has come out. It really isn't that bad. You are feeling much better, and 
you start to eat your lunch as you talk to this boy/girl. 
Well done, that was great. Now, just before we talk about it, I have some 
questions for you to answer. First of all I want to find out how clearly or vividly 
you imagined the scene that you just imagined. 
(Give imagery assessment). 
Now, listen carefully while I give you the instructions for the next questionnaire. 
A number of statements which boys and girls use to describe themselves are 
given below. Read each statement carefully and decide how you felt while you 
were in the middle of the imagination activity, before the kid from your class 
came over to talk to you. Then put an x in the box right in front of the word or 
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phrase which best describes how you felt. There are no right or wrong answers. 
Do not spend too much time on any one statement. Remember find the word or 
phrase which best describes how you felt while we were in the middle of the 
imagination activity, before the kid from your class came over to talk to you. 
Now listen carefully and I will read through the statements. Read through STAI 
state, or leave for them to read. 
Debrief 
1. You felt a bit upset when you were imagining that scene, how do you feel now 
that it is over and you know it is not real? 
2. Has that ever happened to you? 
3. Do you feel sad thinking about it? 
4. What do you think you could do if you were feeling like that about your 
friends? 
Having an Operation 
Prelude 
1. Have you ever had an operation or been to hospital? 
2. What was it for? 
3. Were you scared? 
4. If you did go to hospital, who would go with you? 
OK, sit back in your chair and get yourself really comfortable. I want you to 
close your eyes and just listen to my voice and imagine what I am saying as 
clearly as if you were actually there. 
Part 1 
Imagine you are in a hospital bed waiting to have an operation to have your 
appendix taken out. Really see yourself there. Can you see it? Really imagine 
what it is like, you are feeling very worried, look around you and see the 
hospital room. You can feel your heart beating fast. Really imagine yourself 
there. See the bed there that you are lying in, it has white stiff sheets and cotton 
blankets. You can smell the antiseptic smell of the hospital all around you, 
really smell it. You are feeling sick in the stomach, and nervous because you 
know you are about to have your appendix out. You are feeling very frightened 
and can feel that your palms are sweaty. Really put yourself there in the 
hospital bed waiting to have the operation. 
Without opening your eyes, keep imagining the situation and say out loud what 
is going through your mind as you lie there in the hospital bed. 
What else is going through your mind? (if only 1 or 2 responses) 
Part 2 
You are lying in a hospital bed waiting to have an operation to have your 
appendix taken out. Really see yourself there. Can you see it? You are feeling 
very nervous. As you lie there you can see a nurse coming into your room. She 
is telling you that the doctor is ready for you to come in to have your operation. 
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You feel sick in the stomach and very afraid as she says that. Look up and you 
can see the man coming with the trolley for you to go to the operating theatre, 
and you feel your heart start to beat faster. They are telling you that it will be 
OK, that it will all be over very soon. You climb up onto the trolley and lie 
down, and you are wheeled out of your room and down the hall. Really 
imagine yourself there, being wheeled down the hall to the operating theatre. 
You are feeling very frightened as they wheel you along, and you feel like 
crying. 
Without opening your eyes, keep imagining the situation and say out loud what 
is going through your mind as you lie there on the trolley. 
What else is going through your mind? (if only 1 or 2 responses) 
Part 3 
Really see yourself lying there on the trolley as they wheel you into the 
operating theatre, you are feeling really nervous and have very sweaty palms. 
Can you see it? You can see all the machines and lights around you and all the 
doctors and nurses have green masks over their faces, and you feel scared. 
Really imagine them there, the nurses and doctors with their masks on. Your 
doctor is there and so is another man, the anaesthetist, who is going to give you 
a needle in your arm. Really imagine him there, telling you that you will just 
feel a little prick in your arm, and then you will go to sleep. You can feel your 
heart beat faster as he says that. Really see him there. He holding a big needle 
and is going to put it in your arm. Feel the way that the nurse straps your arm, 
and wipes it with cold alcohol, so that the doctor can give you a needle. Really 
put yourself there, lying there on the operating table. You are feeling terrified 
and sick in the stomach. 
Without opening your eyes, keep imagining the situation and say out loud what 
is going through your mind as you lie there on the operating table before you 
have the needle. 
What else is going through your mind? (if only 1 or 2 responses) 
Part 4 
The doctor has given you a needle and next thing you know you are waking up 
back in your hospital room. Can you see yourself there? You are feeling a bit 
funny, but you open your eyes, and see your (insert parent) looking down at 
you and smiling. (Parent) is there for you as you wake up, and he/she has a big 
box of chocolates for you. Really put yourself there, lying in bed, feeling a bit 
funny and sleepy, looking up at your (parent), as he/she smiles down at you. 
You feel very safe and happy, knowing that you are OK and that your (parent) is 
there waiting for you to wake up. You know that when you feel a bit better, you 
can get up and have the chocolate. You are feeling much better and happier. 
Really see yourself there, lying in the hospital bed feeling very sleepy. 
Well done, that was great. Now, just before we talk about it, I have some 
questions for you to answer. First of all I want to find out how clearly or vividly 
you imagined the scene that you just imagined. 
(Give imagery assessment). 
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Now, listen carefully while I give you the instructions for the next questionnaire 
As for previous). 
Debrief 
1. You felt a bit upset when you were imagining that scene, how do you feel now 
that it is over and you know it is not real? 
2. One thing about that scene that you imagined was that your mum/dad wasn't 
there in the beginning, do you think that would really happen? 
3. What would you do if you were feeling scared about going to hospital or 
having an operation or something like that? 
Sharks 
Prelude 
1. Are you a good swimmer? 
2. Do you go to the beach much in the summer? 
3. Do you get scared if you are out too far? 
4. Has anything bad ever happened while you are swimming? 
5. Have you ever seen a shark? 
OK, sit back in your chair and get yourself really comfortable. I want you to 
close your eyes and just listen to my voice and imagine what I am saying as 
clearly as if you were actually there. 
Part 1 
Imagine yourself at the beach and on a lovely day. Really see yourself there on 
your favourite beach. Can you picture it? Really imagine the beach there. You 
decide to go for a swim out into the water. Feel the water against your skin. 
Really imagine yourself swimming out into the water. Even if you are not very 
good at swimming, on this day you can swim very well. Really put yourself 
there, swimming out into the water. All of a sudden you realise that you are out 
too far, and feel scared. Really imagine yourself there, out too deep in the 
water, and you have a funny feeling in your stomach, because you are scared. 
Look around you and you can a dark shadow in the water. You feel your heart 
start to beat fast, and you feel nervous, because you are too far out and you can 
see a dark shadow moving in the water. The sun is still shining and you are out 
there in the water, a long way out, feeling very afraid, and sick in the stomach. 
Really imagine yourself there, out in the water. 
Without opening your eyes, keep imagining the situation and say out loud what 
is going through your mind as you are swimming out there in the water, seeing 
the dark shadow. 
What else is going through your mind? (if only 1 or 2 responses) 
Part 2 
You are out there in the water, and you can see a dark shadow in the water. Can 
you see it? You are feeling sick in your stomach, and it's hard you get your 
breath because you are feeling so nervous. Really put yourself there, out in the 
water. You are treading water, and you see the shadow moving around you in 
the water, and then it comes up to the surface and you see a grey fin. Really put 
yourself there, feeling very scared. You are out there in the water, all alone and 
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you can see a grey fin slowly circling you. You are trying to swim back, but you 
are very far out, and you're not getting very far. Look down through the water, 
and you can see the sand, it is not too deep, but you feel very frightened. You 
feel like crying because of the fin that you can see. Look and see the fin, watch 
it as it circles you. 
Without opening your eyes, keep imagining the situation and say out loud what 
you are thinking as you are out there in the water, watching the grey fin. 
What else is going through your mind? (if only 1 or 2 responses) 
Part 3 
Really imagine you are out there in the water, away from the shore trying to 
swim in, and there is a grey fin, circling you. It looks like a shark. Can you see 
it? You are out there in the water alone, feeling terrified, and then it 
disappears, so that all you can see is a dark shadow under the water. It is 
swimming slowly around you now, and you feel more frightened, as you see it 
gradually moving closer to you. You can't take your eyes off it, and you see the 
fin rising to the surface again. The closer it gets the faster your heart beats. 
Really see it there, the dark grey of the fin moving towards you slowly, slowly. 
You feel sick in the stomach, and you feel all jittery inside. Imagine what it is 
like, all alone out there in the water trying to swim in to shore with a shark 
circling you. It is getting slowly closer and closer to you, look and see its fin 
coming out of the water. Its about 10 metres away now and you are feeling very 
afraid. Really imagine yourself there. 
Without opening your eyes, keep imagining the situation and say out loud what 
is going through your mind as you watch the shark come closer. 
What else is going through your mind? (if only 1 or 2 responses) 
Part 4 
You are out there in the water all alone, and there is the fin sticking up out of 
the water. Really see yourself there, out in the water. You can see the fin 
sticking up, and it is coming closer. All of a sudden you look more closely and 
the head comes up out of the water, look at the head and see that it is not a 
shark, but a dolphin! It is the smiling face of a dolphin there in front of you. 
Really see her there. She sticks her face up, and smiles at you, and makes that 
lovely noise that dolphins make. Really see her there. You are feeling much 
happier now because you know that you are safe. Really see as she jumps out of 
the water and plays around you, diving and jumping, showing off just for you. 
You are feeling great now, knowing that you are safe. The sun is shining and 
you can't wait to get back to the shore and tell you friends about it. You feel 
great! 
Well done, that was great. Now, just before we talk about it, I have some 
questions for you to answer. First of all I want to find out how clearly or vividly 
you imagined the scene that you just imagined. 
(Give imagery assessment). 
Now, listen carefully while I give you the instructions for the next questionnaire 
(as for previous). 
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Debrief 
1. You felt a bit upset when you were imagining that scene, how do you feel now 
that it is over and you know it is not real? 
2. Do you think that could happen at your favourite beach? 
3. How would you make sure that it didn't happen? 
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B3: Administration Instructions: Experiment 3 
Having an Operation 
1. Internal Threat Cognitions 
OK, sit back in your chair and get yourself really comfortable. I want you to close 
your eyes and just listen to my voice and imagine what I am saying as clearly as if 
you were actually there. 
Imagine you are in a hospital bed waiting to have an operation. Really see 
yourself there. Can you see it? Really imagine what it is like, look around you 
and see the hospital room. You are thinking, I'm really really worried about 
this. Really imagine yourself there. See the bed there that you are lying in, it has 
stiff white sheets and cotton blankets. You are thinking to yourself, I've got 
butterflies in my stomach. You can smell the antiseptic smell of the hospital all 
around you, really smell it. Really put yourself there in the hospital bed waiting 
to have the operation. As you lie there, you are thinking, I'm feeling really 
nervous about this operation, my heart's beating really really fast. Really see 
yourself there lying in the hospital bed waiting to have this operation. Can you 
see it? As you lie there you can see a nurse coming into your room. She is telling 
you that the doctor is ready for you to come in to have your operation. As she 
says that you think to yourself, I'm feeling really really scared. Look up and 
you can see the man coming with the trolley for you to go to the operating theatre. 
They are telling you that it will be OK, that it will all be over very soon. But you 
are thinking I'm getting more and more frightened, and I feel sick in my 
stomach. You climb up onto the trolley and lie down, and you are wheeled out of 
your room and down the hall. Really imagine yourself there, being wheeled 
down the hall to the operating theatre. Really see yourself lying there on the 
trolley as they wheel you into the operating theatre. Can you see it? As you lie 
there, you are thinking to yourself, I just feel really weird. You can see all the 
machines and lights around you and all the doctors and nurses have green masks 
over their faces. Really imagine them there, the nurses and doctors with their 
masks on. Your doctor is there and so is another man, the anaesthetist, who is 
going to give you a needle in your arm. Really imagine him there, telling you that 
you will just feel a little prick in your arm, and then you will go to sleep. And you 
are thinking I'm really terrified now, and I'm going cold all over. Really see him 
there. He's holding a big needle and is going to put it in your arm. Really put 
yourself there, lying there on the operating table. 
The doctor has given you a needle and next thing you know you are waking up 
back in your hospital room. Can you see yourself there? You are feeling a bit 
funny, but you open your eyes, and see your mum or dad looking down at you 
and smiling. They are there for you as you wake up, and have a big box of 
chocolates for you. Really put yourself there, lying in bed, feeling a bit funny and 
sleepy. You feel very safe and happy, knowing that you are OK and that your 
mum or dad is there waiting for you to wake up. You know that when you feel a 
bit better, you can get up and have the chocolate. You are feeling much better and 
happier. Really see yourself there, lying in the hospital bed feeling very sleepy. 
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2. External Threat Cognitions 
OK, sit back in your chair and get yourself really comfortable. I want you to close 
your eyes and just listen to my voice and imagine what I am saying as clearly as if 
you were actually there. 
Imagine you are in a hospital bed waiting to have an operation. Really see 
yourself there. Can you see it? Really imagine what it is like, look around you 
and see the hospital room. You are thinking, everyone is staring at me. Really 
imagine yourself there. See the bed there that you are lying in, it has stiff white 
sheets and cotton blankets. You are thinking to yourself, it's going to really 
really hurt. You can smell the antiseptic smell of the hospital all around you, 
really smell it. Really put yourself there in the hospital bed waiting to have the 
operation. As you lie there, you are thinking, what if it all goes wrong? Really 
see yourself there lying in the hospital bed waiting to have this operation. Can 
you see it? As you lie there you can see a nurse coming into your room. She is 
telling you that the doctor is ready for you to come in to have your operation. As 
she says that you think to yourself, what if I wake up in the middle of the 
operation? Look up and you can see the man coming with the trolley for you to 
go to the operating theatre. They are telling you that it will be OK, that it will all 
be over very soon. But you are thinking I don't believe a word that she says. 
You climb up onto the trolley and lie down, and you are wheeled out of your 
room and down the hall. Really imagine yourself there, being wheeled down the 
hall to the operating theatre. Really see yourself lying there on the trolley as they 
wheel you into the operating theatre. Can you see it? As you lie there, you are 
thinking to yourself, they are taking me closer and closer to where I might die. 
You can see all the machines and lights around you and all the doctors and nurses 
have green masks over their faces. And you are thinking, they don't look very 
friendly, and those lights are glaring right in my face and hurting my eyes. 
Really imagine them there, the nurses and doctors with their masks on. Your 
doctor is there and so is another man, the anaesthetist, who is going to give you a 
needle in your arm. Really imagine him there, telling you that you will just feel a 
little prick in your arm, and then you will go to sleep. And you are thinking I can 
see the needle and it's big and pointy. What if it doesn't work and I wake up in 
the middle of the operation? Really see him there. He's holding a big needle and 
is going to put it in your arm. Really put yourself there, lying there on the 
operating table. 
The doctor has given you a needle and next thing you know you are waking up 
back in your hospital room. Can you see yourself there? You are feeling a bit 
funny, but you open your eyes, and see your mum or dad looking down at you 
and smiling. They are there for you as you wake up, and have a big box of 
chocolates for you. Really put yourself there, lying in bed, feeling a bit funny and 
sleepy. You feel very safe and happy, knowing that you are OK and that your 
mum or dad is there waiting for you to wake up. You know that when you feel a 
bit better, you can get up and have the chocolate. You are feeling much better and 
happier. Really see yourself there, lying in the hospital bed feeling very sleepy. 
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3. Positive Self Statements 
OK, sit back in your chair and get yourself really comfortable. I want you to close 
your eyes and just listen to my voice and imagine what I am saying as clearly as if 
you were actually there. 
Imagine you are in a hospital bed waiting to have an operation. Really see 
yourself there. Can you see it? Really imagine what it is like, look around you 
and see the hospital room. You are thinking, I'm really feeling quite relaxed 
about this. Really imagine yourself there. See the bed there that you are lying in, 
it has stiff white sheets and cotton blankets. You are thinking to yourself, I know 
I don't have to worry, or be nervous. You can smell the antiseptic smell of the 
hospital all around you, really smell it. Really put yourself there in the hospital 
bed waiting to have the operation. As you lie there, you are thinking, I feel 
alright at the moment. Really see yourself there lying in the hospital bed waiting 
to have this operation. Can you see it? As you lie there you can see a nurse 
coming into your room. She is telling you that the doctor is ready for you to come 
in to have your operation. As she says that you think to yourself, I don't feel 
scared. Look up and you can see the man coming with the trolley for you to go to 
the operating theatre. They are telling you that it will be OK, that it will all be 
over very soon. And you are thinking I feel a lot more confident knowing that, I 
don't have to worry. You climb up onto the trolley and lie down, and you are 
wheeled out of your room and down the hall. Really imagine yourself there, 
being wheeled down the hall to the operating theatre. Really see yourself lying 
there on the trolley as they wheel you into the operating theatre. Can you see it? 
As you lie there, you are thinking to yourself, I feel alright, I'm feeling quite 
calm really. You can see all the machines and lights around you and all the 
doctors and nurses have green masks over their faces. Really imagine them there, 
the nurses and doctors with their masks on. Your doctor is there and so is another 
man, the anaesthetist, who is going to give you a needle in your arm. Really 
imagine him there, telling you that you will just feel a little prick in your arm, and 
then you will go to sleep. And you are thinking I feel OK about this. Really see 
him there. He's holding a big needle and is going to put it in your arm. Really put 
yourself there, lying there on the operating table. 
The doctor has given you a needle and next thing you know you are waking up 
back in your hospital room. Can you see yourself there? You are feeling a bit 
funny, but you open your eyes, and see your mum or dad looking down at you 
and smiling. They are there for you as you wake up, and have a big box of 
chocolates for you. Really put yourself there, lying in bed, feeling a bit funny and 
sleepy. You feel very safe and happy, knowing that you are OK and that your 
mum or dad is there waiting for you to wake up. You know that when you feel a 
bit better, you can get up and have the chocolate. You are feeling much better and 
happier. Really see yourself there, lying in the hospital bed feeling very sleepy. 
4. Coping Self Statements 
OK, sit back in your chair and get yourself really comfortable. I want you to close 
your eyes and just listen to my voice and imagine what I am saying as clearly as if 
you were actually there. 
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Imagine you are in a hospital bed waiting to have an operation. Really see 
yourself there. Can you see it? Really imagine what it is like, look around you 
and see the hospital room. You are thinking, I'll try and think of something else 
while I lie here. Really imagine yourself there. See the bed there that you are 
lying in, it has stiff white sheets and cotton blankets. You are thinking to 
yourself, I'll try and enjoy the time before I go in. You can smell the antiseptic 
smell of the hospital all around you, really smell it. Really put yourself there in 
the hospital bed waiting to have the operation. As you lie there, you are 
thinking, I may as well get this over and done with. Really see yourself there 
lying in the hospital bed waiting to have this operation. Can you see it? As you 
lie there you can see a nurse coming into your room. She is telling you that the 
doctor is ready for you to come in to have your operation. As she says that you 
think to yourself, Should I say how I feel, say I'm scared, or should I just start 
crying? Look up and you can see the man coming with the trolley for you to go to 
the operating theatre. They are telling you that it will be OK, that it will all be 
over very soon. And you are thinking I'll try and close my eyes and pretend to 
be brave. You climb up onto the trolley and lie down, and you are wheeled out of 
your room and down the hall. Really imagine yourself there, being wheeled 
down the hall to the operating theatre. Really see yourself lying there on the 
trolley as they wheel you into the operating theatre. Can you see it? As you lie 
there, you are thinking to yourself, this is just a dream. You can see all the 
machines and lights around you and all the doctors and nurses have green masks 
over their faces. Really imagine them there, the nurses and doctors with their 
masks on. Your doctor is there and so is another man, the anaesthetist, who is 
going to give you a needle in your arm. Really imagine him there, telling you that 
you will just feel a little prick in your arm, and then you will go to sleep. And you 
are thinking I will close my eyes while they put the needle in. Really see him 
there. He's holding a big needle and is going to put it in your arm. Really put 
yourself there, lying there on the operating table. 
The doctor has given you a needle and next thing you know you are waking up 
back in your hospital room. Can you see yourself there? You are feeling a bit 
funny, but you open your eyes, and see your mum or dad looking down at you 
and smiling. They are there for you as you wake up, and have a big box of 
chocolates for you. Really put yourself there, lying in bed, feeling a bit funny and 
sleepy. You feel very safe and happy, knowing that you are OK and that your 
mum or dad is there waiting for you to wake up. You know that when you feel a 
bit better, you can get up and have the chocolate. You are feeling much better and 
happier. Really see yourself there, lying in the hospital bed feeling very sleepy. 
Neutral Scenario 
OK, sit back in your chair and get yourself really comfortable. I want you to close 
your eyes and just listen to my voice and imagine what I am saying as clearly as if 
you were actually there. 
Imagine you are at home and you are about to go out for a walk along your street. 
Really see yourself there. Can you see it? Really imagine what it is like, look 
around you and see the inside of your house, near the front door. Really imagine 
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yourself there. See the front door of your house, notice what it looks like. You can 
hear the sounds of your house around you, notice what sounds there are. Really 
put yourself there at your front door waiting to go for a walk down your street. 
Really see yourself opening the front door. Look outside and see what is there 
outside the front door of your house. Look outside and you can see that it is a 
sunny day. You know that it will be quite warm outside. You walk out the front 
door and into the street. Really imagine yourself there, walking out into your 
street. Really see what it looks like as you walk out into the street, look around 
you and notice what things look like. Can you see it? You are starting to walk 
down the street, look and see the trees and plants in the gardens. Look around 
you and see the other houses in your street. Can you see them? Really see 
yourself there. Really imagine yourself there, walking along your street. Look 
across the road at the house over there, really notice what it looks like. You can 
see there is a man in the front yard of the house over the road. Really see him 
there. He's doing something in his garden. Really put yourself there, walking 
along your street, watching the man in his garden. 
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B4: Administration Instructions: Experiment 4 
Having No Friends 
Prelude 
1. Do you have lots of friends at school? 
2. Can you imagine a time when you didn't? 
OK, sit back in your chair and get yourself really comfortable. I want you to close 
your eyes and just listen to my voice and imagine what I am saying as clearly as if 
you were actually there. 
1. Threat Cognitions 
It's lunch time at school and you are going outside to eat your lunch. Really see 
yourself walking outside to eat your lunch. But you know that there won't be 
anyone to have lunch with because you don't have any friends. As you walk 
outside you are thinking to yourself I've got butterflies in my stomach and I'm 
really nervous. Look around you and see where you are walking. Really see 
yourself there walking outside to have your lunch. You are standing outside 
now, and you will have to sit down by yourself and you think to yourself 
Nobody likes me. See the other kids there, running around, laughing and 
talking. Really put yourself there. You go over to where there's a seat. Really see 
the playground and look at where you are walking to. You are thinking Everyone 
is staring at me. Look around you and see the other kids talking and laughing, 
having fun together. You don't feel like having your lunch. Really imagine 
yourself there, sitting by yourself looking down at your lunch. You are thinking to 
yourself I'm so upset. I don't want to eat my lunch at all. You can see all the 
other kids playing and eating their lunch. You can hear them laughing and 
talking, sounding really happy. You think none of the other kids like me. Look 
around you and see what is happening around you, hear the other kids playing, 
laughing and having fun. You think to yourself It's not fair, I have to sit here all 
by myself. You are sitting there all by yourself with no friends, starting to eat 
your lunch. Some other kids come and sit down near you. There are 3 of them 
sitting next to you, they are all in your class. Really see them there, talking to 
each other and laughing and ignoring you. See them there ignoring you really see 
them there, really see their faces. You are thinking to yourself I feel like I'm 
going to cry in a minute. Really put yourself there. One of them looks up at you, 
and says "What are you looking at?" Really hear him/her saying that. Listen to 
his/her voice. You think to yourself I'm scared they might gang up on me. 
Really imagine yourself there, sitting there, trying to eat you lunch with that 
girl/boy saying that to you. 
2. Positive Statements 
It's lunch time at school and you are going outside to eat your lunch. Really see 
yourself walking outside to eat your lunch. You know that there will be no one to 
have lunch with because you don't have any friends. You are thinking to yourself 
I have made good friends near my home anyway. Look around you and see 
where you are walking. Really see yourself there walking outside to have your 
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lunch. You are standing outside now, and you will have to sit down by yourself. 
You are think to yourself It's alright, I am good at making friends. See the other 
kids there, running around, laughing and talking. Really put yourself there. You 
go over to where there's a seat. Really see the playground and look at where you 
are walking to. You are thinking I'm happier on my own anyway. Look around 
you and see the other kids talking and laughing, having fun together. You don't 
feel like having your lunch. Really imagine yourself there, sitting by yourself 
looking down at your lunch. You are thinking to yourself I know I will make 
some friends soon. You can see all the other kids playing and eating their lunch. 
You can hear them laughing and talking, sounding really happy. You think I feel 
good just sitting here listening to them. Look around you and see what is 
happening around you, hear the other kids playing, laughing and having fun. 
You think to yourself I am happy sitting on my own. You are sitting there all by 
yourself with no friends, starting to eat your lunch. Some other kids come and sit 
down near you. There are 3 of them sitting next to you, they are all in your class. 
Really see them there, talking to each other and laughing and ignoring you. See 
them there ignoring you really see them there, really see their faces. You are 
thinking to yourself I don't mind them ignoring me, I am happy sitting here. 
Really put yourself there. One of them looks up at you, and says "What are you 
looking at?" Really hear him/her saying that. Listen to his/her voice. You think 
to yourself It's OK, I can cope with this. Really imagine yourself there, sitting 
there, trying to eat you lunch with that girl/boy saying that to you, and you are 
thinking I feel OK. 
3. Coping Statements 
It's lunch time at school and you are going outside to eat your lunch. Really see 
yourself walking outside to eat your lunch. You know that there will be no one to 
have lunch with because you don't have any friends. You are thinking to yourself 
What am I going to do without any friends to do things with?. Look around 
you and see where you are walking. Really see yourself there walking outside to 
have your lunch. You are standing outside now, and you will have to sit down 
by yourself. You are think to yourself I'd like to go somewhere else to eat my 
lunch. See the other kids there, running around, laughing and talking. Really put 
yourself there. You go over to where there's a seat. Really see the playground 
and look at where you are walking to. You are thinking Maybe I should just 
walk around looking confident, or go and find a quiet place to sit down. Look 
around you and see the other kids talking and laughing, having fun together. 
You don't feel like having your lunch. Really imagine yourself there, sitting by 
yourself looking down at your lunch. You are thinking to yourself I will just stay 
here until lunch is over. You can see all the other kids playing and eating their 
lunch. You can hear them laughing and talking, sounding really happy. You 
think What will I do when I finish my lunch? I just want to go to the library or 
the computer room. Look around you and see what is happening around you, 
hear the other kids playing, laughing and having fun. You think to yourself I am 
trying to see if there's someone who is my friend, I'll look around and see if 
there's anyone I know. You are sitting there all by yourself with no friends, 
starting to eat your lunch. Some other kids come and sit down near you. There 
are 3 of them sitting next to you, they are all in your class. Really see them there, 
talking to each other and laughing and ignoring you. See them there ignoring 
you really see them there, really see their faces. You are thinking to yourself I 
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think I will go off and do something by myself. Really put yourself there. One 
of them looks up at you, and says "What are you looking at?" Really hear 
him/her saying that. Listen to his/her voice. You think to yourself Really 
imagine yourself there, sitting there, trying to eat you lunch with that girl/boy 
saying that to you, and you are thinking 
As you sit there, a boy/girl from your class comes over and sits down. "Where 
were you? We were looking for you. We need someone else on our team." Can 
you see yourself there? You are feeling much happier now, knowing that there 
are some people who want to do things with you, it's just that today they weren't 
around when you came out to have your lunch. The boy/girl looks at you and 
you can see there is a bit of a smile on his/her face. You are feeling much better 
now, your stomach is suddenly feeling much better and you notice you don't feel 
sick any more, but hungry. Really see yourself there, you are sitting there, and all 
of a sudden you feel a lot more like eating your lunch. You notice that the sun has 
come out. It really isn't that bad. You are feeling much better, and you start to eat 
your lunch as you talk to this boy/girl. 
Debrief 
1. You felt a bit upset when you were imagining that scene, how do you feel now 
that it is over and you know it is not real? 
2. Has that ever happened to you? 
3. Do you feel sad thinking about it? 
4. What do you think you could do if you were feeling like that about your 
friends? 
Having an Operation 
Prelude 
1. Have you ever had an operation or been to hospital? 
2. What was it for? 
3. Were you scared? 
4. If you did go to hospital, who would go with you? 
1. Threat Cognitions 
OK, sit back in your chair and get yourself really comfortable. I want you to close 
your eyes and just listen to my voice and imagine what I am saying as clearly as if 
you were actually there. 
Imagine you are in a hospital bed waiting to have an operation. Really see 
yourself there. Can you see it? Really imagine what it is like, look around you 
and see the hospital room. You are thinking, I'm really worried about this. 
Really imagine yourself there. See the bed there that you are lying in, it has stiff 
white sheets and cotton blankets. You are thinking to yourself, it's going to 
really hurt. You can smell the antiseptic smell of the hospital all around you, 
really smell it. Really put yourself there in the hospital bed waiting to have the 
operation. I'm feeling really nervous about this operation, my heart's beating 
really fast. See yourself there lying in the hospital bed waiting to have this 
operation. Can you see it? As you lie there you can see a nurse coming into your 
room. She is telling you that the doctor is ready for you to come in to have your 
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operation. Look up and you can see the man coming with the trolley for you to go 
to the operating theatre. They are telling you that it will be OK, that it will all be 
over very soon. But you are thinking I'm getting more and more frightened. 
You climb up onto the trolley and lie down, and you are wheeled out of your 
room and down the hall. Really imagine yourself there, being wheeled down the 
hall to the operating theatre. Really see yourself lying there on the trolley as they 
wheel you into the operating theatre. Can you see it? As you lie there, you are 
thinking to yourself, what if it all goes wrong? You can see all the machines and 
lights around you and all the doctors and nurses have green masks over their 
faces. And you are thinking, they don't look very friendly, and I'm really 
terrified now Really imagine them there, the nurses and doctors with their masks 
on. Your doctor is there and so is another man, the anaesthetist, who is going to 
give you a needle in your arm. Really imagine him there, telling you that you will 
just feel a little prick in your arm, and then you will go to sleep. And you are 
thinking I can see the needle and it's big and pointy. What if it doesn't work 
and I wake up in the middle of the operation? Really see him there. He's 
holding a big needle and is going to put it in your arm. Really put yourself there, 
lying there on the operating table. 
2. Positive Self Statements 
OK, sit back in your chair and get yourself really comfortable. I want you to close 
your eyes and just listen to my voice and imagine what I am saying as clearly as if 
you were actually there. 
Imagine you are in a hospital bed waiting to have an operation. Really see 
yourself there. Can you see it? Really imagine what it is like, look around you 
and see the hospital room. You are thinking, I'm really feeling quite relaxed 
about this. Really imagine yourself there. See the bed there that you are lying in, 
it has stiff white sheets and cotton blankets. You are thinking to yourself, I know 
I don't have to worry, or be nervous. You can smell the antiseptic smell of the 
hospital all around you, really smell it. Really put yourself there in the hospital 
bed waiting to have the operation. As you lie there, you are thinking, I feel 
alright at the moment. Really see yourself there lying in the hospital bed waiting 
to have this operation. Can you see it? As you lie there you can see a nurse 
coming into your room. She is telling you that the doctor is ready for you to come 
in to have your operation. As she says that you think to yourself, I don't feel 
scared. Look up and you can see the man coming with the trolley for you to go to 
the operating theatre. They are telling you that it will be OK, that it will all be 
over very soon. And you are thinking I feel 'a lot more confident knowing that, I 
don't have to worry. You climb up onto the trolley and lie down, and you are 
wheeled out of your room and down the hall. Really imagine yourself there, 
being wheeled down the hall to the operating theatre. Really see yourself lying 
there on the trolley as they wheel you into the operating theatre. Can you see it? 
As you lie there, you are thinking to yourself, I feel alright, I'm feeling quite 
calm really. You can see all the machines and lights around you and all the 
doctors and nurses have green masks over their faces. Really imagine them there, 
the nurses and doctors with their masks on. Your doctor is there and so is another 
man, the anaesthetist, who is going to give you a needle in your arm. Really 
imagine him there, telling you that you will just feel a little prick in your arm, and 
then you will go to sleep. And you are thinking I feel OK about this. Really see 
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him there. He's holding a big needle and is going to put it in your arm. Really put 
yourself there, lying there on the operating table. 
3. Coping Self Statements 
OK, sit back in your chair and get yourself really comfortable. I want you to close 
your eyes and just listen to my voice and imagine what I am saying as clearly as if 
you were actually there. 
Imagine you are in a hospital bed waiting to have an operation. Really see 
yourself there. Can you see it? Really imagine what it is like, look around you 
and see the hospital room. You are thinking, I'll try and think of something else 
while I lie here. Really imagine yourself there. See the bed there that you are 
lying in, it has stiff white sheets and cotton blankets. You are thinking to 
yourself, I'll try and enjoy the time before I go in. You can smell the antiseptic 
smell of the hospital all around you, really smell it. Really put yourself there in 
the hospital bed waiting to have the operation. As you lie there, you are 
thinking, I may as well get this over and done with. Really see yourself there 
lying in the hospital bed waiting to have this operation. Can you see it? As you 
lie there you can see a nurse coming into your room. She is telling you that the 
doctor is ready for you to come in to have your operation. As she says that you 
think to yourself, Should I say how I feel, say I'm scared, or should I just start 
crying? Look up and you can see the man coming with the trolley for you to go to 
the operating theatre. They are telling you that it will be OK, that it will all be 
over very soon. And you are thinking I'll try and close my eyes and pretend to 
be brave. You climb up onto the trolley and lie down, and you are wheeled out of 
your room and down the hall. Really imagine yourself there, being wheeled 
down the hall to the operating theatre. Really see yourself lying there on the 
trolley as they wheel you into the operating theatre. Can you see it? As you lie 
there, you are thinking to yourself, this is just a dream. You can see all the 
machines and lights around you and all the doctors and nurses have green masks 
over their faces. Really imagine them there, the nurses and doctors with their 
masks on. Your doctor is there and so is another man, the anaesthetist, who is 
going to give you a needle in your arm. Really imagine him there, telling you that 
you will just feel a little prick in your arm, and then you will go to sleep. And you 
are thinking I will close my eyes while they put the needle in. Really see him 
there. He's holding a big needle and is going to put it in your arm. Really put 
yourself there, lying there on the operating table. 
The doctor has given you a needle and next thing you know you are waking up 
back in your hospital room. Can you see yourself there? You are feeling a bit 
funny, but you open your eyes, and see your mum or dad looking down at you 
and smiling. They are there for you as you wake up, and have a big box of 
chocolates for you. Really put yourself there, lying in bed, feeling a bit funny and 
sleepy. You feel very safe and happy, knowing that you are OK and that your 
mum or dad is there waiting for you to wake up. You know that when you feel a 
bit better, you can get up and have the chocolate. You are feeling much better and 
happier. Really see yourself there, lying in the hospital bed feeling very sleepy. 
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Debrief: 
1. You felt a bit upset when you were imagining that scene, how do you feel now that it is 
over and you know it is not real? 
2. One thing about that scene that you imagined was that your mum/dad wasn't there in the 
beginning, do you think that would really happen? 
3. What would you do if you were feeling scared about going to hospital or having an 
operation or something like that? 
Sharks 
Prelude 
1. Are you a good swimmer? 
2. Do you go to the beach much in the summer? 
3. Do you get scared if you are out too far? 
4. Has anything bad ever happened while you are swimming? 
5. Have you ever seen a shark? 
OK, sit back in your chair and get yourself really comfortable. I want you to close 
your eyes and just listen to my voice and imagine what I am saying as clearly as if 
you were actually there. 
1. Threat Statements 
Imagine yourself at the beach and on a lovely day. Really see yourself there on 
your favourite beach. Really imagine the beach there. You decide to go for a 
swim out into the water. Feel the water against your skin as you get in. Really 
imagine yourself swimming out into the water. Even if you are not very good at 
swimming, on this day you can swim really well. Really put yourself there, 
swimming out into the water. All of a sudden you realise that you are out too far, 
and you think 'no one knows that I'm out here'. Really imagine yourself there, 
out too deep in the water. Look around you and you can a dark shadow in the 
water. You think to yourself 'What if it's a shark, it might come up and bite my 
leg off.' You are too far out and you can see a dark shadow moving in the water. 
You think to yourself 'I'm really really scared now, I can feel my heart thumping 
really fast.' The sun is still shining and you are out there in the water, a long way 
out. Really imagine yourself there, out in the water. You are out there in the 
water, and you can see a dark shadow in the water. Really put yourself there, out 
in the water. You are treading water, and you see the shadow moving around 
you in the water, and then it comes up to the surface and you see a grey fin. You 
think to yourself 'I feel terrified!' You are out there in the water, all alone and 
you can see a grey fin slowly circling you. You are trying to swim back. Look 
down through the water, and you can see the sand, it is not too deep. Look and 
see the fin, watch it as it circles you. You think to yourself 'What if it chomps me 
straight up, I think its teeth would be really sharp!'. Really imagine you are out 
there in the water, away from the shore trying to swim in, and there is a grey fin, 
circling you. It looks like a shark. You are out there in the water alone, and then 
it disappears, so that all you can see is a dark shadow under the water. It is 
swimming slowly around you now, see it gradually moving closer to you. You 
are thinking to yourself 'If I keep swimming it might get really angry' You don't 
take your eyes off it, and you see the fin rising to the surface again. Really see it 
there, the dark grey of the fin moving towards you slowly, slowly. Imagine what 
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it is like, all alone out there in the water trying to swim in to shore with a shark 
circling you. You are thinking 'I am so scared'. It is getting slowly closer and 
closer to you, look and see its fin coming out of the water. Really imagine 
yourself there. 
2. Positive Statements 
Imagine yourself at the beach and on a lovely day. Really see yourself there on 
your favourite beach. Really imagine the beach there. You decide to go for a 
swim out into the water. Feel the water against your skin as you get in. Really 
imagine yourself swimming out into the water. Even if you are not very good at 
swimming, on this day you can swim really well. Really put yourself there, 
swimming out into the water. All of a sudden you realise that you are out too far, 
and you think 'It's OK, I'm a good swimmer, I feel good swimming through the 
water so easily'. Really imagine yourself there, out too deep in the water. Look 
around you and you can a dark shadow in the water. You are thinking to 
yourself 'I don't have to worry, I know what to do if it's a shark' You are too far 
out and you can see a dark shadow moving in the water. You think to yourself 
'It's OK, I am feeling relaxed. I feel OK about this' The sun is still shining and 
you are out there in the water, a long way out. Really imagine yourself there, out 
in the water. You are out there in the water, and you can see a dark shadow in 
the water. Really put yourself there, out in the water. You are treading water, 
and you see the shadow moving around you in the water, and then it comes up to 
the surface and you see a grey fin. You think to yourself 'I am really excited, I 
haven't seen a shark or anything like that before'. You are out there in the 
water, all alone and you can see a grey fin slowly circling you. You are trying to 
swim back. Look down through the water, and you can see the sand, it is not too 
deep. Look and see the fin, watch it as it circles you. You think to yourself 'I am 
feeling safe, it's not too far to the shore'. Really imagine you are out there in the 
water, away from the shore trying to swim in, and there is a grey fin, circling you. 
It looks like a shark. You are out there in the water alone, and then it disappears, 
so that all you can see is a dark shadow under the water. It is swimming slowly 
around you now, see it gradually moving closer to you. You are thinking to 
yourself 'I won't have any trouble swimming that far back to shore.' You don't 
take your eyes off it, and you see the fin rising to the surface again. Really see it 
there, the dark grey of the fin moving towards you slowly, slowly. Imagine what 
it is like, all alone out there in the water trying to swim in to shore with a shark 
circling you. You are thinking 'I am a great swimmer, I will be OK'. It is getting 
slowly closer and closer to you, look and see its fin coming out of the water. 
Really imagine yourself there. You think to yourself 'I feel great swimming out 
here'. 
3. Coping Statements 
Imagine yourself at the beach and on a lovely day. Really see yourself there on 
your favourite beach. Really imagine the beach there. You decide to go for a 
swim out into the water. Feel the water against your skin as you get in. Really 
imagine yourself swimming out into the water. Even if you are not very good at 
swimming, on this day you can swim really well. Really put yourself there, 
swimming out into the water. All of a sudden you realise that you are out too far, 
and you think 'I should get someone's attention'. Really imagine yourself there, 
out too deep in the water. Look around you and you can a dark shadow in the 
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water. You think to yourself 'What am I going to do?' You are too far out and 
you can see a dark shadow moving in the water. You think to yourself 'If only I 
could do something so that this thing would go away' The sun is still shining 
and you are out there in the water, a long way out. Really imagine yourself there, 
out in the water. You are out there in the water, and you can see a dark shadow 
in the water. Really put yourself there, out in the water. You are treading water, 
and you see the shadow moving around you in the water, and then it comes up to 
the surface and you see a grey fin. You think to yourself 'I've got to be careful it 
doesn't get me, I've got to get back in before it gets me' You are out there in the 
water, all alone and you can see a grey fin slowly circling you. You are trying to 
swim back. Look down through the water, and you can see the sand, it is not too 
deep. Look and see the fin, watch it as it circles you. You think to yourself 'They 
tell me to stay calm when you see a shark, I've got to keep my eyes on it, watch 
it carefully'. Really imagine you are out there in the water, away from the shore 
trying to swim in, and there is a grey fin, circling you. It looks like a shark. You 
are out there in the water alone, and then it disappears, so that all you can see is a 
dark shadow under the water. It is swimming slowly around you now, see it 
gradually moving closer to you. You are thinking to yourself 'I'm trying to 
pretend that I am not there' You don't take your eyes off it, and you see the fin 
rising to the surface again. Really see it there, the dark grey of the fin moving 
towards you slowly, slowly. Imagine what it is like, all alone out there in the 
water trying to swim in to shore with a shark circling you. You are thinking 'I'm 
trying to swim faster and faster away from it, I have to swim as fast as I can'. It 
is getting slowly closer and closer to you, look and see its fin coming out of the 
water. Really imagine yourself there. 
You are out there in the water all alone, and there is the fin sticking up out of the 
water. Really see yourself there, out in the water. You can see the fin sticking up, 
and it is coming closer. All of a sudden you look more closely and the head 
comes up out of the water, look at the head and see that it is not a shark, but a 
dolphin! It is the smiling face of a dolphin there in front of you. Really see her 
there. She sticks her face up, and smiles at you, and makes that lovely noise that 
dolphins make. Really see her there. You are feeling much happier now because 
you know that you are safe. Really see as she jumps out of the water and plays 
around you, diving and jumping, showing off just for you. You are feeling great 
now, knowing that you are safe. The sun is shining and you can't wait to get back 
to the shore and tell you friends about it. You feel great! 
Debrief: 
1.You felt a bit upset when you were imagining that scene, how do you feel now 
that it is over and you know it is not real? 
2. Do you think that could happen at your favourite beach? 
3. How would you make sure that it didn't happen? 
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Neutral 
OK, sit back in your chair and get yourself really comfortable. I want you to close 
your eyes and just listen to my voice and imagine what I am saying as clearly as if 
you were actually there. 
Imagine you are at home and you are about to go out for a walk along your street. 
Really see yourself there. Can you see it? Really imagine what it is like, look 
around you and see the inside of your house, near the front door. Really imagine 
yourself there. See the front door of your house, notice what it looks like. You can 
hear the sounds of your house around you, notice what sounds there are. Really 
put yourself there at your front door waiting to go for a walk down your street. 
Really see yourself opening the front door. Look outside and see what is there 
outside the front door of your house. Look outside and you can see that it is a 
sunny day. You know that it will be quite warm outside. You walk out the front 
door and into the street. Really imagine yourself there, walking out into your 
street. Really see what it looks like as you walk out into the street, look around 
you and notice what things look like. Can you see it? You are starting to walk 
down the street, look and see the trees and plants in the gardens. Look around 
you and see the other houses in your street. Can you see them? Really see 
yourself there. Really imagine yourself there, walking along your street. Look 
across the road at the house over there, really notice what it looks like. You can 
see there is a man in the front yard of the house over the road. Really see him 
there. He's doing something in his garden. Really put yourself there, walking 
along your street, watching the man in his garden. 
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Appendix C: Additional Data and Analyses 
Cl: Mean responses and ANOVA for each FSSC-II item by grade: 
Experiment 1 
Grade 
Item 	3 4 5 7 10 F Score 
1 1.10 (0.4) 1.20 (0.5) 1.19 (0.4) 1.14 (0.4) 1.22 (0.4) F(4, 305)=0.92 
2 1.46 (0.7) 1.44 (0.6) 1.52 (0.7) 1.28 (0.5) 1.33 (0.6) F(4, 304)=1.64 
3 1.27 (0.5) 1.34 (0.6) 1.52 (0.7) 1.25 (0.5) 1.25 (0.5) F(4, 304)=2.25 
4 1.02 (0.1) 1.02 (0.1) 1.02 (0.1) 1.02 (0.1) 1.00 (0.0) F(4, 303)=0.30 
5 1.24 (0.5) 1.50 (0.6) 1.27 (0.5) 1.10 (0.3) 1.18 (0.4) F(4, 303)=6.44* 
6 1.03 (0.2) 1.16 (0.5) 1.10 (0.4) 1.09 (0.3) 1.12 (0.4) F(4, 304)=1.01 
7 1.62 (0.6) 1.66 (0.7) 1.65 (0.8) 1.58 (0.6) 1.73 (0.7) F(4, 300)=0.47 
8 1.52 (0.7) 1.55 (0.7) 1.33 (0.6) 1.32 (0.5) 1.36 (0.7) F(4, 303)=1.90 
9 1.27 (0.6) 1.19 (0.5) 1.15 (0.5) 1.16 (0.4) 1.17 (0.5) F(4, 302)=0.63 
10 1.23 (0.5) 1.56 (0.7) 1.44 (0.6) 1.30 (0.5) 1.43 (0.6) F(4, 304)=3.21* 
11 1.96 (0.8) 2.09 (0.8) 1.96 (0.8) 1.71 (0.8) 1.70 (0.7) F(4, 302)=3.07* 
12 1.18 (0.5) 1.23 (0.6) 1.56 (0.7) 1.16 (0.4) 1.18 (0.5) F(4, 303)=5.33* 
13 2.13 (0.8) 2.22 (0.8) 2.17 (0.8) 1.95 (0.8) 1.94 (0.8) F(4, 306)=1.58 
14 2.27 (0.8) 2.38 (0.8) 2.32 (0.7) 2.17 (0.7) 1.67 (0.7) F(4, 305)=9.83* 
15 1.18 (0.5) 1.31 (0.6) 1.49 (0.7) 1.19 (0.5) 1.18 (0.4) F(4, 304)=3.24* 
16 1.18 (0.5) 1.34 (0.5) 1.40 (0.5) 1.41 (0.5) 1.82 (0.6) F(4, 305)=13.07* 
17 1.30 (0.6) 1.31 (0.6) 1.25 (0.5) 1.14 (0.4) 1.03 (0.2) F(4, 306)=4.00* 
18 1.43 (0.7) 1.54 (0.8) 1.75 (0.7) 1.45 (0.7) 1.81 (0.8) F(4, 306)=3.62* 
19 2.13 (0.8) 2.14 (0.8) 2.33 (0.9) 2.11 (0.8) 1.90 (0.7) F(4, 306)=2.21 
20 1.24 (0.5) 1.46 (0.6) 1.48 (0.6) 1.27 (0.5) 1.19 (0.5) F(4, 305)=3.50* 
21 1.60 (0.7) 1.55 (0.7) 1.56 (0.7) 1.42 (0.6) 1.42 (0.6) F(4, 306)=1.04 
22 2.34 (0.7) 2.32 (0.8) 2.45 (0.7) 2.17 (0.7) 1.96 (0.8) F(4, 303)=3.75* 
23 2.06 (0.8) 2.00 (0.8) 2.15 (0.7) 2.03 (0.8) 1.94 (0.7) F(4, 303)=0.60 
24 1.13 (0.4) 1.31 (0.5) 1.17 (0.4) 1.13 (0.3) 1.48 (0.5) F(4, 305)=7.57* 
25 1.91 (0.9) 1.94 (0.8) 2.08 (0.8) 1.70 (0.7) 1.57 (0.6) F(4, 305)=4.28* 
26 1.90 (0.8) 2.08 (0.9) 1.85 (0.7) 1.81 (0.8) 1.81 (0.7) F(4, 305)=1.27 
27 1.24 (0.6) 1.20 (0.6) 1.51 (0.9) 1.06 (0.4) 1.04 (0.3) F(4, 305)=5.98* 
28 2.57 (0.7) 2.44 (0.8) 2.57 (0.7) 2.36 (0.7) 2.24 (0.7) F(4, 303)=2.46* 
29 1.16 (0.4) 1.31 (0.5) 1.17 (0.4) 1.13 (0.4) 1.18 (0.4) F(4, 305)=1.74 
30 1.70 (0.7) 1.65 (0.7) 1.98 (0.8) 1.46 (0.6) 1.37 (0.5) F(4, 299)=6.66* 
31 2.18 (0.8) 2.35 (0.8) 2.17 (0.8) 1.86 (0.8) 1.60 (0.6) F(4, 302)=9.68* 
32 2.49 (0.8) 2.42 (0.8) 2.52 (0.7) 2.22 (0.9) 2.03 (0.8) F(4, 304)=4.11* 
33 2.39 (0.7) 2.35 (0.8) 2.34 (0.7) 2.13 (0.8) 1.82 (0.7) F(4, 305)=6.64* 
34 1.77 (0.8) 1.86 (0.9) 1.73 (0.8) 1.39 (0.6) 1.25 (0.5) F(4, 304)=9.16* 
35 1.39 (0.7) 1.34 (0.6) 1.44 (0.5) 1.31 (0.6) 1.25 (0.5) F(4, 306)=0.80 
36 2.40 (0.7) 2.25 (0.8) 2.44 (0.8) 2.34 (0.7) 2.15 (0.7) F(4, 306)=1.57 
37 1.85 (0.8) 1.88 (0.8) 2.19 (0.7) 1.73 (0.7) 1.55 (0.6) F(4, 304)=5.78* 
38 2.42 (0.8) 2.38 (0.7) 2.50 (0.7) 2.36 (0.7) 2.21 (0.8) F(4, 305)=1.24 
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cont... 
Grade 
Item 	3 4 5 7 10 F Score 
39 1.43 (0.6) 1.35 (0.6) 1.54 (0.6) 1.15 (0.4) 1.24 (0.5) F(4, 304)=4.86* 
40 1.33 (0.6) 1.48 (0.7) 1.29 (0.5) 1.27 (0.5) 1.33 (0.5) F(4, 305)=1.40 
41 1.75 (0.8) 1.62 (0.8) 1.79 (0.7) 1.77 (0.8) 1.31 (0.5) F(4, 306)=4.87* 
42 1.75 (0.8) 1.73 (0.8) 2.02 (0.7) 1.61 (0.7) 1.64 (0.7) F(4, 305)=2.36 
43 2.03 (0.8) 2.08 (0.9) 2.25 (0.8) 1.79 (0.8) 1.66 (0.7) F(4, 302)=4.99* 
44 1.61 (0.7) 1.60 (0.7) 1.79 (0.7) 1.66 (0.7) 1.34 (0.5) F(4, 306)=3.50* 
45 2.11 (0.7) 2.08 (0.7) 2.23 (0.8) 2.02 (0.7) 1.96 (0.6) F(4, 303)=1.24 
46 1.78 (0.7) 1.82 (0.8) 1.85 (0.7) 1.31 (0.5) 1.21 (0.4) F(4, 306)=14.53* 
47 1.76 (0.7) 1.82 (0.8) 1.69 (0.7) 1.69 (0.6) 1.88 (0.7) F(4, 306)=0.84 
48 1.73 (0.6) 1.66 (0.7) 1.85 (0.6) 1.81 (0.6) 1.76 (0.6) F(4, 304)=0.84 
49 1.60 (0.7) 1.68 (0.7) 1.56 (0.6) 1.42 (0.6) 1.21 (0.4) F(4, 306)=6.02* 
50 1.37 (0.6) 1.31 (0.5) 1.33 (0.5) 1.11 (0.3) 1.10 (0.4) F(4, 306)=4.85* 
51 1.97 (0.8) 2.06 (0.8) 2.17 (0.8) 1.87 (0.7) 1.72 (0.6) F(4, 304)=3.16* 
52 1.60 (0.7) 1.45 (0.7) 1.73 (0.7) 1.30 (0.5) 1.33 (0.6) F(4, 304)=4.31* 
53 1.35 (0.6) 1.40 (0.7) 1.56 (0.7) 1.21 (0.4) 1.21 (0.5) F(4, 304)=3.64* 
54 1.21 (0.5) 1.49 (0.7) 1.33 (0.6) 1.33 (0.6) 1.33 (0.6) F(4, 306)=1.81 
55 1.56 (0.7) 1.69 (0.7) 1.69 (0.6) 1.48 (0.6) 1.64 (0.7) F(4, 305)=1.19 
56 2.37 (0.8) 2.12 (0.9) 2.23 (0.8) 2.00 (0.8) 1.69 (0.7) F(4, 305)=7.15* 
57 1.64 (0.8) 1.58 (0.7) 1.83 (0.8) 1.36 (0.6) 1.36 (0.6) F(4, 305)=4.51* 
58 1.24 (0.5) 1.35 (0.6) 1.52 (0.7) 1.23 (0.5) 1.10 (0.3) F(4, 306)=4.91* 
59 1.12 (0.4) 1.29 (0.6) 1.31 (0.6) 1.28 (0.5) 1.30 (0.5) F(4, 305)=1.53 
60 1.52 (0.6) 1.38 (0.6) 1.50 (0.7) 1.45 (0.6) 1.48 (0.6) F(4, 304)=0.47 
61 1.30 (0.5) 1.23 (0.5) 1.29 (0.6) 1.08 (0.3) 1.33 (0.6) F(4, 306)=2.54* 
62 1.21 (0.5) 1.22 (0.6) 1.27 (0.6) 1.11 (0.4) 1.04 (0.2) F(4, 305)=2.31 
63 1.09 (0.3) 1.11 (0.4) 1.10 (0.4) 1.05 (0.3) 1.03 (0.2) F(4, 304)=0.83 
64 2.28 (0.8) 2.34 (0.8) 2.40 (0.8) 2.39 (0.7) 2.21 (0.8) F(4, 306)=0.61 
65 1.55 (0.7) 1.55 (0.7) 1.46 (0.6) 1.31 (0.5) 1.33 (0.5) F(4, 305)=2.22 
66 1.60 (0.8) 1.58 (0.7) 1.87 (0.7) 1.42 (0.6) 1.40 (0.7) F(4, 305)=3.78* 
67 2.00 (0.9) 1.88 (0.8) 1.94 (0.8) 1.73 (0.7) 1.63 (0.8) F(4, 304)=2.37 
68 1.97 (0.8) 1.89 (0.8) 2.00 (0.7) 1.50 (0.6) 1.54 (0.5) F(4, 305)=7.70* 
69 1.31 (0.6) 1.32 (0.6) 1.14 (0.5) 1.16 (0.4) 1.03 (0.2) F(4, 306)=3.88* 
70 1.44 (0.6) 1.37 (0.6) 1.48 (0.7) 1.31 (0.5) 1.28 (0.6) F(4, 305)=1.14 
71 1.36 (0.6) 1.48 (0.6) 1.54 (0.7) 1.28 (0.6) 1.21 (0.4) F(4, 305)=2.95* 
72 1.48 (0.7) 1.48 (0.7) 1.23 (0.5) 1.25 (0.5) 1.22 (0.5) F(4, 306)=3.15* 
73 1.39 (0.6) 1.42 (0.6) 1.50 (0.7) 1.28 (0.5) 1.42 (0.6) F(4, 306)=1.02 
74 1.07 (0.3) 1.26 (0.5) 1.27 (0.6) 1.06 (0.2) 1.21 (0.4) F(4, 305)=3.38* 
75 1.63 (0.7) 1.72 (0.8) 1.65 (0.7) 1.48 (0.6) 1.25 (0.5) F(4, 305)=5.06* 
76 1.52 (0.7) 1.74 (0.8) 1.71 (0.7) 1.31 (0.5) 1.31 (0.6) F(4, 306)=5.70* 
77 2.28 (0.8) 2.18 (0.9) 2.54 (0.7) 1.87 (0.8) 1.90 (0.8) F(4, 304)=7.08* 
78 2.09 (0.8) 2.09 (0.9) 2.29 (0.8) 1.91 (0.9) 1.93 (0.8) F(4, 306)=1.90 
*=p<0.05 
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C2: Mean responses and ANOVA for each FSSC-Il item (with no 
significant effect of grade overall) for males and females separately 
by grade: Experiment 1 
Females 
Grade 
Item 3 4 5 7 10 F Score 
1 1.13 (0.4) 1.34 (0.6) 1.30 (0.5) 1.29 (0.5) 1.37 (0.5) F(4,131)=1.00 
2 1.50 (0.7) 1.50 (0.6) 1.50 (0.6) 1.21 (0.4) 1.37 (0.6) F(4,131)=1.16 
3 1.40 (0.6) 1.44 (0.6) 2.00 (0.7) 1.50 (0.7) 1.33 (0.5) F(4,131)=3.96* 
4 1.00 (0.0) 1.03 (0.2) 1.05 (0.2) 1.04 (0.2) 1.00 (0.0) F(4,131)=0.65 
6 1.03 (0.2) 1.19 (0.5) 1.20 (0.5) 1.25 (0.5) 1.23 (0.5) F(4,131)=0.97 
7 1.66 (0.5) 1.66 (0.7) 2.10 (0.7) 1.75 (0.7) 1.80 (0.7) F(4,130)=1.78 
8 1.60 (0.7) 1.78 (0.7) 1.45 (0.5) 1.63 (0.6) 1.50 (0.7) F(4,131)=1.05 
9 1.40 (0.7) 1.31 (0.6) 1.05 (0.2) 1.17 (0.4) 1.27 (0.6) F(4,131)=1.44 
13 2.23 (0.8) 2.47 (0.7) 2.30 (0.7) 2.04 (0.7) 2.13 (0.8) F(4,131)=1.34 
19 2.33 (0.8) 2.31 (0.7) 2.65 (0.7) 2.67 (0.5) 2.17 (0.5) F(4,131)=2.82* 
21 1.87 (0.8) 1.78 (0.8) 1.90 (0.6) 1.71 (0.6) 1.50 (0.6) F(4,131)=1.36 
23 2.30 (0.7) 2.06 (0.7) 2.25 (0.6) 2.38 (0.7) 2.03 (0.7) F(4,131)=1.32 
26 2.17 (0.8) 2.19 (0.9) 2.15 (0.5) 2.21 (0.8) 1.97 (0.8) F(4,131)=0.46 
29 1.30 (0.5) 1.44 (0.6) 1.25 (0.4) 1.17 (0.5) 1.20 (0.5) F(4,131)=1.27 
35 1.60 (0.8) 1.47 (0.7) 1.45 (0.5) 1.58 (0.8) 1.37 (0.6) F(4,131)=0.56 
36 2.67 (0.6) 2.53 (0.7) 2.60 (0.6) 2.88 (0.3) 2.33 (0.5) F(4,131)=3.08* 
38 2.63 (0.6) 2.38 (0.7) 2.40 (0.8) 2.71 (0.6) 2.30 (0.8) F(4,131)=1.84 
40 1.47 (0.6) 1.59 (0.7) 1.50 (0.5) 1.33 (0.6) 1.27 (0.4) F(4,131)=1.46 
42 1.93 (0.8) 2.00 (0.8) 2.30 (0.5) 2.08 (0.8) 2.03 (0.7) F(4,130)=0.81 
45 2.29 (0.7) 2.23 (0.6) 2.45 (0.7) 2.42 (0.7) 2.10 (0.7) F(4,128)=1.18 
47 1.87 (0.7) 1.91 (0.8) 1.90 (0.6) 1.88 (0.6) 1.93 (0.6) F(4,131)=0.05 
48 1.90 (0.6) 1.90 (0.7) 2.05 (0.6) 2.17 (0.6) 1.93 (0.6) F(4,129)=0.98 
54 1.30 (0.5) 1.75 (0.8) 1.60 (0.6) 1.75 (0.7) 1.67 (0.8) F(4,131)=2.08 
55 1.55 (0.7) 1.94 (0.7) 1.80 (0.5) 1.67 (0.5) 1.83 (0.7) F(4,130)=1.61 
59 1.14 (0.4) 1.44 (0.7) 1.40 (0.7) 1.25 (0.4) 1.27 (0.4) F(4,130)=1.48 
60 1.67 (0.6) 1.59 (0.7) 1.65 (0.7) 1.71 (0.7) 1.67 (0.5) F(4,131)=0.12 
62 1.34 (0.6) 1.34 (0.7) 1.40 (0.8) 1.29 (0.6) 1.10 (0.3) F(4,130)=1.01 
63 1.07 (0.3) 1.22 (0.5) 1.10 (0.3) 1.13 (0.4) 1.07 (0.3) F(4,130)=0.89 
64 2.27 (0.8) 2.59 (0.7) 2.35 (0.7) 2.75 (0.4) 2.40 (0.8) F(4,131)=2.01 
65 1.62 (0.7) 1.91 (0.8) 1.65 (0.6) 1.58 (0.7) 1.53 (0.6) F(4,130)=1.42 
67 2.31 (0.8) 2.22 (0.8) 2.25 (0.5) 2.12 (0.7) 1.83 (0.8) F(4,130)=1.88 
70 1.69 (0.7) 1.53 (0.7) 1.75 (0.8) 1.50 (0.6) 1.47 (0.7) F(4,130)=0.79 
73 1.53 (0.6) 1.53 (0.7) 1.65 (0.7) 1.38 (0.6) 1.50 (0.6) F(4,131)=0.55 
78 2.20 (0.8) 2.47 (0.7) 2.40 (0.7) 2.33 (0.8) 2.07 (0.8) F(4,131)=1.30 
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cont... 
Males 
Grade 
Item 3 4 5 7 10 F Score 
1 1.08 (0.3) 1.06 (0.4) 1.11 (0.3) 1.05 (0.2) 1.11 (0.3) F(4,169)=0.27 
2 1.43 (0.6) 1.38 (0.5) 1.54 (0.7) 1.33 (0.5) 1.31 (0.5) F(4,168)=0.82 
3 1.17 (0.4) 1.25 (0.5) 1.18 (0.4) 1.10 (0.4) 1.19 (0.4) F(4,168)=0.61 
4 1.03 (0.2) 1.00 (0.0) 1.00 (0.0) 1.00 (0.0) 1.00 (0.0) F(4,167)=0.98 
6 1.03 (0.2) 1.13 (0.5) 1.04 (0.2) 1.00 (0.0) 1.03 (0.2) F(4,168)=1.24 
7 1.58 (0.7) 1.66 (0.8) 1.32 (0.6) 1.48 (0.6) 1.68 (0.6) F(4,165)=1.48 
8 1.44 (0.7) 1.31 (0.5) 1.25 (0.6) 1.13 (0.3) 1.24 (0.6) F(4,167)=1.64 
9 1.16 (0.5) 1.06 (0.2) 1.21 (0.6) 1.15 (0.5) 1.08 (0.3) F(4,168)=0.64 
13 2.05 (0.8) 1.97 (0.8) 2.07 (0.9) 1.90 (0.8) 1.78 (0.8) F(4,170)=0.71 
19 1.97 (0.8) 1.97 (0.9) 2.11 (0.9) 1.78 (0.7) 1.68 (0.7) F(4,170)=1.53 
21 1.38 (0.6) 1.33 (0.5) 1.32 (0.6) 1.25 (0.4) 1.35 (0.5) F(4,170)=0.29 
23 1.86 (0.8) 1.94 (0.9) 2.07 (0.7) 1.82 (0.7) 1.86 (0.7) F(4,167)=0.54 
26 1.68 (0.8) 1.97 (0.8) 1.64 (0.8) 1.56 (0.7) 1.68 (0.7) F(4,169)=1.39 
29 1.05 (0.2) 1.18 (0.4) 1.11 (0.3) 1.10 (0.3) 1.16 (0.4) F(4,169)=0.87 
35 1.22 (0.5) 1.21 (0.5) 1.43 (0.6) 1.15 (0.4) 1.16 (0.4) F(4,170)=1.60 
36 2.19 (0.8) 1.97 (0.8) 2.32 (0.9) 2.03 (0.7) 2.00 (0.7) F(4,170)=1.20 
38 2.25 (0.9) 2.39 (0.8) 2.57 (0.6) 2.15 (0.8) 2.14 (0.8) F(4,169)=1.80 
40 1.22 (0.5) 1.36 (0.6) 1.14 (0.4) 1.23 (0.5) 1.39 (0.5) F(4,169)=1.42 
42 1.59 (0.8) 1.48 (0.8) 1.82 (0.8) 1.33 (0.6) 1.32 (0.5) F(4,170)=2.89* 
45 1.97 (0.7) 1.94 (0.7) 2.07 (0.8) 1.78 (0.6) 1.84 (0.6) F(4,169)=1.01 
47 1.68 (0.8) 1.73 (0.8) 1.54 (0.7) 1.58 (0.6) 1.84 (0.7) F(4,170)=0.91 
48 1.59 (0.7) 1.42 (0.6) 1.71 (0.5) 1.60 (0.6) 1.62 (0.6) F(4,170)=0.90 
54 1.14 (0.5) 1.24 (0.6) 1.14 (0.4) 1.08 (0.3) 1.05 (0.2) F(4,170)=1.12 
55 1.57 (0.7) 1.45 (0.5) 1.61 (0.6) 1.38 (0.6) 1.49 (0.7) F(4,170)=0.78 
59 1.11 (0.4) 1.15 (0.4) 1.25 (0.6) 1.30 (0.6) 1.32 (0.5) F(4,170)=1.32 
60 1.41 (0.6) 1.18 (0.5) 1.39 (0.6) 1.29 (0.5) 1.32 (0.5) F(4,168)=0.87 
62 1.11 (0.4) 1.09 (0.4) 1.18 (0.4) 1.00 (0.0) 1.00 (0.0) F(4,170)=2.29 
63 1.11 (0.4) 1.00 (0.0) 1.11 (0.4) 1.00 (0.0) 1.00 (0.0) F(4,169)=1.99 
64 2.30 (0.9) 2.09 (0.9) 2.43 (0.8) 2.17 (0.8) 2.05 (0.7) F(4,170)=1.11 
65 1.49 (0.7) 1.21 (0.5) 1.32 (0.6) 1.15 (0.4) 1.16 (0.4) F(4,170)=2.75* 
67 1.75 00.9 1.54 (0.7) 1.71 (0.8) 1.50 (0.6) 1.46 (0.7) F(4,169)=1.07 
70 1.24 (0.5) 1.21 (0.5) 1.29 (0.5) 1.20 (0.4) 1.14 (0.3) F(4,170)=0.53 
73 1.27 (0.6) 1.30 (0.5) 1.39 (0.6) 1.23 (0.5) 1.35 (0.5) F(4,170)=0.48 
78 2.00 (0.9) 1.73 (0.9) 2.21 (0.8) 1.65 (0.8) 1.81 (0.8) F(4,170)=2.32 
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C3: Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for males and 
females on selected FSSC-Il items with t test results: Experiment 1 
Item Females 	Males 
Factor 1: Fear of Death and Danger: 
13 Nuclear war 	 2.24 (0.76) 	1.95 (0.83) t(309)=3.23** 
23 Getting a serious illness 2.19 (0.69) 1.90 (0.75) t(306)=3.49** 
36 Being threatened with a gun 2.59 (0.60) 2.09 (0.77) t(309)=6.21** 
38 Not being able to breathe 2.48 (0.69) 2.28 (0.78) t(308)=2.32* 
45 Someone in my family 
having an accident 2.28 (0.67) 1.91 (0.67) t(306)=4.80** 
48 Someone in my family 
getting sick 1.98 (0.59) 1.59 (0.62) t(307)=5.58** 
64 AIDS 2.47 (0.72) 2.20 (0.82) t(309)=3.04** 
Factor 2: Fear of The Unknown 
8 Being in closed places 1.60 (0.66) 1.27 (0.55) t(306)=4.78** 
21 Being in a fight 1.74 (0.72) 1.33 (0.55) t(309)=5.79** 
35 Ghosts or spooky things 1.49 (0.69) 1.22 (0.49) 4309)=4.02** 
54 Rats 1.61 (0.71) 1.13 (0.41) t(309)=7.54** 
62 Thunder 1.29 (0.61) 1.07 (0.30) t(308)=4.19** 
Factor 3: Fear of Failure and Criticism 
1 Being teased 1.29 (0.50) 1.08 (0.29) t(308)=4.53** 
2 Rides like the big dipper 1.42 (0.60) 1.39 (0.58) t(307)=0.47ns 
7 Losing my friends 1.77 (0.66) 1.55 (0.67) t(303)=2.91** 
29 Making mistakes 1.28 (0.51) 1.12 (0.33) t(308)=3.32** 
40 Failing a test 1.43 (0.59) 1.27 (0.51) t(308)=2.62** 
47 Having no friends 1.90 (0.66) 1.67 (0.74) t(309)=2.75** 
55 Going to a new school 1.76 (0.65) 1.49 (0.61) t(308)=3.76** 
59 Sitting for a test 1.30 (0.53) 1.23 (0.50) t(308)=1.15ns 
60 Being bullied 1.65 (0.64) 1.32 (0.56) t(307)=4.94** 
73 Looking foolish 1.51 (0.62) 1.30 (0.55) t(309)=3.18** 
Factor 4: Psychic stress and medical fears 
9 Going to the doctor 1.26 (0.56) 1.13 (0.43) (307)=2.21* 
26 Having and operation 2.13 (0.77) 1.70 (0.77) (308)=4.90** 
63 Lizards 1.12 (0.37) 1.04 (0.25) (307)=2.23* 
70 Cemeteries 1.58 (0.70) 1.21 (0.44) (308)=5.67** 
Factor 5: Animal fears 
78 Sharks 2.29 (0.77) 1.86 (0.86) t(309)=4.51** 
*=p<0.05 
**=p<0.01 
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C4: Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for STAI and 
STAIC state anxiety by presentation condition and grade for 
baseline, the operation, shark, friends and neutral scenarios: 
Experiment 4 
Scenario Presentation Condition 
Positive Coping Threat Total 
Grade 
Baseline 
3 27.63 (3.8) 27.94 (4.7) 28.74 (4.0) 28.11 (4.1) 
5 30.56 (7.5) 27.59 (5.2) 29.35 (5.5) 29.23 (6.2) 
7 32.79 (7.7) 29.65 (5.7) 28.67 (3.7) 30.39 (6.1) 
Total 30.35 (6.9) 28.38 (5.2) 28.95 (4.5) 29.25 (5.7) 
10 35.10 (12.0) 33.83 (12.6) 32.13 (8.3) 33.61 (10.8) 
Operation Scenario 
3 33.63 (7.2) 45.56 (9.6) 49.50 (8.1) 42.96 (10.7) 
5 36.25 (10.3) 48.65 (6.9) 48.75 (9.4) 44.55 (10.6) 
7 45.11 (7.8) 48.50 (6.9) 48.06 (8.0) 47.23 (7.6) 
Total 38.29 (9.7) 47.64 (7.8) 48.79 (8.4) 44.91 (9.9) 
10 53.28 (12.7) 59.24 (17.0) 57.83 (15.5) 56.83 (15.1) 
Friends Scenario 
3 33.63 (7.5) 46.18 (8.0) 47.53 (9.8) 42.31(10.5) 
5 41.50 (8.3) 44.84 (8.2) 47.95 (11.0) 44.71 (9.5) 
7 42.89 (12.3) 43.50 (9.5) 50.88 (6.7) 45.48 (10.3) 
Total 39.32 (10.2) 44.77 (8.5) 48.67 (9.4) 44.17 (10.1) 
10 53.60 (15.3) 59.17 (14.8) 61.14 (14.4) 58.03 (14.9) 
Shark Scenario 
3 39.53 (12.1) 47.22 (12.5) 50.80 (7.8) 45.91 (11.8) 
5 45.04 (11.1) 48.42 (8.0) 51.21 (8.3) 47.92 (9.6) 
7 52.39 (7.1) 49.68 (6.7) 51.47 (7.1) 51.15 (6.9) 
Total 45.48 (11.4) 48.46 (9.2) 51.14 (7.6) 48.26 (9.9) 
10 59.85 (11.2) 63.59 (12.9) 65.05 (10.4) 62.86 (11.5) 
Neutral Scenario 
3 27.00 (6.1) 26.33 (4.7) 27.26 (7.2) 26.85 (6.0) 
5 27.35 (9.3) 26.39 (6.1) 25.32 (5.7) 26.37 (7.2) 
7 27.57 (4.2) 25.64 (4.9) 27.81 (4.8) 26.95 (4.7) 
Total 27.29 (7.6) 26.16 (5.2) 26.74 (6.1) 26.68 (6.2) 
10 27.25 (8.2) 31.56 (9.5) 29.00 (14.3) 29.94 (11.6) 
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C5: Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for STAI and 
STAIC state anxiety by gender for baseline, the operation, friends, 
shark and neutral scenarios: Experiment 4 
STAIC 
Female 	Male 
STAI 
Female 	Male 
Baseline 29.42 (6.0) 29.05 (5.3) 36.04 (4.8) 31.68 (11.4) 
Operation 46.60 (9.4) 42.96 (10.0) 59.62 (12.7) 54.56 (16.7) 
Friends 45.48 (9.5) 42.64 (10.7) 59.15 (13.6) 57.12 (16.1) 
Shark 50.30 (9.0) 45.76 (10.3) 66.31 (8.0) 60.15 (13.1) 
Neutral 26.81 (6.5) 26.55 (6.0) 35.67 (15.2) 25.86 (5.6) 
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C6: Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for the 
operation TCL positive, coping and threat scales by presentation 
condition and grade: Experiment 4 
Scenario Presentation Condition 
Positive Coping Threat Total 
Grade 
Positive Statements 
3 6.84 (2.9) 6.06 (2.5) 2.73 (2.0) 5.38 (3.0) 
5 4.80 (3.1) 4.05 (2.5) 4.37 (3.1) 4.41 (2.9) 
7 5.05 (2.9) 3.90 (2.3) 4.44 (2.2) 4.46 (2.5) 
10 5.22 (3.5) 4.47 (3.1) 5.50 (3.2) 5.11 (3.2) 
Total 5.47 (3.1) 4.59 (2.7) 4.39 (2.9) 4.82 (2.9) 
Coping Statements 
3 6.74 (1.3) 5.50 (2.9) 5.73 (2.2) 6.02 (2.2) 
5 4.20 (2.9) 5.55 (2.8) 6.63 (1.8) 5.44 (2.7) 
7 6.58 (1.9) 5.45 (2.7) 6.11 (2.0) 6.04 (2.2) 
10 4.33 (2.2) 4.82 (3.2) 4.91 (1.7) 4.70 (2.3) 
Total 5.46 (2.4) 5.35 (2.8) 5.81 (2.0) 5.54 (2.4) 
Threat Statements 
3 4.95 (3.2) 5.28 (3.1) 6.80 (2.3) 5.60 (3.0) 
5 4.70 (3.5) 6.05 (2.6) 6.53 (3.1) 5.75 (3.1) 
7 6.47 (3.2) 6.40 (2.8) 7.22 (2.5) 6.68 (2.8) 
10 4.50 (3.3) 5.41 (2.7) 5.73 (3.3) 5.25 (3.1) 
Total 5.16 (3.3) 5.81 (2.8) 6.51 (2.9) 5.82 (3.1) 
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C7: Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for the 
operation TCL scales by gender: Experiment 4 
Female Male 
Positive Statements 4.53 (2.7) 5.13 (3.1) 
Coping Statements 5.91 (2.5) 5.15 (2.3) 
Threat Statements 6.16 (3.0) 5.47 (3.1) 
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C8: Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for the friends 
TCL positive, coping and threat scales by presentation condition 
and grade: Experiment 4 
Scenario Presentation Condition 
Positive Coping Threat Total 
Grade 
Positive Statements 
3 6.79 (2.3) 4.47 (2.5) 3.42 (2.7) 4.91 (2.8) 
5 5.40 (2.5) 3.68 (2.7) 3.42 (3.7) 4.19 (3.1) 
7 4.53 (2.5) 3.84 (2.7) 3.63 (2.8) 4.02 (2.6) 
10 4.00 (2.6) 3.39 (2.9) 3.10 (2.7) 3.49 (2.7) 
Total 5.17 (2.7) 3.84 (2.7) 3.37 (2.9) 4.14 (2.9) 
Coping Statements 
3 6.37 (2.5) 6.94 (2.5) 4.95 (3.0) 6.05 (2.8) 
5 5.35 (2.9) 7.21 (2.3) 6.58 (2.1) 6.36 (2.6) 
7 7.21 (2.4) 7.42 (1.5) 6.13 (3.0) 6.96 (2.4) 
10 5.00 (2.6) 6.39 (2.1) 5.52 (1.9) 5.61 (2.2) 
Total 5.96 (2.7) 7.00 (2.1) 5.77 (2.5) 6.23 (2.5) 
Threat Statements 
3 4.32 (2.4) 5.41 (2.1) 6.32 (3.1) 5.35 (2.7) 
5 4.95 (3.4) 5.74 (3.0) 6.79 (3.7) 5.81 (3.4) 
7 7.26 (3.1) 6.53 (2.9) 6.50 (3.6) 6.78 (3.1) 
10 4.40 (3.6) 5.83 (2.5) 6.81 (3.3) 5.69 (3.3) 
Total 5.22 (3.3) 5.89 (2.6) 6.61 (3.3) 5.90 (3.2) 
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C9: Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for the friends 
TCL by gender: Experiment 4 
Female Male 
Positive Statements 3.72 (2.8) 4.58 (2.9) 
Coping Statements 6.55 (2.4) 5.90 (2.6) 
Threat Statements 6.29 (2.9) 5.48 (3.3) 
310 
Cl 0: Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for the shark 
TCL positive, coping and threat scales by presentation condition 
and grade: Experiment 4 
Scenario Presentation Condition 
Positive Coping Threat Total 
Grade 
Positive Statements 
3 5.55 (3.4) 3.28 (2.0) 3.45 (2.2) 3.86 (2.6) 
5 3.60 (3.2) 2.89 (2.6) 2.63 (2.7) 3.05 (2.8) 
7 2.89 (3.0) 3.16 (2.9) 2.71 (2.9) 2.93 (2.9) 
10 2.60 (2.8) 2.00 (2.5) 1.90 (2.0) 2.17 (2.4) 
Total 3.43 (3.2) 2.85 (2.5) 2.66 (2.5) 2.97 (2.7) 
Coping Statements 
3 8.18 (2.0) 8.61 (1.7) 7.35 (1.9) 8.00 (1.9) 
5 7.00 (2.5) 8.33 (1.7) 8.11 (1.4) 7.78 (1.9) 
7 8.33 (1.7) 7.63 (2.6) 7.41 (1.7) 7.80 (2.1) 
10 6.55 (2.7) 6.94 (2.0) 7.95 (1.9) 7.17 (2.3) 
Total 7.41 (2.4) 7.88 (2.0) 7.71 (1.7) 7.67 (2.1) 
Threat Statements 
3 6.27 (2.6) 7.89 (2.1) 7.20 (2.7) 7.24 (2.5) 
5 6.60 (2.6) 7.37 (2.5) 7.26 (3.1) 7.07 (2.7) 
7 8.22 (1.8) 6.58 (2.9) 8.00 (2.3) 7.57 (2.5) 
10 6.70 (2.7) 7.18 (2.3) 8.10 (2.7) 7.34 (2.6) 
Total 7.00 (2.5) 7.25 (2.5) 7.64 (2.7) 7.31 (2.6) 
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C11: Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for the shark 
TCL by gender: Experiment 4 
Female Male 
Positive Statements 2.45 (2.5) 3.51 (2.9) 
Coping Statements 8.16 (1.5) 7.16 (2.4) 
Threat Statements 7.90 (2.3) 6.68 (2.7) 
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C12: Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for STAIC p-
state anxiety by grade and presentation condition for baseline, the 
operation, shark, friends and neutral scenarios: Experiment 4 
Scenario Presentation Condition 
Positive Coping External Total 
Grade 
Baseline 
3 16.79 (3.9) 16.67 (4.1) 17.74 (3.2) 17.07 (3.7) 
5 17.75 (5.0) 16.50 (3.9) 18.40 (4.1) 17.55 (4.4) 
7 19.71 (3.8) 19.55 (5.4) 18.22 (3.6) 19.20 (4.3) 
Total 18.13 (4.4) 17.60 (4.7) 18.12 (3.6) 18.12 (4.2) 
Operation 
3 20.16 (4.9) 26.00 (3.9) 27.45 (3.8) 24.56 (5.3) 
5 20.75 (6.1) 28.05 (2.5) 27.40 (3.3) 25.40 (5.4) 
7 24.86 (4.8) 27.55 (3.0) 27.06 (3.3) 26.44 (4.0) 
Total 22.00 (5.6) 27.24 (3.3) 27.31 (3.4) 25.48 (4.9) 
Friends 
3 20.74 (4.7) 25.82 (4.2) 27.00 (5.0) 24.47 (5.4) 
5 23.95 (5.3) 27.55 (3.5) 26.50 (4.7) 25.98 (4.7) 
7 24.85 (4.8) 25.90 (4.9) 28.31 (2.8) 26.21 (4.5) 
Total 23.22 (5.2) 26.46 (4.3) 27.23 (4.3) 25.57 (4.9) 
Shark 
3 22.89 (6.8) 27.78 (4.2) 28.70 (3.3) 26.47 (5.5) 
5 26.10 (3.8) 27.90 (3.2) 27.50 (4.2) 27.16 (3.8) 
7 28.68 (2.4) 28.00 (2.8) 27.65 (3.7) 28.13 (3.0) 
Total 25.90 (5.2) 27.89 (3.4) 27.98 (3.7) 27.24 (4.3) 
Neutral 
3 16.27 (4.7) 15.39 (3.8) , 15.74 (4.4) 17.73 (4.2) 
5 14.75 (6.2) 16.43 (5.0) 15.08 (5.3) 15.34 (5.5) 
7 15.83 (3.4) 16.69 (4.5) 16.64 (5.7) 16.50 (4.6) 
Total 15.39 (5.0) 15.56 (4.4) 15.49 (4.7) 15.37 (4.7) 
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C13: Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for STAIC n-
state anxiety by grade and presentation condition for neutral, the 
operation, shark, friends and neutral scenarios: Experiment 4 
Scenario Presentation Condition 
Positive Coping External Total 
Grade 
Baseline 
3 10.74 (1.2) 11.22 (2.0) 11.00 (2.0) 11.46 (2.9) 
5 12.37 (4.2) 10.85 (1.9) 11.20 (2.1) 11.54 (3.0) 
7 12.86 (4.4) 10.85 (1.8) 10.78 (1.2) 10.98 (1.8) 
Total 12.02 (3.7) 10.97 (1.9) 11.00 (1.8) 11.33 (2.6) 
Operation 
3 13.47 (2.9) 19.28 (6.0) 23.00 (6.4) 18.65 (6.6) 
5 15.50 (5.9) 20.45 (5.5) 21.35 (6.3) 19.10 (6.4) 
7 19.00 (5.1) 20.95 (4.9) 21.00 (5.1) 20.27 (5.1) 
Total 16.08 (5.3) 20.26 (5.4) 21.81 (6.0) 19.35 (6.0) 
Friends 
3 12.78 (3.5) 19.41 (5.5) 20.58 (5.9) 17.61 (6.1) 
5 17.50 (5.4) 18.95 (6.2) 19.78 (6.6) 18.71 (6.0) 
7 20.65 (8.1) 17.50 (5.4) 21.94 (5.1) 19.89 (6.6) 
Total 17.12 (6.8) 18.58 (5.7) 20.72 (5.9) 18.75 (6.3) 
Shark 
3 16.63 (5.8) 22.67 (6.3) 22.05 (5.3) 20.44 (6.3) 
5 21.40 (7.1) 21.37 (6.0) 22.39 (6.2) 21.70 (6.4) 
7 23.70 (4.9) 21.74 (4.8) 23.94 (4.3) 23.11 (4.7) 
Total 20.64 (6.6) 21.91 (5.6) 22.75 (5.3) 21.74 (5.9) 
Neutral 
3 10.73 (1.7) 10.94 (1.8) 10.53 (1.0) 10.73 (1.5) 
5 11.55 (4.5) 11.00 (1.5) 11.08 (2.5) 11.26 (3.2) 
7 11.33 (2.8) 10.08 (0.3) 10.18 (0.6) 10.37 (1.3) 
Total 11.35 (3.4) 11.10 (2.4) 11.80 (3.5) 11.68 (3.6) 
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C14: ANOVA results for STAIC p-state anxiety by gender, presentation condition and grade for baseline, the 
operation, shark and friends and neutral scenarios: Experiment 4 
Baseline Operation Friends Shark Neutral 
Gender F(1, 157)=1.59 F(1, 158)=8.21* F(1, 151)=5.93* F(1, 152)=11.29* F(1, 107)=1.12 
Presentation F(2, 157)=0.19 F(2, 158)=33.56* F(2, 151)=12.70* F(2, 152)=5.64* F(2, 107)=0.57 
Grade F(2, 157)=0.24 F(3, 158)=2.95 F(3, 151)=2.71 F(3, 152)=2.61 F(3, 107)=0.12 
Grade x Gender F(2, 157)=0.32 F(2, 158)=0.09 F(2, 151)=0.72 F(2, 152)=3.51* F(2, 107)=1.09 
Grade x Presentation F(4, 157)=0.52 F(4, 158)=2.97* F(4, 151)=2.27 F(4, 152)=5.03* F(4, 107)=0.56 
Gender x Presentation F(2, 157)=0.92 F(2, 158)=0.17 F(2, 151)=0.38 F(2, 152)=2.28 F(2, 107)=0.67 
Grade x Gender x Presentation F(4, 157)=0.40 F(4, 158)=1.10 F(4, 151)=3.07* F(4, 152)=2.06 F(4, 107)=0.79 
•p<0.05 
C15: ANOVA results for STAIC n-state anxiety by gender, presentation condition and grade for baseline, the 
operation, shark and friends and neutral scenarios: Experiment 4 
Baseline Operation Friends Shark Neutral 
Gender F(1, 156)=0.00 F(1, 158)=7.36* F(1, 150)=0.43 F(1, 150)=12.79* F(1, 107)=0.64 
Presentation F(2, 156)=2.66 F(2, 158)=17.94* F(2, 150)=5.57* F(2, 150)=2.51 F(2, 107)=0.17 
Grade F(2, 156)=0.69 F(3, 158)=1.27 F(3, 150)=2.65 F(3, 150)=3.19 F(3, 107)=0.88 
Grade x Gender F(2, 156)=0.37 F(2, 158)=0.17 F(2, 150)=1.59 F(2, 150)=2.07 F(2, 107)=0.64 
Grade x Presentation F(4, 156)=1.38 F(4, 158)=0.14 F(4, 150)=0.49 F(4, 150)=1.51 F(4, 107)=0.60 
Gender x Presentation F(2, 156)=0.10 F(2, 158)=2.40 F(2, 150)=4.73* F(2, 150)=3.18* F(2, 107)=0.12 
Grade x Gender x Presentation F(4, 156)=0.33 F(4, 158)=0.70 F(4, 150)=4.74* F(4, 150)=1.57 F(4, 152)=0.06 
*p<0.05 
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